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Abstract 
 
The thesis I hope to develop here aims to contribute to recent 
discussions in ethics on the merits of anger. In particular, it focuses on the 
debate between moderationists, who contend that anger is, in some way, 
good, and thus should be retained and utilised, and eliminativists, who 
contend that anger should be eliminated, i.e. that we should never allow it to 
arise. By the end of this thesis, I hope that I have shown that (despite its 
current popularity) the moderationist defence of anger is not without its 
difficulties. This should hopefully carve out a space for a contemporary 
defence of eliminativism. The eliminativist view I defend is essentially 
Buddhist, though it also draws upon Buddhist-inspired accounts in the 
Western philosophical literature. I advocate a pedagogical reading of the 
difficult (and perhaps seemingly unattractive) Buddhist metaphysics, that I 
suggest — when put into practice — might eventually lead to an openness to 
that metaphysical view. The consequence of both the practice and the 
metaphysical outlook is the elimination of anger. Far from being the loss of 
something beneficial or apt, I suggest that the elimination of anger is both 
beneficial and (from the metaphysical viewpoint) apt. I attempt to 
demonstrate this by applying the position I defend to the kind of case where 
moderationists are at their most persuasive — cases of social injustice. I 
hope to have at least shown that such a position can be a viable alternative 
to the moderationist suggestion that we harness anger for social change. 
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Introduction: 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
 
Chapter 1: Buddhist Characterisation of Anger 
 
Chapter 1 surveys the Buddhist characterisation of anger (focusing 
specifically on the Indian Buddhist tradition). I first note the multitude of 
difficulties we face when attempting to work with texts that pose linguistic 
and cultural barriers to interpretation. The central concept under 
consideration — ANGER — is shown to pose many difficulties as an object of 
study, simply in virtue of the nature of the texts. Translations from different 
source languages (Pāli, Sanskrit, Tibetan etc.) often yield different results — 
sometimes the same passage is interpreted as discussing ‘hatred’ rather than 
‘anger’, for example. As such, a rather broad approach is taken, 
incorporating all anger-related terms just as long as the topic seems to 
broadly match a familiar phenomenology of anger. Taking this 
phenomenology-centred approach, I suggest, helps us to ensure that we are 
dealing with the same emotion across both Buddhist texts and those from 
Western literature. 
 
 This approach thus relies upon a focus on the occasions of anger in 
the Buddhist texts, i.e. situations that give a description of the circumstances 
under which the emotion arises. That way we can hopefully avoid some of 
the linguistic ambiguities posed in translation. Of course, there may still be 
some cultural difficulties that cannot be overcome using this method — for 
instance, a Westerner may not understand why a Thai might be angry when 
you point and gesture towards the TV remote with your foot, rather than 
your hand. However, many of the occasions of anger described in the 
Buddhist text provide examples of situations in which we can be highly 
confident are associated with the emotion we are focused on. Characterising 
anger by examining the occasions of anger, the accompanying 
phenomenological character, and its effects as they appear in the Buddhist 
literature is also a deliberate attempt to avoid imposing a twenty-first-
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century Anglo-European understanding of anger onto our reading of these 
texts. 
 
 The characterisation of the occasions of anger that emerges in the 
first chapter is that anger occurs when we perceive ourselves, or something 
or someone we value, to be harmed. Sometimes the cause of this harm can 
be impersonal — such as when we are irritated constantly by mosquitos, 
provoking our anger. At other times, the cause is personal — such as when 
someone insults us, or physically assaults us. What is notably absent in the 
Buddhist texts is any discussion of social injustice; the examples found in the 
texts are typically centred on the individual. This is perhaps unsurprising 
given the meditative or pedagogical purpose of many Buddhist texts, 
however. Moreover, the Buddhist characterisation of occasions of anger also 
leans on the notion of perception, i.e. what we perceive as harmful to us. 
This emphasis on perception reflects the possibility that we can sometimes 
get it wrong when it comes to anger — sometimes we believe we have been 
harmed, when we haven’t, or we believe that person A harmed us, when it 
was person B etc. However, we see in later chapters that the Buddhist 
Eliminativists don’t concern themselves with this particular kind of epistemic 
error, but with what they see as a much deeper and more significant kind 
arising from their distinctive metaphysical position. 
 
 Chapter 1 goes on to outline a variety of phenomenological aspects 
of anger. Firstly, I discuss the association of anger and pain. Discussions of 
anger are rife with fire metaphors, expressing the unpleasantness of the 
experience of anger. Similarly, metaphors of poison abound. On the 
Buddhist view, we see that anger is associated with a mental pain which 
operates over and above whatever pain comes directly from the harm we 
have suffered. However, we see that anger can also be associated with 
pleasure. In one Buddhist text, anger is described as having a “poisoned root 
and honeyed tip.” This acknowledges that anger, or at least some aspects of 
anger, can be pleasurable — for instance, anticipating revenge — but the 
scarcity of examples in the Buddhist texts discussing examples of pleasure 
(there is, in fact, just a single example) reveal a lot about the Buddhist 
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conception of anger. Even this single example sees anger’s roots as 
poisonous, so the pleasure does not come without suffering. 
 
 Two further phenomenological aspects of anger are identified and 
discussed. Anger is shown to have a conative aspect i.e. it desires something. 
The Buddhist texts focus specifically on our desire for the suffering of the 
wrongdoer, however they are quick to stress that this suffering will not be 
brought about by our desires but instead by their own transgressions. Our 
desire might be for some awful fate to befall an enemy, or it might be a 
desire for an apology, but each involves some harm to the subject. We also 
seem to desire to end our own suffering, whether that involves avoiding the 
cause of it, or destroying that cause. Since anger involves desire, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that we often also see anger characterised as intentional i.e. 
‘about’ or directed towards someone or something. However, I suggest that 
we need not see it as such, particularly when we consider anger as a mood. 
Under those circumstances, anger comes to alter the way we experience or 
perceive the world, and can encourage us to become angry at or about 
specific things. I suggest that this is one reason why anger is so troubling to 
the Buddhist — it is not the correct way in which to experience or perceive 
the world. 
 
 The final aspect of anger that is discussed in the opening chapter is 
the physical aspect. Anger is accompanied by some well-known physical 
symptoms — trembling, clenching of fists, a flushed face etc. These bodily 
changes can be connected to a readiness to act (e.g. by taking revenge) but 
the Buddhist discussions of anger tend towards anger’s dispositions and 
tendencies, rather than the actions themselves. Of course, it is possible to 
hide one’s anger too, and this is perhaps a good reason to focus on anger’s 
dispositions rather than its outward symptoms. Moreover, the elimination of 
anger amounts to more than simply not displaying anger, or behaving 
angrily, but instead of not allowing anger to arise in the first place. It is this 
position that is central to eliminativist thought, and thus the position I 
defend in this thesis. It is at this point, then, that I turn my attention to their 
arguments. 
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Chapter 2: Buddhist Arguments for the Elimination of 
Anger 
 
My second chapter serves a dual function. Firstly, it provides the rest 
of the background context for the arguments I make in chapters three, four 
and five. Secondly, it outlines the existing arguments for eliminativism in the 
Indian Buddhist texts. The first piece of contextual discussion is regarding 
the Buddhist understanding of happiness, and its relationship to enlightenment. 
There is not a singular understanding of happiness in the Buddhist tradition, 
just as there is not in the Western tradition, but we see that it is a concept 
perhaps much closer to the idea of wellbeing than it is to happiness in the 
hedonistic sense. As such, it connects very closely to the goal of 
enlightenment, which we see is the cessation of suffering. Anger, since it is 
seen by Buddhists as a kind of suffering, is an impediment to both happiness 
and enlightenment. Moreover, we see that enlightenment involves both 
moral and epistemic factors, and so anger is also seen as an impediment 
both to our moral development and to our ability to correctly perceive the 
world. This observation is important in developing my own Buddhist-
inspired argument for eliminativism. 
 
Another distinction needs to be drawn to help contextualise my 
discussion — that between moderationism and eliminativism. Chapter 2 
outlines this distinction, highlighting that the positions can actually run very 
closely to one another in many ways, despite appearing on the surface as 
positions that are somewhat binary. Moderationists, we see, do not attempt 
to defend all types of anger, and certainly not anger in every situation. 
Instead, their position defends very specific kinds of anger, or anger which 
has been ‘transformed’. We pick back up on the types of moderationism in 
more depth in Chapter 3. Eliminativism, by contrast, thinks that anger 
should be rooted out. Some Buddhist eliminativist positions are quite 
forceful in their discussions, showing no sympathy at all for the 
moderationist view, even under quite extreme circumstances (such as being 
chopped up alive by our enemies). Yet other eliminativists appear to have a 
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slightly softer stance on anger, offering guidance on what to do with anger 
when it does arise, yet explicitly cautioning against allowing this to happen 
in the first place.  
 
There are many reasons given by the eliminativist, and we can 
broadly categorise these into three main types of argument. They essentially 
fall under three broad claims: (1) that our actual experience of anger shows it 
to be both unpleasant and unhelpful, (2) that anger impairs our moral 
development by hindering the cultivation of specific virtues, and (3) that 
anger follows from an epistemic or cognitive error. The focus in this chapter 
is primarily on the first type of claim, since the second and third kind relate 
directly to the discussions in the subsequent chapters in which I establish my 
opposition to moderationism and offer a defence of eliminativism. My 
discussion of this first type of argument against anger invokes some recent 
empirical evidence in support of the sorts of claims we saw the Buddhists 
make about anger in Chapter 1. The evidence suggests that it is true that 
anger can occasionally be pleasant, but it is also true that anger typically 
involves physiological changes associated with the fight or flight response, 
and triggers behaviour which can be harmful to ourselves, our relationships, 
and those around us. This can impact on both personal relationships and 
public ones — such as when we are running for political office, or trying to 
bring about social change via a movement. As a consequence, anger can 
make us unhappy, and thus impair our path to enlightenment, i.e. the 
elimination of suffering. 
 
This is where the connection between happiness and enlightenment 
is key. It is clear that happiness is a goal that virtually everyone shares, 
whereas enlightenment may well only be desired by a small number of 
people. However, if the Buddhists can persuade people that anger impairs 
happiness, they can also set them on the path to enlightenment — a sort of 
‘bait-and-switch’ strategy which is common in their texts. I ultimately 
employ a version of this strategy in my own argument in Chapter 4. Part of 
the explanation of anger’s impairment to our pursuit of happiness comes in 
the ways that it clouds our judgement, or affects our ability to see things 
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clearly. This point is made in Seneca’s work too, which emphasises the ways 
in which anger can undermine our rationality. Without being able to 
comprehend the world in the right sorts of ways, it is clearly much harder to 
know how to go about pursuing happiness. So what, then, should we do to 
pursue a life without anger? We see that the Buddhist does not simply 
advocate eliminating anger, but instead replacing anger with virtue. The 
Buddhist emphasises patience as a key virtue in this regard. Those who are 
genuinely interested in their moral development can utilise occasions of 
anger as opportunities to develop virtues like patience; and since this directly 
contributes to happiness, from the Buddhist perspective, the same argument 
applies to anyone who wishes to pursue that goal. And, in turn, this places us 
on the path towards enlightenment. 
 
This, of course, speaks only of our moral development, and the path 
to enlightenment (as suggested above) also involves an epistemological 
aspect. For the Buddhist, the issue with anger is (fundamentally) that it 
follows from, and perpetuates, an incorrect perception of the world. Briefly 
put, here’s how the argument goes: anger is a manifestation of an epistemic 
failure to recognise the world as it actually is; oneself and other agents, as 
well as our surroundings, are impermanent, interdependent, and lacking of 
essence i.e. they are (ultimately) not real; since anger involves one’s being 
angry at some agent, because of some harm they have caused oneself or 
one’s property, valued possessions, etc., then anger is irrational because 
one’s beliefs do not correspond with the truth. This argument invokes what 
is known as the ‘no-self’ (or ‘not-self) thesis from Buddhism, and this lies at 
the heart of Buddhist eliminativism. The success of this view, then, will 
depend upon somehow persuading people to accept this sort of metaphysical 
view, and my own argument will attempt to accomplish just that (or, at least, 
offer a method for doing so). 
 
In addition to the metaphysical notion of ‘no-self’, the Buddhist also 
invokes the notion of dependent arising: that all things are inevitably 
affected by something else, and at the same time themselves become the 
factors that affect other things. This principle helps explain one of the 
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difficulties when trying to identify the causes of harm: we can say that a 
person harmed me, but that person’s actions were dependent upon other 
things, perhaps even including my own actions towards them. In order to 
get rid of anger, but also to come to understand why we ought to get rid of 
anger, we must come to see the world as made up of these interconnected 
chains of events and actions. However, it is not enough to simply be aware 
of the metaphysical truths (as the Buddhist would have them); one must also 
act in accordance with them. Thus, a successful eliminativist argument 
should offer some instructions as to how to do this (which I hope to do 
within this thesis). 
 
Our final task in Chapter 2 is to remind ourselves of the central aim 
for Buddhism — enlightenment. This amounts to a cessation of suffering. 
For the Buddhist, life is suffering. We don’t tend to think of things in this 
way — we tend to think that sometimes we suffer, but we always have 
(hopefully many) good times too. However, the Buddhist notion of suffering 
is broad, and in effect suggests that they see even the good times as tinged by 
suffering. In part, this is because of the temporary nature of things: good 
things must end, or they cannot remain good forever. This, like the Buddhist 
position on anger, follows from the principle of dependent arising. If we 
truly understand the nature of our happiest moments, then we understand 
that they (like everything else) depend upon others things, and many of those 
things will be outside of our control. Thus, clinging to our desires — whose 
fulfillment would bring us happiness — actually engenders suffering. 
Moreover, we too are subject to the principle of dependent arising, and so 
are being made to suffer, since we cannot act without being acted upon. 
This suffering is thus deeply rooted, operating as it does at the metaphysical 
level — even when we are at our happiest, this fact remains, and so we 
suffer. 
 
However, despite its deep-rootedness, suffering is not inescapable. 
Because suffering must have causes, then it must be possible to bring about a 
cessation of suffering by identifying those causes and eliminating them. The 
Buddhists conclude that certain mental attitudes are the cause for suffering, 
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and this is where the focus of this thesis comes in — anger. While we might 
not be able to alter the fundamental structure of reality, we can alter our 
approach to it, and thus at least some suffering is eliminable by us. In 
particular, what we can seek to eliminate are our desires (they are many, and 
chasing them can be exhausting); and since anger is intimately connected to 
desire (Chapter 1), we can also seek to eliminate anger. The first step 
towards doing this comes in understanding the no-self thesis and putting it to 
use. If we can do this, we will understand that there is no real need for 
desires — something cannot become my desire if there is no self to attach 
that desire to. 
 
Of course, relying on such an unusual metaphysical picture may 
make the Buddhist eliminativist view initially unappealing to a non-Buddhist 
audience (or perhaps one simply disinterested in metaphysics). This means 
that the argument that I develop must approach this problem pragmatically, 
by aiming to make people open to the Buddhist position. This need not 
involve a direct defence of the metaphysics — indeed, I am perhaps not 
qualified to do so, and it would require a separate thesis to even begin such a 
project. Instead, I will try to develop an argument which utilises the 
metaphysics for pedagogical reasons, and sees the project of persuasion as 
one which might take some time! Before getting to that argument, however, 
it is necessary to see something more of the position which I am opposing — 
Moderationism. It is to this view that I turn in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Moderationist Arguments for Anger 
 
Moderationist accounts, we see in Chapter 3, take varied approaches 
to the defence of anger. Broadly speaking, those approaches involve either (i) 
attempting to suggest that anger can be beneficial just so long as we can 
transform it, shaking off what are seen as its negative qualities while 
retaining its positive ones, or (ii) defending anger from a position of ‘aptness’, 
i.e. whether we have proper reason to be angry (regardless of its 
consequences). I examine moderationist accounts in Chapter 3 that take 
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both sorts of approach, and attempt to suggests some shortcomings of those 
accounts in order to create a space in the discussion for a defence of 
eliminativism. 
 
‘Transformation of anger’ covers a broad variety of means. In some 
cases, it is simply an attempt to distance anger from its negative associations, 
such as violence, or the desire to harm others, while retaining its ‘energising 
effects’ (i.e. its tendency to motivate action) so that they might be put to 
good use. In many cases, the transformation process (how to do this) is 
unclear, partially because those accounts are not strictly philosophical 
examination. As such, those accounts are left open to concerns about 
whether the transformative process actually eliminates anger by removing its 
essential features, or whether it leaves too broad a list of positive qualities 
such that other emotions like compassion or generosity might well lay claim 
to the same benefits (e.g. they too are ‘energising’). However, we do see a 
more systematic attempt to explain transformation from Buddhist 
moderationist Emily McRae. 
 
McRae describes a kind of anger that she calls ‘Tantric anger’. This 
anger is not feigned, but instead is normal anger that has undergone a 
‘metabolising process’ which retains the energising effects, desire to act, and 
outward focus of normal anger, following therapising meditative and 
contemplative practices. These practices give us control over our anger, so 
that we can choose to deploy it or not, and when it is so deployed it aims to 
help rather than harm others. The meditative practices McRae seems to 
have in mind are those that help us come to accept the Buddhist ‘no-self’ 
thesis. This sort of anger, McRae argues, has a unique capacity for 
recognising wrongdoing that is absent in the sorts of alternatives just 
suggested above — compassion, generosity, patience etc. 
 
In making this case, McRae leans on the example of a Holocaust 
survivor who suggests that seeing the anger of his rescuer restored the lost 
humanity to his situation. However, I argue that it is not clear that McRae’s 
account makes the best sense of this situation. Instead, I suggest, that what is 
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restorative of humanity here is sympathy, or common feeling — the victim 
recognises his own anger in the rescuer. Moreover, I suggest that McRae is 
too quick to dismiss the alternatives to anger here. This comes about 
because she works outwards from the observation that we do get angry, to 
the question of what we should do with anger. This, I suggest, bypasses the 
central point of discussion between moderationists and eliminativists, i.e. 
whether or not we should get angry. If anger’s alternatives are a better 
response to these sorts of situation than Tantric anger, then we might very 
well still be able to argue for the elimination of anger altogether. Moreover, 
McRae’s use of the no-self thesis leads her to a radically different conclusion 
than the one drawn by the eliminativist when they consider the same thesis. 
McRae claims that the no-self thesis leads to our understanding that it is 
futile to desire to harm others, since there are no other selves, just as there is 
no self; thus, she suggests, we should retain anger in the absence of this 
desire. However, eliminativists draw upon the same no-self thesis and draw 
the conclusion that anger itself is futile; thus, why retain it at all? The answer 
might lie in the supposed advantages of anger. It is to this issue that we turn 
next.  
 
Moderationist arguments tend to claim four kinds of benefits for 
anger: Evaluative, Epistemic, Communicative and Motivational. However, 
these claims, I suggest, do not stand up to scrutiny. Firstly, the Evaluative 
claim states that if we truly value X, we will become angry when X is 
harmed. However, I suggest that this is not always the case — anger and 
value come apart in a number of ways. The Epistemic claim suggests that 
anger helps us recognise the morally salient features of our situation. Yet, 
when we consider a variety of empirical evidence, that turns out to not be 
the case — anger, in fact, simultaneously clouds our judgement and gives us 
false confidence in its accuracy. The Communicative claim suggests that 
anger lets others know what we value, expect or demand. I argue, rather, 
that anger makes others unwilling to listen, and often causes us to say things 
we do not mean, thus obstructing communication at both ends. Finally, the 
Motivational claim suggests that anger can move us to defend what we care 
about. However, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this energising 
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effect of anger is often misdirected, and that oppressed communities are the 
authors of some alarming statistics on ways in which their anger is frequently 
self-directed. 
 
There is, however, another kind of moderationist argument that does 
not focus on its benefits, but instead on the aptness of anger. This argument 
is put forward by Srinivasan, who suggests that focusing on the productivity 
of anger overlooks its intrinsic value. If I try to persuade you to eliminate 
your anger over your partner’s betrayal on the grounds that getting angry is 
only likely to make them do it again, then I’m simply missing the point. I 
should really be focusing on your reasons for anger. I do not fully address 
this view here, in part because it requires looking back at the Buddhist 
metaphysical position, and a more suitable opportunity to do so comes in 
Chapter 4 while developing my own eliminativist argument. However, I do 
offer some preliminary responses, which is to suggest that the Buddhist 
eliminativist need not disagree with Srinivasan: seeking to understand the 
reasons for someone’s anger is a matter of compassion, which is an 
important virtue in the Buddhist moral system. The question of whether or 
not a person’s anger is apt can only be dealt with by reference to the 
metaphysical view, and so that particular issues is pushed back until the next 
chapter. 
 
The final consideration in the chapter is regarding the moderationist 
application of the concepts of anger and compassion. The particular 
concern here is with the way these concepts are related in moderationist 
accounts, though I do not press this issue other than to raise some questions 
for the moderationist to consider. The central issue is with accounts that 
attempt to ground anger in compassion. On the surface, these seem like two 
concepts that could conflict in a variety of ways, and I raise some of those 
issues at the end of Chapter 3. Although I think many of these issues could 
be addressed by the moderationist, the general strategy here is to help clear 
some room in the discussion for a defence of eliminativism, a view with few 
defenders in the contemporary literature. Hopefully, by the end of Chapter 
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3, this has been accomplished to some degree. As such, I turn in the 
following chapter to developing a positive thesis in favour of eliminativism. 
 
 
Chapter 4: In Defence of Eliminativism 
 
Chapter 4 begins by reminding us of the dual challenges of 
moderationism: (1) that anger can have positive effects in the world, and that 
(2) even if it doesn’t, it is still an apt moral attitude, thus worth preserving. 
The former challenge, at this point, has been met to some degree — we 
have seen in Chapter 3 that moderationists overstate the case for anger’s 
positive effects, and we have also seen that alternative responses 
(compassion, generosity, etc.) actually do yield the positive effects they claim 
on behalf of anger and so should be preferred. The second concern above, 
that of aptness, has only been partially addressed at this point, and Chapter 
4 seeks to offer a broader response to this concern from a Buddhist 
eliminativist perspective. As we shall see, this response depends upon an 
understanding of the Buddhist metaphysics, and the role this plays in the 
elimination of anger. 
 
The aim is this thesis is certainly not to offer a defence of the 
metaphysics, but rather to explicate the role that it plays in the eliminativist 
argument. Chapter 2 set out many of the key notions, and we return to 
those here — specifically the ideas of dependent arising and no-self. In 
Chapter 4 we look at these ideas as they are deployed by Śāntideva in his 
eliminativist argument, and attempt to deal with what can seem like some 
troubling passages in his work — troubling both for the difficulties they 
present in understanding them, but troubling also for what seem like the 
victim-blaming nature of his discussion of wrongdoing. Śāntideva utilises 
dependent arising and no-self to arrive at a position where we are urged to 
consider a situation in which we are harmed as one in which we actually do 
the harming. Making sense of this is also a matter of trying to build a more 
appealing version of eliminativism — or else we will not win over anyone to 
the cause of eliminating anger. I attempt to do this in this chapter. 
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 If Buddhist texts are intended to appeal to a mass audience, we have 
to assume that not everyone coming to those texts will be familiar with their 
metaphysical view, nor will they necessarily be open to it. As such, Buddhist 
eliminativist views based upon this distinctive metaphysics must offer some 
way of winning over even those who may be initially sceptical. One way to 
do this is to suggest that the metaphysical view can be treated as a 
pedagogical tool — rather than reading the texts as literal descriptions of 
reality, we can begin by asking what it is that the metaphysics is intended to 
make us consider. The principle of dependent arising, I suggest, as it appears 
in Śāntideva, is intended to instruct us to consider harmful actions from a 
broader perspective. Śāntideva urges us to think of wrongdoers as we do 
impersonal causes — as things which are acted upon by factors beyond their 
control. Doing so is intended to bring about a different way of perceiving the 
world — a way which prevents anger from arising. 
 
 The account I give advocates for the development of the patient 
perspective: seeing wrongdoing towards us as enmeshed in the broadest set of 
interdependent causes that we can bring ourselves to do. This perspective 
brings in impersonal causes to contextualise the personal ones that we 
ordinarily focus on in cases of wrongdoing. For example, if someone were to 
cut me off in traffic, I could focus on the actions of the careless driver and 
the harm done to me, and as a result I could become angry. However, if I 
can come to understand those actions against a broader set of facts e.g. that 
he could have a pregnant wife giving birth in the back seat, that years of 
underfunding of the NHS has led to a shortage of ambulances, etc. then 
anger need not arise. That is to say, if I approach my drive with this sort of 
patience, then any driver who cuts me off will fail to anger me since I come 
to see the wrongdoer as not only acting upon me, but as acted upon by 
circumstances beyond his control (i.e. he is in a state of suffering; see 
Chapter 2). As I broaden my perspective, the personal causes become less 
significant, undermining the importance of considerations of agency (who 
did what to whom). Moreover, the eliminativist view is not restricted to 
simply stopping anger from arising (though that is its aim), it also seeks to 
replace anger with a positive response i.e. with virtues like compassion, 
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generosity, etc. The patient perspective, by stopping anger from arising, 
creates space for these virtues to operate. In turn, these virtues can reinforce 
aspects of the Buddhist metaphysical picture. For instance, generosity can 
lead to us giving up our personal possessions, and thus reducing further the 
significance of considerations of the self. By engaging with the texts in this 
way, we gradually move closer to an openness to the possibility of the truth 
of the metaphysical view, since the reward for prevention of anger is the 
reduction of suffering. 
 
 Applying the principle of dependent arising in regulating our 
experience of the world might be seen by aptness-moderationists as falling 
foul of the concerns they highlighted in Chapter 3. However, I argue that 
this is not the case. Instead, I argue, the broadening of perspective that the 
pedagogical reading of the principle of dependent arising leads to actually 
helps us make better sense of the criteria for aptness. Since the concern here 
is whether our reasons are properly connected to our emotional response 
(anger), a broader set of considerations allows us to better answer that 
question. However, a consequence of the broad perspective is also that we 
find few, if any, instances of apt anger. Where anger might first appear to be 
apt, a broader set of considerations should reveal that it is not. However, the 
metaphysical view can eliminate even the possibility of aptness, should it in 
fact be true. Since the principle of dependent arising and the no-self thesis 
undermine our ability to stabilise ascriptions of agency, certain kinds of 
reasons (e.g. ‘I am angry because X unjustly harmed me’) simply cannot 
function in the way the aptness-moderationist wants them to. Thus, if one 
accepts the Buddhist metaphysical view, then one also accepts that there is 
no objective way in which anger can be apt. This need not lead to 
callousness on the part of the Buddhist eliminativist — they can still respond 
compassionately, both to the angry person’s perceived wrongdoing, and 
towards the epistemic failure which underpins this perception. 
 
 Accepting the Buddhist metaphysics thus amounts to a radical shift 
in the way we do our moral reasoning. Familiar notions like agency and 
justice appear to be de-stabilised in ways about which many would feel 
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uncomfortable. However, since the moderationist depends on an alternative 
metaphysics, and the focus here is not to adjudicate between these, we must 
leave this debate unsettled. Instead, we turn our focus in the final chapter to 
the arena in which moderationist views are at their most powerful, and 
about which Buddhist eliminativist views are typically quietist — systemic 
social injustice. 
 
 
Chapter 5: Eliminativism and Social Injustice 
 
Chapter 5 turns to the issue of social injustice, focusing specifically 
on a contemporaneous movement for positive change — the so-called 
#MeToo Movement. This particular movement has increased significance 
at the time of writing this final chapter since the hearings for US supreme 
court nominee were ongoing amidst a seemingly credible allegation of sexual 
assault. This allegation is one of a number of high profile allegations, as well 
as an alarmingly large number of less-often-discussed cases, that have 
emerged from victims of sexual assault in recent months; a 
disproportionately large number of these victims are female, while 
aggressors were overwhelmingly male. The movement derives its name from 
the phrase used on social media to share these allegations. 
 
Many of the victims, and the women who have otherwise joined the 
movement, have been vocal about their anger, and have often contemplated 
how this anger can be harnessed for good. However, their anger also 
appears to have generated much backlash against the movement. I therefore 
turn, in this chapter, to an analysis of what the patient perspective would 
have to say on this issue. In doing so, I suggest that the method I have 
advocated in Chapter 4 could successfully navigate the problems for 
eliminativists raised by moderationists, even in this very complex and 
difficult area. 
 
Firstly, I argue that the patient perspective doesn’t involve a denial of 
wrongdoing when it comes to the accused. We are reminded that the 
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elimination of anger is only part of the process recommended by the 
Buddhist eliminativist account I defend. Instead, we are meant to actively 
seek to replace anger with a positive virtue like compassion or generosity. 
Doing so, I suggest, allows us to identify wrongdoing, but it also helps us to 
contextualise that wrongdoing in a way that also prompts compassion for 
the perpetrator. The patient perspective sees the wrongdoer as both 
conditioning and conditioned, as per the principle of dependent arising. 
Factors like the culture of toxic masculinity that appears to have infected the 
alleged actions of Kavanaugh should help us see that he is lacking in self-
control: his angry testimony in the senate demonstrates as much. The 
purpose of adopting this perspective is not to exonerate the accused, but 
instead help move us to respond to them in a way that helps them to change. 
This may well include punishment, whose aim would be to reduce their 
suffering by reducing the influence of the factors that conditioned their 
action. I suggest that this does not violate the concerns raised by Srinivasan 
about the apt anger of the victim either — we will still be prompted to 
respond compassionately to the victim as well. 
 
We then turn to examine the pragmatic benefits of the patient 
perspective for bringing about social change, compared to the supposed 
benefits of anger. As we have noted in the preceding chapters, the supposed 
benefits of anger are overstated. However, the patient perspective can grant 
a clarity of thought that helps us both identify what needs to be changed and 
also how to go about changing it. Anger’s unpredictable nature is illustrated 
with the example of the 1992 Los Angeles riots (since the outcome of the 
#MeToo movement is still unclear), where a spontaneous outpouring of 
anger over police brutality lead to a spike in handgun sales and a correlating 
spike in homicides committed using handguns. A contrasting case is the 
(non-Buddhist) eliminativism practiced by Martin Luther King, who had 
greater relative success in achieving his aims. I suggest that the #MeToo 
movement might need to keep this in mind, particularly considering some of 
the hateful responses to those in the movement who defend the 
moderationist position. 
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Conclusion 
 
 By the end of this thesis, I hope that I have shown that, despite its 
current popularity, the moderationist defence of anger is not without its 
difficulties. This should hopefully have carved out a space for a 
contemporary defence of eliminativism. The eliminativist view I defend is 
essentially Buddhist, though it draws upon Buddhist-inspired accounts in the 
Western philosophical literature. I advocate for a pedagogical reading of the 
difficult (and perhaps seemingly unattractive) Buddhist metaphysics, that I 
suggest — when put into practice — might eventually lead to an openness to 
that metaphysical view. The consequence of both the practice and the 
metaphysical outlook is the elimination of anger. Far from being the loss of 
something beneficial or apt, I suggest that the elimination of anger is both 
beneficial and (from the metaphysical viewpoint) apt. I attempt to 
demonstrate this by applying the position I defend to the kind of case where 
moderationists are at their most persuasive — cases of social injustice. I 
hope to have at least shown that such a position can be a viable alternative 
to the moderationist suggestion that we harness anger for social change. 
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Chapter One: 
BUDDHIST CHARACTERISATION  
OF ANGER 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Despite the familiarity with the phenomenon, attempting to unpack 
a concept like ANGER can be complicated. As an emotion, anger is fraught 
with the difficulties faced when attempting to understand any emotion. The 
category ‘emotion’ in the sense we understand today is itself a relatively 
recent entry into philosophical vocabulary — prior to that philosophers 
from antiquity to the early modern period had historically opted for terms 
like ‘passion’1, ‘sentiment’, and ‘affection’2 to refer to comparable 
psychological phenomena, although the meaning of these terms then do not 
coincide with the contemporary usage of ‘emotion’ now.3 Neither do these 
terms now have the exact same meaning to ‘emotions’ (e.g. the notion of 
passions tends to be more intense, explosive, and even sexual). In this study I 
do not intend to delve into the discussion about the definition or history of 
emotion. But given the potential confusion, it should be pronounced that 
these terms are loosely employed here: anger is to be referred to as an 
emotion, a feeling, an attitude, and so on, without any categorical distinction 
unless noted otherwise. Evidently, emotions are bound up with subjective 
experience, and that is the point of departure of my adopted methodology 
we will see below. My own focus here, however, is on the particular emotion 
of anger; more specifically still, it is on anger as it is understood within 
Indian Buddhist philosophy. 
 
This chapter attempts to identify and elucidate the central features of 
the Buddhist conceptions of anger (for there is not a singular conception in 
                                               
1 Pathos/pathe in Greek, as notably treated in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric. The 
term apparently has a sense of passivity. It was historically a common choice adopted by 
many philosophers in the seventeenth century. 
2 The latter two terms are markedly in use in the eighteenth century amongst British 
philosophers, sometimes used in contrast with turbulent ‘passions’. 
3 Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 2–6; Schmitter, “17th and 18th Century Theories of 
Emotions.” 
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play across all traditions) in order to form a general account with which to 
work throughout the rest of this thesis. In doing so, I describe a variety of 
methodological issues faced when comparing across traditions, settling on an 
approach which focuses on occasions of anger in order to unpack the general 
concept at play. As such, I discuss here multiple examples of anger as it 
appears in the Buddhist literature, examining the scope of emotional 
responses covered by these examples, and variously translated as ‘anger’, 
‘hatred’, ‘annoyance’, and otherwise, in the texts. I argue that these various 
responses fall under a broad conception of anger for the Buddhist, expressed 
as the idea of dosa/dveṣa. It should be noted also, at this early point, that 
when we discuss occasions of anger, the choice of wording is deliberate to 
avoid the notion of causation — we will see, ultimately, that the root cause of 
anger for the Buddhist is not the immediate situation, which at best is a 
proximate cause, we are in (i.e. the ‘occasion’), but our own understanding of 
our situation (see Chapters 2 and 4 for this discussion). 
 
 
1. Approaching Anger 
 
 Let us begin with some notes on methodology. I would like to avoid 
the assumption that anger is a universal emotion, and that its 
characterisation in Buddhist accounts has to be categorised in the same way 
that we understand it in the Anglo-European literature. By comparing 
descriptions of anger in the literature from both the Western tradition and 
Buddhist tradition, I wish to achieve two goals:  
 
1) to delineate the Buddhist characterisation of anger, and  
2) by doing so, demonstrate that the conception we’re looking into in 
the Buddhist literature is, in fact, the same emotion that we conceive 
of in Anglo-European traditions.  
 
This first chapter, however, does not aim to give a comprehensive 
account of the Buddhist conception of anger but, instead, to establish that 
we are talking about the same mental phenomenon as those discussed in 
some of the Western literature. This can be concluded from some salient 
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qualities of anger that are recognised across accounts in spite of differences 
in their conceptions. 
 
Chief among the methodological concerns for my project here are 
the linguistic and cultural barriers we encounter in studying the concept of 
anger in ancient Buddhist texts. Practitioners in the art of translation or, for 
that matter, even language-learners in general, know all too well how 
difficult it can be to find a word-for-word translation most of the time. 
Numerous terms can refer to the same concept, and that is also true of the 
notion we want to investigate: anger. In English, aside from ‘anger’, we also 
use ‘resentment’, ‘indignation’, ‘ire’, ‘irascibility’,  ‘rage’, ‘wrath’, ‘fury’, etc. 
to refer to a similar idea. However, these do not pick out exactly the same 
concept, each having subtle differences from the others. For example, 
‘wrath’ suggests a higher degree of anger than ‘ire’. ‘Rage’, by contrast, 
implies a lack of (self-) control, such as when we say somebody acted ‘in a fit 
of rage’. Given that ‘fits’ are sudden, involuntary, and often involve quite 
extreme physical symptoms (whether it is an epileptic seizure or a sneezing 
fit), we can see the possible implication of selecting ‘rage’ over ‘anger’ if we 
were to translate another language into English. Even within the tradition 
often considered as a root of modern-western philosophy such as Greek, as 
many are aware of but tend to forget, linguistic, cultural, and temporal 
barriers are inevitably also present. It has been argued that the conception 
of orgē, as well as other terms such as cholos and thumos or even Latin ira, is 
more intense than we would consider now as anger and often associated 
with madness.4 
  
Use of ‘anger’ in the philosophical literature is equally unhelpful: 
there is little consistency in how the term is deployed. ‘Anger’ and 
‘resentment’ are the most recurring terms. Although they are sometimes 
interchangeable, other times they denote slightly differently. Joseph Butler, 
for instance, often referred to anger as sudden and hasty, and resentment as 
settled and deliberate. Whereas the former is a natural self-defence, the 
                                               
4 Harris, “The Rage of Women,” 122–25. 
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latter has a more moral tone as it is provoked by injustice.5 This resonates in 
the more recent work by P. F. Strawson, where ‘resentment’ seems to be 
deliberately chosen in the context which is principally a moral discussion 
and the word ‘anger’ is thus avoided.6 Meanwhile, David Hume talked 
almost solely of ‘anger’. Others do not make such necessary association, like 
Robert C. Solomon who deems resentment a sense of ‘intolerable inferiority’ 
having myriads of pettiness.7 
 
Uses of the term in Buddhist texts are no less complex than in their 
English-language counterparts. In fact, it is arguably more confusing — 
particularly to someone from outside the tradition. Source languages of the 
traditional Buddhist literature are many, including Pāli, Sanskrit, Tibetan, 
Chinese, and Japanese. To make matters easier, I will use the translations 
from sources mainly written in Pāli and Sanskrit (since these languages share 
many features and have a common origin), as well as occasionally relying 
upon Tibetan sources for comparison, as important writings about anger 
can be found in Tibetan. The first of these two languages has ancient roots 
that can be traced to South Asia, sharing virtually the same grammar and 
vocabulary. The equivalent terms for ‘anger’ in the source languages are 
kodha (Pāli)/krodha (Sanskrit). They, and dosa (Pāli)/dveṣa (Sanskrit) are 
common words used to refer to a concept related to ‘anger’ in the literature. 
However, we sometimes see other words such as pratigha8 (Sanskrit) and 
makkha9 (Pāli) translated as ‘anger’ too. The former has a sense of enmity and 
resistance, and the latter can also mean hypocrisy. Without the knowledge of 
Pāliists and Sanskritists, which I fear I cannot claim to have mastered, the 
subtleties of these terms, mirroring as they do the same subtle differences 
between ‘wrath’ and ‘anger’ in English, would prove difficult to recognise. 
 
Consider, for example, the problems from one of the main texts we 
will use in this study — that of Bodhicaryāvatāra. This text, ascribed to 
                                               
5 Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, 68–74. 
6 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. 
7 Solomon, The Passions, 290–95. 
8 For example, in BCA 6.1. 
9 Horner, Milinda’s Questions, 2:289.  
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Śāntideva (late 7th to mid 8th century), was originally composed in 
Sanskrit.10 It was then later translated into Tibetan in the eighth century. 
The latter version had a lot of influence over Tibetan Buddhism and 
became a significant Buddhist account in its own right. In turn, multiple 
English translations, including those upon which my own study is based, 
have been rendered from both source languages. A version relies on Sanskrit 
(i.e. Crosby and Skilton), another Tibetan (i.e. The Padmakara Translation 
Group), while the other is mainly based on Sanskrit in consultation with 
Tibetan (i.e. Wallace and Wallace). When comparing the translations from 
Sanskrit in BCA Chapter 6, which is dedicated to the discussion of the virtue 
of patience/forbearance and includes an analysis of anger, we will see that 
they did not always render the words pratigha, krodha and dveṣa consistently. 
For instance, in BCA 6.1, while Wallace and Wallace translated pratigha as 
‘anger’, Crosby and Skilton chose ‘hatred’ as the translation. The words 
‘anger’ and ‘hate’ indeed pose some difficulties to us. In the original Sanskrit 
text, dveṣa, which is commonly translated to ‘hatred’ or ‘aversion’ (themselves 
with distinct connotations in English), is sometimes rendered as ‘anger’ by 
the translators. For example, dveṣa as it appears in BCA 6.7 is translated as 
‘hatred’ by Crosby and Skilton, but ‘anger’ by Wallace and Wallace. 
Moreover, while krodha in BCA 6.5 is translated as ‘anger’ in both 
translations, it becomes ‘hatred’ in BCA 6.6 in both versions.  
 
Despite the seeming minor issue about a choice of vocabulary, it is 
important to be aware of the inconsistencies, or perhaps fluidity, in these 
translations. The case of ‘anger’ and ‘hatred’ should be particularly noted as 
they tend to be treated as distinct, yet related, phenomena in contemporary 
literature.11 The fact that the translators are not firmly fixed with the 
common translation of the words, coupled with the way these terms are 
employed in the same manner and discussion, may suggest that Buddhists 
                                               
10 BCA is one of the most translated Buddhist texts. It has been translated into other 
traditional Buddhist languages such as Tibetan, Chinese and Mongolian during pre-
modern period. There are also many versions in European languages. See how purposes of 
translation of the text have changed over time in Nelson, “Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra in 
Translation.” 
11 See Ben-Ze’ev, “Anger and Hate”, for example.  
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do not make an important distinction between them. Thus, I shall include 
all anger-related terms in my study. 
 
Of course, language is in many ways inherently problematic. A 
(natural) language isn’t a static, immutable entity, it is dynamic and 
constantly evolving. The implicature effects of any given word or phrase 
might change over time, as can the accepted meaning of a word. The word 
‘nice’, for example, once had the meaning ‘silly’ or ‘foolish’ (deriving from 
Latin nescius, as more familiar in the English word ‘nescient’)12 — a far cry 
from the compliment it is today! It isn’t always entirely clear, then, what a 
translator was attempting to capture simply by looking at the word choice in 
the absence of a broader context. That context might include an 
etymological history, but such an approach might be better reserved for a 
linguist. Instead, I suggest that we can helpfully focus on the occasions and 
phenomenology of anger — that is, the experiences of the subject in a given 
situation. We will, therefore, engage in the texts of any Buddhist traditions 
which allow us to see how the human subjects feel, perceive, conceive and 
act in the context of anger. Typically, however, we can’t entirely avoid 
relying on languages. This is possible where we have a detailed description 
of some particular set of circumstances of anger. In this way, we will get a 
glimpse of the concept in action, and where it belongs. An experience of 
anger, or of any emotion for that matter, is particular. It always occurs in a 
particular locale i.e. in an individual mind and a specific culture. More often 
than not, with a sufficiently detailed example, we can still empathise with the 
subject because of the phenomenological similarity of their actual and our 
imagined situation (though some situations might be lost on us because of 
cultural reasons — for instance, not understanding why a Thai might be 
angry when you point and gesture towards the TV remote with your foot, 
rather than your hand). Given that human beings are generally subject to 
the same basic set of needs and desires, and share basically the same 
cognitive architecture, approaching anger via specific examples equips us 
with a methodology that can hopefully circumvent at least some of the 
                                               
12 Dent, What Made the Crocodile Cry?, 92. 
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linguistic and cultural barriers evident at the surface level when translating 
texts. 
 
 Note that I do not claim completeness in terms of the coverage of 
Buddhist traditions. Due to immense diversity in Buddhist thought, the ideas 
represented here are best identified as South Asian Buddhism, including an 
area from Tibet to Sri Lanka. In particular, the texts I heavily cite include 
the English translations of Pāli Nikāyas, Visuddhimagga, and Sanskrit and 
Tibetan Bodhicaryāvatāra. These are prominent works dealing with anger in 
Buddhist philosophy. They represent different schools of Buddhist thought, 
hence defying being labeled in a sectarian manner. Still, such geographical 
denomination may appear deceptive as it might sound as though it excludes 
modern scholarship produced in Anglo-European traditions or produced for 
an Anglo-European audience; however, works falling under this description 
are also drawn upon in this research. These writings, such as The Dalai 
Lama's Book of Wisdom and Emily McRae's interpretation of Dharmarakṣita 
in "Metabolizing Anger", rest in some ways upon Buddhist thinkers from the 
subcontinent. With that in mind, let us now turn towards the task of 
characterising anger as it appears within the Buddhist tradition. 
 
 
2. Characterising Anger 
 
 Characterising anger by examining the occasions of anger, the 
accompanying phenomenological character, and its effects as they appear in the 
Buddhist literature is a deliberate attempt to avoid imposing our conception — 
a twenty-first-century Anglo-European understanding of anger — onto the 
first-person experience of the subject who lived in the tradition. We will first 
look at the context of anger — the situations in which anger arises (section 
2.1). Comparing the occasions of anger in Buddhist texts with other cultures 
and traditions allows us to see the similarity of what they take to be 
occurrences of anger. What we shall see is that the occasions of anger vary 
greatly: they can be personal or impersonal, trivial or serious. Subsequently 
in section 3, I will attempt to characterise the notion of anger through the 
phenomenology of anger as found in the Buddhist literature. This may differ 
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in the details, but it is nonetheless the case that what is regarded as ‘anger’ in 
Buddhist literature is a similar mental phenomenon in other traditions. It 
doesn’t matter whether their attitudes and assessment of anger are distinct 
or similar; insofar as the points of consideration are shared across traditions, 
they refer to the same mental state. Conversely, any dissimilarities in the 
phenomenological content descriptions we may find will highlight the 
peculiar features of the Buddhist conception of anger. After examining the 
private experience of anger, the discernible effects of anger will then be 
looked at in section 4. While this last section can be treated as 
supplementary to the characterisation of anger, it is an important point that 
deserves a distinct treatment separately from that of the phenomenology of 
anger. 
 
2.1 Occasions of anger 
 
 The situations in which anger can be provoked are various. It can be 
something very trivial, such as hearing spoilers of the movies we’re looking 
forward to watching; something less trivial, such as the persistent lateness of 
our regular commuter train to work; or something serious, like your partner 
cheating on you. It is true that some frustrating situations may generate 
feelings other than (or as well as) anger; many of us, when kept from having a 
barbecue that has been planned for weeks with friends, are disappointed or 
miserable. However, anger is not an unimaginable response to other people 
either. As a matter of fact, people get angry at all kinds of things, and this 
anger also varies in degree. This is reflected in the Buddhist literature too. 
We will consider some examples of the occasions of anger that are discussed 
in the literature across various cultures from different time periods. The 
purpose here is not to include an exhaustive list of examples; the examples 
cited should be sufficient to demonstrate that those found in the Buddhist 
literature are similar to the occasions of anger that we are familiar with from 
both Western philosophical literature and everyday experience. 
 
 In the Buddhist texts, the typical occasions of anger can be said to be 
when we perceive ourselves to be harmed by someone else. There are two 
elements to unpack here: one is the perception of the subject, and the other 
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is the harm done to the subject. The latter is a common view shared by most 
accounts. The scope of ‘harm’ does not have to be done only physically and 
directly to the subject, but can be extended to family and friends, i.e. those 
who are dear to the subject, as well as the subject’s desires and beliefs. In 
other words, harms are done to those things in the circle of one’s concerns. 
So the apparent injuries can be done not only to the subject, but also to her 
people, her desires, her beliefs, etc. Moreover, anger doesn’t only have to 
occur at the exact moment of the infliction of harm — remembering the 
experience could also be an occasion of anger.13 
 
 Occasions of anger that have moral significance to the Buddhist are 
diverse. Whether the anger is occasioned by seemingly insignificant things, 
or something which seems much more serious, they are treated seriously all 
the same. Let us now consider some specific occasions in the Buddhist texts 
that give rise to anger.  
 
Sometimes anger can arise without involving another person: 
 
“The irritation of bugs, gnats, and mosquitoes, of hunger and 
thirst, and discomfort such as an enormous itch: why do you not 
see them as insignificant? Cold, heat, rain, and wind, journeying 
and sickness, imprisonment and beatings: one should not be too 
squeamish about them. Otherwise the distress becomes worse.”14 
 
 Such impersonal occasions of anger are usually only causes of 
annoyance for most people, yet there is no distinction drawn in the Buddhist 
literature here between ‘annoyance’ and ‘anger’. If bitten by a bug, we 
squash it. If thirsty and peckish, we go to the kitchen and grab a glass of 
water and some snacks. If the temperature is not right, we adjust radiators 
and air-conditioners to make us feel comfortable. We don’t usually feel angry 
towards the bug, our tummy, or the air-conditioner. They only annoy us to 
                                               
13 For example, Vism IX, 14 acknowledges that “If resentment arises in him when he applies 
his mind to a hostile person because he remembers wrongs done by that person,…” (stress is 
mine). 
14 BCA 6.15,16. 
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take some action to put an end to it. But it is not impossible that one can get 
angry over these situations: imagine they happen simultaneously; a lot of 
annoyances could stir up anger in us too, so it is perhaps not unreasonable 
to see these as lying on one and the same spectrum.  
 
 In the context of those who practice meditation like Śāntideva, the 
author of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, these annoyances become unwelcome 
distractions from what they wish to accomplish. This kind of situation should 
be familiar to us all. We sometimes get angry when things don’t go as 
planned — when we forget to save important work on the computer before 
shutting it down; when a car accident prevents us from boarding an 
aeroplane in time; when my cat ruins a jigsaw that I’m about to finish. As 
noted above, such occasions for anger might seem trivial. But if my cat were 
to delete the only copy of my thesis, we might think that this is a far more 
serious concern! Nonetheless, this is still an impersonal occasion for anger 
(arguments for the personhood of cats notwithstanding!) The common 
thread running through these examples is the thwarting of desires. In this 
sense, there are similarities here with another ancient tradition. Aristotle also 
sees that when we are in pain, or have to suffer pain by way of being 
prevented from getting what we desire, anger is triggered: “Men are angry 
when they are pained, because one who is pained aims at something.”15  
 
 However, Aristotle also recognises that there are personal occasions 
for anger which operate in much the same way i.e. wherein our desires are 
thwarted:  
 
“[I]f then anyone directly opposes [a person] in anything, as, for 
instance, prevents him from drinking when thirsty, or not 
directly, but seems to be doing just the same; and if anyone goes 
against him or refuses to assist him, or troubles him in any other 
way when he is in this frame of mind, he is angry with all such 
persons.”16 
                                               
15 Rhetoric II. ii. 9. 
16 Rhetoric II. ii. 9. 
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 Thwarting of desires is thus a common prompt for occasions of 
anger, as clearly spelled out in BCA 6.7: “Finding its fuel in discontent 
originating from an undesired event and from an impediment to desired 
events, anger becomes inflamed and destroys me.” And just as with 
impersonal occasions of anger, personal occasions vary greatly and may be 
regarded as trivial or serious (perhaps depending upon the strength or 
domain of the desire). My desire to be able to concentrate on my meditation 
being thwarted by an inconsiderate roommate playing her music too loud 
may not seem (and shouldn’t!) compelling enough to cause anger, but my 
desire to save my own life by aborting the foetus which threatens it being 
thwarted by pro-life protestors blocking my route to the clinic would 
certainly seem worthy of considering as an appropriate occasion of anger. 
Thus, this notion of anger as occasioned by the thwarting of desires described in 
the Buddhist texts is recognisable elsewhere. 
 
 Another occasion found in the Buddhist texts concerns injuries 
caused by insults. In the Pāli sutta, which partly forms the early Buddhist 
canonical texts, there’s a story about a follower of Brahminism being angry 
because another brahmin of his clan left the family to live a life of asceticism 
under the Buddha’s guidance, so the displeased brahmin approaches the 
Buddha and reproaches him with offensive words (SN I 7:2). In fact, similar 
occasions appear numerous times in the texts. In ancient India, this was 
considered an insult. Brahmins were considered the highest class of all the 
social groups; by persuading people that were perceived to be superior and 
privileged to leave the clan, it was as if to say that they were inferior to the 
Buddha — someone who rejected Brahmanism and came from an apparent 
lower caste (i.e. kṣatriya or warrior) according to their tradition — that their 
clan was being belittled. This kind of occasion is perhaps the most common 
issue in the Buddhist texts. In another place, Śāntideva acknowledges that 
he is also capable of getting angry over an insult to his religious beliefs, and he 
has to resist the urge to submit to his anger, saying, “And my hatred towards 
those who damage sacred images and stūpas or who abuse the true teaching 
is inappropriate, since the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are not distressed” 
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(BCA 6.64). This example eerily rings true even today. Many people tend to 
get offended easily and immensely over any remarks or behaviours that 
seem to insult their religion. Consider, for example, the attacks on the 
exhibition of drawings of the prophet Mohammed at the Curtis Culwell 
Centre, Texas, in 2015. So clearly the idea that insults occasion anger is not 
something peculiar to Buddhism. Aristotle also shares a similar thought:  
 
“Now men think that they have a right to be highly esteemed by 
those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and virtue, and 
generally, in whatever similar respect a man is far superior to 
another; for example, the rich man to the poor man in the 
matter of money, the eloquent to the incompetent speaker in the 
matter of oratory, the governor  to the governed, and the man 
who thinks himself worthy to rule to one who is only fit to be 
ruled.”17 
 
 Noticeably, these occasions of anger are all social in nature — 
whether that be related directly to social standing, or indirectly to some 
social structure such as an organised religion. Occasions of anger related to 
social standing and/or social structures are seemingly those most likely to 
connect to a notion of self-worth, whether we want to think of it as social-
influenced or wholly self-defined.  
 
 We might wish to recast insults in the language used above, i.e. that 
of desires and harm. An insult could be construed as harming our desire to 
be treated in a particular way — a way that fits how we perceive ourselves as 
being worthy of. A President of a country may want to be addressed 
according to his status and get offended when he does not get what he 
wants, for instance.18 Reeve argues that insults are bound to the notion of 
honour — essentially a matter of being treated in a manner proportional to 
our worth.19 Another person’s treatment of ourselves is taken as an 
                                               
17 Rhetoric II. ii. 7. 
18 Emmanuel Macron seemed unhappy to be called ‘Manu’ instead of ‘Mr President’. See 
“‘Not Manu - Call Me Mr President.’” 
19 Reeve, “The Anger of Achilles.” 
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expression of her perception of who we are. We are insulted when we 
perceive ourselves as being treated in a way that falls short of our own 
assessment of our own self-worth (whether that assessment is warranted or 
not). The notion of how we perceive ourselves is central to Buddhist 
philosophy, whose primary project is unraveling the (apparently incorrect) 
perception of the self as a continuing, independent subject of experience (see 
Chapters 2 and 4 for discussion of the ‘no-self doctrine’, and section 2.2 
below for more on anger and perception). Again, we might recast this in the 
language of desires — a desire to be perceived as worth more than our 
treatment by others suggests. And, again, the focus here could thus be on the 
harm done to our desires. 
 
 A final occasion of anger to consider from the Buddhist texts is that 
when harm appears to be done to someone else. Some verses in Buddhist 
texts seemingly indicate that people get angry even when it doesn’t involve 
them personally, such as when they perceive some wrongdoing to others.  
 
 “Therefore, even if one sees a friend or an enemy behaving 
badly, one can reflect that there are specific conditioning factors 
that determine this, and thereby remain happy.”20 
 
“When people harm one’s teachers, relatives, and others dear to 
us, one should, as above, regard it as arising on the basis of 
conditioning factors and refrain from anger towards them.”21 
 
 These verses suggest that the behaviour of both our friends and our 
enemies can anger us (though we might ‘remain happy’ if we can consider 
the circumstances of the matter objectively). However, it is notable from 
these passages that the occasions of anger that are being considered here are 
those which still bear a close relation to us — our teachers, our relatives, our 
friends, and so on. Even with our enemies, these are still people who have a 
significant role to play in our lives (if we consider an enemy as someone who 
                                               
20 BCA 6.33. 
21 BCA 6.65. 
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has set out to deliberately harm us). Yet there is no substantive discussion of 
anger about more remote circumstances — such as the anger we might feel 
over a reported injustice in another land, whose people we have no 
connection to other than a shared humanity. For instance, we might be 
angry over the lack of support given to the people of Puerto Rico by the US 
government in the wake of the dual disasters of Hurricane Irma and 
Hurricane Maria. It is unlikely that Puerto Rico’s inhabitants would count 
as ‘others dear to us’, and yet we might still feel anger on their behalf. Anger 
over social injustices is often the focus of discussion in Western literature, yet 
it is largely unaddressed by the Buddhist texts (though understandably when 
consider how we have become more socially and mentally globalised now). I 
will attempt to redress this imbalance somewhat in Chapter 5 of this thesis, 
by applying the Buddhist Eliminativist argument I develop to an issue of 
social injustice. 
 
2.2 Anger and perception 
 
 Of course, we are not always willing to take up the cudgels on behalf 
of others. As Śāntideva explains: 
 
“If you argue that your dislike of one who speaks ill of you is 
because he is harming living beings, why then do you feel no 
anger when he defames others in the same way? You tolerate 
those showing disfavour when others are the subject of it, but you 
show no tolerance towards someone speaking ill of you when he 
is subject to the arising of defilements.”22 
  
We are often capable of hypocrisy when it comes to occasions of 
anger — we may well have no emotional response when we see others 
experiencing something which angered us when the same treatment was 
directed our way.23 This highlights another important point about anger 
                                               
22 BCA 6.62, 63. 
23 It is not only anger which is highlighted as a source of hypocrisy by Śāntideva — he also 
highlights our hypocrisy with respect to praise of others: “When your own good qualities 
are being praised, you want others to rejoice as well. When good qualities of someone else 
are being praised, you do not want happiness even for yourself. Upon generating the Spirit 
of Awakening out of the desire for the happiness of all sentient beings, why are you angry at 
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which seems to be reflected in the Buddhists’ treatment of it: that our angry 
responses are dependent upon how we perceive a given occasion of anger. 
 
 We noted above (section 2.1) that Reeve argues that insults are 
bound to the notion of honour, and that honour is tied up with our own 
perception of self. However, beyond this idea (which will be addressed in 
Chapters 2 and 4), there is the matter of our judgements regarding who is to 
blame, and to what extent, within occasions of anger. The cases discussed 
above are all cases where our anger appears to be more or less justified; 
many modern philosophers, in fact, focus their discussion on moral anger in 
particular — where anger has been triggered by a morally wrong action. 
The approach taken on this sort of view is one which suggests that we 
evaluate the action itself, judging it to be immoral, and respond with anger. 
However, the Buddhist approach emphasises instead the perceived harm to the 
subject (and the people, things, etc. close to the subject). By emphasising the 
notion of perception when it comes to anger, the Buddhist approach 
captures the complexities present within all occasions of anger. As with 
perception proper, we are susceptible to error and illusion. For instance, we 
might react angrily when we believe someone to have harmed us, even 
though this may not actually be the case (e.g. when we falsely believe that 
our partner has taken the only set of house keys with them, and left us 
unable to leave the house as we are unable to lock the door — the reality 
being that the keys were in the house all along). 
 
 Acknowledging this possibility of error aligns with much work in 
contemporary philosophy, specifically those who believe that anger should 
be preserved, albeit curbed, in appropriate situations, or as I call them 
‘moderationists’, which draws the line between anger that is reasonable and 
                                               
sentient beings now that they have found happiness themselves?” (BCA 6.79-80) It seems to 
me that Śāntideva observes how we are often envious when others receive praise. In fact, 
Buddhism appears to have a category of emotion opposite to envy: muditā, or empathetic 
joy, the feeling of happiness when seeing other people happy, even if one does not 
contribute to it. Buddhaghosa specifies different states of emotions rooted in the hateful 
temperament that actually includes anger and envy (as well as enmity, disparaging, 
domineering, and avarice; see Vism XIV, 172), and thus anger and envy are derived from 
the same root for the Buddhist. 
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unreasonable, warranted and unwarranted, or justified and unjustified. In 
other words, there is a kind of anger that is acceptable and the other is 
unacceptable. Such distinctions are not made explicit in the Buddhist 
account of anger, and yet by emphasising perception they tacitly 
acknowledge that there might be occasions of anger where our judgements 
are impaired. Nonetheless, distinctions between appropriate and 
inappropriate anger are ultimately redundant for the Buddhist — as we shall 
see in Chapter 2, according to the Buddhist we should simply eschew all 
forms of anger. We are advised to simply disavow ourselves from any actual, 
attempted, or simply misperceived, harm that comes our way: 
 
“We — who do not abuse, who do not scold anyone, who do not 
rail against anyone — refuse to accept from you the abuse and 
scolding and tirade you let loose at us. It still belongs to you, 
brahmin!”24 
 
In this way, the Buddhist acknowledgement of the similarities 
between perception and the occasions of anger still leaves the advised 
response to these occasions essentially untouched — it simply notes that we 
might sometimes be angry for a reason, and sometimes not, but regardless of 
this, a right-minded Buddhist should still refrain from anger altogether. For 
orthodox Buddhists think that there’s actually never a good reason that 
justifies anger. I pick up on the reasons for this in Chapter 2. Now, however, 
let us turn to the subjective aspect of the occasions of anger — its 
phenomenology. 
 
 
3. Experiencing Anger 
 
Our aim, to make sure that the phenomenon that Buddhists call 
‘anger’ is one and the same phenomenon of which we also use that term, has 
not yet been accomplished. That is why it is important that we talk about 
the phenomenology of anger. It is an approach to de-clutter both linguistic 
and cultural elements that may be associated with the concept of anger. 
                                               
24 SN I 7:2. 
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Philosophers have come up with different accounts of anger, and they are 
culturally specific. In some cultures, anger may be closely associated with the 
idea of justice and individualism, whereas in another culture it might be 
connected to a mental phenomenon like conceit. Others find it seldom 
occurs, and the vocabulary that indicates it is even absent altogether.25 As 
such, it is not without difficulties for us to compare accounts of anger that 
are remote in place and time and be certain that they talk about the same 
emotion, as has been expressed by Robert Solomon who remarked, “it is not 
the nature of emotion that matters so much as the nature and place of 
particular (kinds of) emotions in a particular worldview.”26 But while theories 
of anger may differ, anger as a phenomenon has similar effects on us all. 
After all, anger is primarily, though not exclusively, a mental phenomenon 
experienced by a person. It is always related to the ‘I’ which is the subject of 
the affect, and is something that is felt and urges us to behave in certain 
ways, whether we are aware of its presence or not. In this sense then, anger 
is a universal experience across human populations, and since anger is 
necessarily experienced by a subject, examining such experiences should 
allow us to arrive at the heart of the phenomenon. 
 
 Although an analysis of the phenomenology of anger from different 
accounts lets us compare our experience, we cannot examine the 
phenomenology of anger in Buddhist literature straightforwardly. Buddhists 
do not offer a theory of anger in the way we are familiar with. They do not 
discuss the phenomenon in an abstract way by unpacking the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for anger. When they talk about anger, they often talk 
about its value i.e. how it’s good or bad, and how to get rid of it, because 
that is their goal. However, we can deduce the phenomenon from the texts 
as some expressions of it are also present in the discussions. Again, it is 
reasonable to suspect that those expressions are culturally-bound, too. And 
while some expressions may not always be similar to ours, many are 
surprisingly similar and even the dissimilar are perfectly recognisable. This 
                                               
25 Briggs, Never in Anger, quoted in Solomon, “Some Notes on Emotion, ‘East and West,’” 
171. 
26 Solomon, “Some Notes on Emotion, ‘East and West,’” 177. 
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suggests that it is more or less the same phenomenon we know as ‘anger’. 
This section will examine the different aspects of anger as experienced by 
the subject, throughout the course of the phenomenon, from the moment it 
arises to when it is dissolved. And as will be apparent below, Buddhists 
recognise different aspects of anger that make up the phenomenon in the 
same way that we do. Let us turn to the first of these aspects now. 
 
3.1 Anger and pain 
 
 The emotions are not solely mental events, but are instead embodied. 
Buddhist psychological theorists well observed this complexity of emotional 
experiences: they often describe bodily symptoms concurring with 
psychological phenomena. Getting angry is, most of the time, not a nice 
experience. It is an uncomfortable feeling. Yet sometimes, it can somehow 
feel good when we get angry, especially when anger is expressed. Anger 
giving us such mixed feelings is, perhaps, one of the reasons why people 
have different opinions about it. That conflicting experience did not go 
unnoticed thousands of years ago either. Buddhist philosophers too 
recognise that anger is both an unpleasant and a pleasurable feeling but, for 
them, it is not a balanced experience: they see that painful, rather than 
pleasurable, feelings dominate the experience of anger. This conclusion is 
drawn from the way they describe the experience. While they have various 
examples of anger’s unpleasantness, there’s only a single example of the 
pleasure of anger that I have found (see below). 
 
 Feelings are not something easily put into words. How can we 
describe something that is intangible and personal for other people to 
understand? The available vocabulary may be too vague, inaccurate, or 
perhaps ineffective in spelling out our feelings. This is perhaps why we often 
utilise analogies to help other people understand us. For example, we may 
ask someone who has a near-death experience ‘What does it feel like?’ and, 
unable to find the right words to explain, they compare it with something 
else that other people may have experienced e.g. moving towards a light at 
the end of a tunnel, or some such thing. The privacy of the experience 
makes us become an everyday poet who relies on some figure of speech 
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when we want to say how the experience feels.27 And Buddhist philosophers 
are no different in their reliance on such literary devices. 
 
 Indeed, Buddhist philosophers are no strangers to using metaphors 
to describe the experience of anger. Metaphors related to fire are amongst 
those most frequently used. In AN 7:64, they compare the experience of 
anger to a burning feeling: “he is tormented as if burnt by fire”. A burning 
sensation is something we can relate to in our experience of anger. Think 
about the physiological effects of anger. We usually go through a phase in 
which our heart-rate is increased, pumping blood to muscles all over our 
body creating a warming sensation, as if it’s burning inside. Perhaps, this is 
why the language of fire is a typical metaphor used to refer to an experience 
of anger. Elsewhere, a Buddhist account also suggests that an angry person 
is “like a man who wants to hit another and pick up a burning ember or 
excrement in his hand and so first burns himself or makes himself stink”.28 
Śāntideva, too, did not fail to make an analogy between anger and fire, 
emphasising its virulent nature.29 Indeed, a fire metaphor for anger seems 
not idiosyncratic to the Buddhist texts, as Seneca similarly describes a person 
as “consumed in the flame of anger”.30 Sometimes our language reflects the 
thought that the heat may even be visible on the surface, such as when we 
describe someone as “incandescent with anger”.31 Many other words and 
phrases which connect with anger are also associated with heat or fire. For 
                                               
27 The metaphorical descriptions of personal experience like taste, smell, sensation, and 
pain are certainly not uncommon. Patient-doctor communication is permeated with 
metaphorical descriptions and doctors are encouraged to learn the skills for effective 
interpretations in diagnosis as well as to convey ambiguity which is less threatening to 
patients (Bleakley, Thinking with Metaphors in Medicine.) Also, the literally indescribable 
experience is not limited to sensations and feelings: we use metaphors to describe music, too 
(Zangwill, “Music, Essential Metaphor, and Private Language.”) Conversely, physical 
sensation is sometimes used to describe experience of different emotions. The ancient 
Indian theory of aesthetics refers to emotions that are evoked by arts and dramas as tastes, or 
rasa. For further explanation about rasa theory, see Pollock, A Rasa Reader.  
28 Vism IX, 23. 
29 In BCA 6, 70-71 he says: “When a house is burning down and the fire has spread towards 
the next house, any grass or such in which it might spread is dragged off and taken away. 
So, when the mind it catching alight with the fire of hatred as a result of contact with 
something, it must be cast aside immediately for fear that one’s body of merit might go up 
in flames.” 
30 De Ira I. 2.3 
31 See, for example, Mapondera and Smith, “Malawi President’s Attack on Madonna Said 
to Be a ‘Goof.’” 
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example, ‘I boiled at their employees’ incompetency’; ‘The president got 
steamed up about the media reports’; ‘She was smouldering with rage as she 
talked to those scoundrels on the phone’. It can be said that fire is one of the 
favoured descriptions of anger even outside the Buddhist literature. But as 
the analogy goes, while the heat can provide us energy, being burnt, boiled, 
or steamed are surely painful. 
 
 It should also be noted that fire metaphor is not exclusively used for 
anger in Buddhist literature. Fire is a major thread running through all 
important conceptions in Buddhism. It is typically used to represent negative 
attributes or something conducive to harm in general. For example, in 
the Fire Sutta, SN 35.28, the Buddha compares our lives as living through 
fire. Our senses and the things they are in contact with i.e. whatever is 
involved in our experience, are all aflame. It concurs, by no means 
accidentally, with the term for aggregates of experience. Constituents of 
human experience which are made up of body/matter (rūpa), 
sensation/feeling (vedanā), perception (samjñā/saññā), volitional formations 
(samskāra/saṅkhāra), and consciousness (vijñāna/viññāṇa) are collectively 
referred to as skanda/khandha, meaning ‘heap’ or ‘pile’.32 Originally it refers 
to a pile of firewood for a funeral pyre. As such, fire is an allegory of life 
being burnt, and in turn feeds itself with more energy to perpetuate the fire. 
Here, fire is suffering, or dukkha, something that needs to be put out. Thus, it 
signals to the soteriological goal of nirvana, i.e. a cessation of suffering, 
through an analogy of fire having been extinguished.33 These are 
foundational concepts in Buddhist philosophy, which will be further dealt 
with in Chapter 2. But for now, it is important to see the connection, or 
rather the conflict, between the ultimate aim and anger: life is on fire; fire 
has to be put out; but anger, itself a fire, keeps fuelling it. Anger, along with 
two other fires i.e. craving and delusion (or some other variations of 
lobha/rāga, dosa/dveṣa, moha), are exactly the opposite of what they strive for. 
 
                                               
32 The analysis of khandha is commonly understood as constituents of being. However, Sue 
Hamilton in Identity and Experience argues that according to Early Buddhism they are not a 
set of what human is, these are the processes by which a being experiences. 
33 Gombrich, What the Buddha Thought, 111–28; Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, 12–13. 
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 A burning sensation is not the only description of the experience of 
anger in Buddhist texts. It is sometimes described as ‘poisonous’34 and like 
being struck by an arrow.35 Those who are familiar with Buddhist narratives 
would not fail to recognise that these are the same metaphors used in the 
famous parable in MN 63, in which poisoned arrows represent the cause of 
human suffering that should be removed immediately. But even without the 
context, it is not hard to imagine (or is presumably not unimaginable) how 
painful it can be to get poisoned or have a sharp weapon piercing through 
your body. Essentially, the typical metaphors for anger are things that could 
harm, some even so powerful they could kill us. 
 
 Of course, in terms of the level of painfulness we can’t take it literally 
that getting angry is as agonising as getting poisoned or stabbed by a knife. 
To begin with, it is doubtful that the pain of getting angry is actually the same 
as physically localised pain such as when we are stabbed. But that is the 
whole point of using metaphors. Our experience of anger may have never 
been felt particularly on our forehead or our hand, but because painful 
feeling in the sense closer to physical sensation is more ubiquitous and 
accessible, and often provokes an immediate visible reflex, such a literary 
device is purposefully employed to that effect. The exaggerated level of pain 
serves to emphasise the level of danger regarded by the Buddhist whose 
evaluation of anger is clearly negative. Pain has a significant role to play 
when considered in conjunction with desire, which will be addressed in 
detail in 3.3. For now, we can infer that the Buddhist thinks that people 
respond negatively to pain. It is an aspect that motivates people to want to 
do something to stop the pain. 
 
It is important to distinguish between the pain caused by the 
occasion of anger and the pain associated with anger itself. A mother may 
suffer pain or emotional distress on an occasion such as her daughter being 
run down by a careless driver — that is the pain that occasions whatever 
                                               
34 Vism XIV, 171; AN 7:64 
35 BCA 6.3 reads, “One’s mind finds no peace, neither enjoys pleasure or delight, nor goes 
to sleep, nor feels secure while the dart of hatred is stuck in the heart.” 
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responses a person may have, be it shock at the unexpected incident, 
fearfulness of losing her daughter, or anger at the driver. This observation is 
present in the Buddhist analysis of anger, where it is said that, “As this sharp 
pain wells up,… wrath wells up against one’s will”.36 As discussed earlier, 
where we perceive some pain, anger can often be the result. Yet, the 
Buddhist view goes a step further to claim that an angry reaction brings with 
it a pain of its own. For instance, Vism IX 22 asks us to consider the 
following: 
 
“Suppose an enemy has hurt you now in what is his domain, why 
try yourself as well to hurt your mind? — That is not his 
domain.” 
 
What appears to be suggested here is that there are, in fact, two 
episodes of pain in the phenomenology of anger. The first pain is 
engendered by harms — physical or otherwise — done by another person, 
while the second pain is felt while being angry (and never felt locally, like 
when you stub your toe) i.e. mental pain.37 In other words, anger is self-
afflictive. Therefore, it is not inevitable. This is why Vism IX, 24 cautions us 
against anger, for fear that we end up “like a man who wants to throw dust 
at another against the wind and only covers himself with it”. Although we 
cannot thoroughly avoid all kinds of pain (appetites and sickness are the least 
everyone has to face), which may be one that occasions anger, but the latter 
pain can be eschewed (through practice) by gaining control over our 
responses to circumstances that would ordinarily constitute such occasions. 
Thus, the kind of pain accompanied with anger and identified by Buddhists 
is not caused, or at least not directly caused, by anyone else but the man’s 
anger; the occasion of anger is painful, but the anger itself causes pain in its 
own right.  
 
 
                                               
36 BCA 6.23 
37 This distinction between localised feeling i.e. sensation and mental feeling, which is 
recognised in contemporary philosophy (e.g. Solomon, True to Our Feelings, 14-15), is also 
made in some Buddhist texts. For example, in Sallatha Sutta (SN 36.6) it is said that a well-
instructed Buddhist would not feel mental pain despite physical discomfort. 
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3.2 Anger and pleasure 
 
Having discussed the painful experience of anger, now we turn to an 
opposing feeling associated with anger — pleasure. In SN I 1:71, anger is 
described as having a “poisoned root and honeyed tip.” This symbolises two 
opposing qualities of anger that can be dangerous yet so tempting. 
Interestingly enough, such a description is strikingly similar to that of 
Aristotle’s account, which quotes it from The Iliad, writing: “Far sweeter than 
dripping honey down the throat it spreads in men’s hearts.”38 Whether it is a 
mere coincidence or there was actually a shared culture, what we can take 
from both accounts is how they acknowledge the pleasure that we may 
derive from anger. But as sweet and delightful as honey is, it certainly makes 
the poisoned root even more dangerous for the Buddhist as sweetness is 
apparently addictive, so much so that knowing its side effects, many people 
still can’t divorce from wanting to taste it.39 Pleasure feeling has that effect 
on most of us — we continue desiring it despite some pain that comes with 
it. 
 
 Let us dwell on the metaphor “poisoned root and honeyed tip” for a 
moment as it gives us insight into the experience in relation to anger. The 
root of a plant is long-standing and essential, but the ‘tip’ i.e. the fruit, is 
seasonal and inessential. The fruit is often the bit which tempts us, yet there 
can be no fruit without the roots. The reverse is false: a plant may have roots 
and no fruit. This suggests that the Buddhist conception of anger sees it as 
necessarily painful, yet ‘seasonally’ pleasurable. The variety and strength of 
the metaphors used in the Buddhist texts seem to be carefully chosen, 
effectively conveying anger’s connection with pleasure and pain. When 
metaphors are various and powerful, it requires more imaginative 
engagement with descriptions of such experience, which in turn stirs more of 
                                               
38 Rhetoric II. ii. 2. 
39 Such as those seventeenth century French royals who were afflicted by teeth cavities or 
current obesity problem in the modern world. There are many interesting, but not so 
pleasant facts, about producing and consuming sugar in Walvin, Sugar. Once, the comedian 
Bob Mortimer also remarked on the show Would I Lie to You? that he had lost many teeth 
due to his habit of adding 17 spoons of sugar in a cup of tea. Given much affliction, he still 
kept consuming sugar that way that he lost several teeth. 
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our feelings. In addition, the deadliness of the poison metaphor suggests that 
the experience is extremely unpleasant for them (even if it does have an 
associated fleeting joy). Again, Buddhist philosophers are trying to 
emphasise the extent of the unpleasantness of the experience of anger to 
their audience; given the fact that the reference to the pleasure of anger is 
seemingly singular, it would also appear that they are equally keen to 
downplay its more pleasant side. 
 
 The honey metaphor for anger is found in a Pāli sutta, and not 
repeated in our other main subsequent sources, including Śāntideva’s 
Bodhicaryāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya, Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, and 
Candrakīrti’s Madhayāmakāvatāra. Considering this context, Buddhist 
philosophers after the Pāli sutta tradition seem to be reluctant to admit that 
an angry person can also experience a pleasurable feeling. Perhaps this is 
because of the reason that is suggested above i.e. that anger is not essentially 
a pleasurable experience, but it is essentially painful. This is also why we see 
a multitude of pain metaphors reappearing across times and traditions. Or it 
could be the case that, even though they acknowledged it, it did not serve 
their aim — namely, to convince us of the negative effects of anger. In other 
words, it might be a pragmatic decision taken for pedagogical reasons. In 
any case, the accounts show that Buddhist philosophers stress the painful 
feeling that anger causes us more than they do its pleasure. 
 
 Although pleasure is a contingent affect in anger, it might as well be 
asked why we sometimes enjoy getting angry. Perhaps, just like Aristotle’s 
theory, they may find pleasure from anticipating revenge.40 Whether one is 
actually capable of actually obtaining revenge (the target might be too 
powerful to fancy such action done, for example) is irrelevant as she doesn’t 
have to succeed it to enjoy it and she can still hope that something bad could 
happen to him (further discussed in 3.3) In fact, a Buddhist source suggests 
something along those lines. In AN 7:64, it indicates that the pleasure we 
could find in anger is the thought or wish that an enemy suffers. Still, the 
                                               
40 Rhetoric II. ii. 2. 
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after-effect when one’s anticipation is actualised is certainly more 
pleasurable. This is where it looks potentially dangerous to the Buddhists. 
One of the problems of pleasure for them is how it is powerful in luring us to 
seek something we find pleasurable. The more one is drawn to pleasure, the 
more driven one may want to actualise the thought i.e. to exact revenge to 
savour the ‘honey’. This explanation can also apply to other actions that 
offer some sort of release such as screaming or kicking the air. For this can 
simply be a physiological pleasure response closely built in with anger for 
evolutionary reasons. This apparent connection between pain, pleasure and 
desire will be explored further in the following section. 
 
3.3 Anger as conative 
 
 Anger has a desiderative aspect. It desires something. This 
characteristic of anger can be seen from the fact (relating to the discussion in 
3.2) that an angry person is disturbed by the emotion and wants to act upon 
it. Anger seeks to satisfy itself, which may include bringing about certain 
actions or the occurrence of certain events, such as getting back at the 
person who harms you, some disaster befalling the person who harmed 
them, or simply receiving apologies, after which such disturbance subsides. 
Buddhists also recognise that in anger there is a desire, a state of 
dissatisfaction that needs something to be appeased. In many cases in the 
Buddhist texts, anger is defined by the desire to harm (such as when Nāgasena 
explains that the Buddha is free from anger as the ocean is free from the 
desire to harm).41 So the question that can be asked is: what is it that could 
occur to satiate my desire and allow my anger to subside? Perhaps more 
narrowly: what do Buddhist philosophers think that anger desires? 
 
In some Buddhist accounts, they indicate that anger is appeased by 
the wrongdoer’s suffering. In AN 7:64, a list of seven things we wish to befall 
our transgressor is laid out; if these things happen, it leaves us feeling 
satisfied. The list consists in wishing that one’s enemy looks unattractive, 
loses some sleep, fails in what she does, acquires no wealth, nor achieves 
                                               
41 Mil IV 3, 39 
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fame, has no friends, and goes to hell! The Buddha’s intention in this 
account, however, is not about what an angry person wants, but to stress the 
negative consequences that she would inevitably meet — thus if our enemy 
is angry at us, they will suffer these fates because of their own doings, not 
from our malicious wishes. This is also expressed by Śāntideva, “Suppose 
something unpleasant does befall your rival. Would your satisfaction make it 
happen again? It will not happen without a cause, merely by your wishing 
it.”42 Likewise, if we respond with anger, such affliction will turn to 
ourselves.  
 
Of course, the manners of harm are not necessarily limited to what 
have been listed in the Buddhist text and delineated above. We should not 
assume that people cannot or do not want other bad things beyond this list 
to happen to their enemy. As a matter of fact, it by no means exhausts all 
the possibilities of people’s wishes to harm the wrongdoers when they get 
angry. But whatever wishes they may be, it is acknowledged that a typical 
reaction of one who has been offended is the desire to see our enemies 
afflicted by some kind of pain. In other words, it is a desire for revenge (as 
opposed to a desire to harm which is initiated by the agent and not 
considered a retaliation). Note the distinction between a desire for and an 
actual act of revenge. You may contemplate a revenge for thirty years 
without exacting it yourself. If you act upon it, your act is done out of 
vengeance and it becomes actual revenge. But for what we are talking about 
in the case of anger, merely the ill wish suffices. This allows you to be 
satisfied when unfortunate events fall upon your target.43  
 
Again, this shares similarities with Aristotle’s conception of anger, 
whose definition includes a desire to seek revenge.44 More recently, William 
Blake’s poem A Poison Tree draws a visible line between anger and the kind of 
unintended revenge in which ills befall our enemies by telling the story of a 
pent-up anger that gives rise to a poisoned apple, eventually causing the 
                                               
42 BCA 6.87 
43 Trudy Govier offers some examples that distinguish the myriad nuances revolving 
‘revenge’ in Forgiveness and Revenge, 2-3. 
44 Rhetoric II. ii. 2. 
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death of an enemy. The poem opens with lines which advise on what 
happens when anger is expressed, and what happens when it is not: 
 
I was angry with my friend 
I told my wrath, my wrath did end. 
I was angry with my foe: 
I told it not, my wrath did grow. 
 
However, at the end of the poem we see that the anger has grown 
into an apple tree, which bears poisoned fruit. When his enemy took the 
apple from the tree, Blake writes of his pleasure at seeing the consequences 
of his anger: 
 
  And into my garden stole 
When the night had veil’d the pole: 
In the morning glad I see 
My foe outstretch’d beneath the tree. 
 
 Note that Blake writes of being ‘glad’ to see his poisoned foe. For 
Blake, then, anger is the perfect ingredient for the dish of revenge. However, 
in this instance it isn’t clear that Blake has taken any particular action to 
bring about the death of his foe (if anything, it appears to be a result of his 
foe’s further actions), he simply allows his anger to grow, and what follows is 
the death of an enemy. 
  
The desire that something bad happens to the person you are angry 
with, especially with enemies, seem entirely typical, whether those bad things 
happen because of actions taken yourself or they are simply what befalls 
them by chance. But for the same thing to happen to our loved ones seems 
unthinkable. Look at how Blake contrasts his treatment of friend and foe; 
one was spared his anger but the other was killed. People tend to draw this 
line between friends and foes. Śāntideva also makes an observation on this 
disparate treatment: “suffering, humiliation, harsh words, and disgrace: 
these we desire neither for ourselves nor our loved ones; but for our enemies 
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it is the reverse.”45 This disparity urges us to consider whether all anger 
desires harm to happen to the wrongdoer. 
 
Perhaps more common and more often do we find ourselves getting 
angry with family and friends than with ‘enemies’, but we appear to 
sometimes have a different way of dealing with them. A popular solution is 
demanding an apology or some form of acknowledgement that they were in 
the wrong, just like how Blake telling his friend supposedly wanting him to 
recognise his anger. But are apologies entirely harmless? I think it could be 
argued otherwise. An apology is an act of admitting our past wrongdoings. 
Doing so requires us to humble ourselves before the person to whom we 
apologise. Notable synonyms for ‘humble’ as a verb include ‘humiliate’, 
‘degrade’ and ‘debase’ — an apology involves lowering one’s estimation of 
oneself in relation to another. In this sense, at least, our self-esteem is 
harmed. A demand for an apology is, therefore, arguably a desire that 
causes harm to the person with whom we are angry. It doesn’t matter 
whether it’s a feigned or genuine apology, whether they really feel regretful 
or not, because the expression of it is what lowers them.  
 
And what about simply telling of our anger to the subject? This one 
is trickier as it appears as if we don’t want anything from the wrongdoer but 
an acknowledgement. To be sure, an acknowledgement must have some 
purpose. For an explanation for this, I think we should return to the point 
about pain. Typically we respond to pain in the manner of ‘pushing’, e.g. by 
turning away from it, retreating, or avoiding it (and the opposite is true of 
pleasure). In Buddhism, we can think of pleasure and pain in the sense of 
likes and dislikes respectively, which is more of disposition than deliberation, 
thus, for example, some people can find pleasure in physical pain because 
they like it. Pain prompts us to try to end or destroy whatever we think 
causes the pain. The methods to stop it can be varied. In this case, the 
friend’s wrong may damage their relationship or cause some tension 
between them, which is perhaps more painful than the pain that occasions 
                                               
45 BCA 6.11. 
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his anger. Telling his friend can be a way to reach a mutual understanding 
and reparation of their friendship, hence ending the pain.  
 
I argue that understanding anger thus gives us a better picture of the 
Buddhist notion of dveṣa. Let me remind you that, as discussed early on, dveṣa 
— a kind of negative afflictive emotion — associates with various ‘emotions’ 
from anger and hatred to irritation and annoyance. While contemporary 
philosophers tend to distinguish these conceptual cousins from one another, 
Buddhist philosophers see them as manifestations of the same poisonous 
root, viz. dveṣa. As such, a desire to harm those who cause pain to us is not 
sufficient. Dveṣa is manifested in the form of ‘opposition’.46 In terms of how 
these harms manifest themselves, irritation and annoyance might be 
associated more closely with avoidance behaviour than with seeking 
revenge. When something irritates us, we might walk away from the source 
of irritation, or if a person irritates us, we may simply stop talking to them. 
In other words you sever ties to the source of unpleasantness by retreating, 
but it doesn’t seem to involve the desire to harm it. However, we might 
sometimes act more positively to stop an irritation — by retorting to the 
person who irritates us, or by swatting the insect, etc. This kind of positive 
action isn’t done out of anger in the sense we’re familiar with, yet the 
outward manifestation of irritation here is very close to outward 
manifestations of anger, and borne of a desire to stop the unpleasant 
sensation. 
 
To be precise, due to unpleasantness of, and discontent concerning, 
the state of affairs, there’s a desire to put an end to such feelings. What we 
often do in order to ‘put an end to’ these feelings is we harm, destroy, or 
avoid that which we take to be the source of pain, which can be persons, 
things, or states of affairs. Again, this requires an appraisal of the situation. If 
we take another person to be the cause, while feeling unhappy, we may 
                                               
46 Padmasiri De Silva thinks that, according to Buddhist psychology, dveṣa or dosa is a kind of 
'avoidance desire' i.e. a desire to turn away from what we don’t like. He explains of the 
desire, "If we wish to avoid a situation or a person that we dislike, and we cannot do so, 
there is excited in us an urge to destroy, harm, fight, etc." See De Silva, An Introduction to 
Buddhist Psychology, 52. 
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harm her so she stops causing the pain, or in anticipation she will not cause 
us pain again. Alternatively, although being angry, we may ask her nicely, 
just like the way we normally deal with loved ones. It will be clear in 
Chapter 2 that the definition of anger that requires a desire to harm another 
agent will not suffice for eliminativist Buddhists who argue for all kinds of 
anger (which includes similar but milder versions of these attitudes) to be 
eliminated i.e. not just anger directed towards agents, but also anger that is 
directed towards an object or an event. It is towards the directedness of 
anger that we now turn. 
 
3.4 Anger and intentionality 
 
 Another aspect of the experience of anger that is worth turning our 
attention to is that of the intentionality of anger: the notion that anger is 
‘about’ something, or directed at some object in the world. Related to this 
discussion is the distinction between anger as an emotional response, and 
anger as a mood. I will offer some thoughts on this distinction here, though 
we will see that it will not play a key role in Buddhist philosophy as they are 
rather seen as reinforcing each other. 
 
 Anger, it is often pointed out, appears to be directed at a particular 
object (e.g. a friend’s offensive joke). More broadly, it is said that anger refers 
to, or is about, objects, persons, or events in the world.47 Colloquially, we say 
‘I’m angry with my sister’, ‘I’m angry with myself’, ‘I’m angry with the 
system’, ‘I’m angry that the train is late’, and so on. This kind of 
intentionality can be seen in Aristotle’s description of anger in The 
Nicomachean Ethics when he says, “The man who is angry at the right things 
and with the right people.”48 It is present in Buddhist texts too: BCA 6.22, 39, 
for example, suggests that we get angry at other people for doing harm to 
us.49 The way anger is described above will, I feel, be familiar to everyone. If 
a friend tells us they are angry, the natural questions to ask them would be 
                                               
47 Or in some world, perhaps, we might be angry at objects, persons or events in a fictional 
world too. 
48 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 72–73 (1125b32). Emphases are mine. 
49 “I don’t feel angry towards bile and the like, even though they cause intense suffering.” 
Emphases are mine. 
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‘What about?’, or ‘With whom?’ The proximate cause which occasions 
anger, however, is not necessarily what anger is about or aims at. Someone 
might have deliberately parked in front of your driveway, although 
ordinarily our anger is directed at the person or the car, it can also instead 
be directed at the passenger sitting next to you instead. It is about an 
obstructive situation but it is aimed at a different thing. This means that 
anger can be ‘misdirected’ from what appears to cause annoyance to some 
innocent objects. 
 
 The observation that anger is intentional seems typically correct but 
not particularly revealing. A more interesting observation to make might be 
that, despite the common opinion that intentionality marks the difference 
between emotions and moods, anger doesn’t always demonstrate this kind of 
intentionality. Sometimes we are simply angry — we might just wake up one 
day feeling that way. I think that this is where we can draw a distinction 
between anger as an emotion, and anger as a mood.  
 
 It might be tempting to conceive of the difference between emotions 
and moods as one based on intensity — that an emotion like anger is more 
intense than a mood, such as when we are depressed. However, this doesn’t 
seem entirely accurate. As Colombetti points out, “emotional episodes vary 
considerably in intensity, ranging from the mild to the overpowering, across 
and within emotion categories; likewise for moods”.50 Anxiety, although a 
mood, can be severely crippling; amusement, although an emotion, might 
be mild. A more promising candidate for distinguishing between moods and 
emotions might be their duration: emotions like anger appear to be fleeting, 
episodic, whereas moods like depression can persist for days, weeks, months, 
or even years. One reason for this difference in duration might be the 
apparent lack of intentionality that is characteristic of moods, yet common 
for emotions. If emotions are directed at the world, it is presumably much 
easier to ascertain what must be done to satisfy our emotional response of 
anger — that we get revenge, or harm our enemy (see above). However, 
                                               
50 Colombetti, The Feeling Body, 77. 
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moods do not appear to be intentional states in this way: we do not feel low 
about anything, we simply feel low. But, I wish to argue, there are times 
where anger has this character too, and thus anger might also been seen as a 
mood. 
 
 We often describe people as ‘cranky’ or ‘irritable’. But what do we 
mean when we use these terms? Someone who is irritable is easily annoyed, 
or (we might say) quick to anger. As we have seen, the Buddhist approach to 
anger doesn’t really draw a distinction between annoyance and anger — 
they are both manifestations of dveṣa. And, I feel, this conceptual blurring 
actually captures our experience of anger, because sometimes we do simply 
wake up feeling angry. Some philosophers have attempted to argue that this 
kind of anger still has certain degree of intentionality, because in such a 
mood we are angry at ‘everything’, or ‘one’s whole life’, or ‘the world’.51 
While there are numerous accounts of intentionality with which such 
arguments fit, those are not the same accounts that we have linked to 
emotion (i.e. it is about specific things, not everything or none at all). Invoking 
a new kind of intentionality in order to accommodate moods as intentional 
states seems to be an ad hoc solution, which likely undermines what seems 
like the relatively safe characterisation of emotion given above. If we take 
the same approach to moods that I take here to emotions, i.e. examining the 
experience of moods, we can probably avoid discussions of intentionality 
altogether and look more directly at the way that moods affect us. And, I 
think, the key observation here is in the way that they colour and shape our 
emotional responses to the world. 
 
 When I am in a cheerful mood, I respond to the world in particular 
ways — I smile more at strangers, I brush off unfortunate events with ease, 
and so on. When I am irritable, I snap at those around me over small issues, 
and smack my computer monitor on the side when the machine runs slowly. 
My mood seems to ‘facilitate’ the emotional responses I have to the world 
(and the reverse is perhaps also true, i.e. that repeated emotional responses 
                                               
51 See Solomon, True to Our Feelings, 39-50; Goldie, The Emotions, 143-151; Ben-Ze’ev, “The 
Thing Called Emotion”. 
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might induce a certain mood; see below). When I am in an angry mood, I’m 
not angry at any particular person, event or object, yet I might easily 
become angry at any particular person, event or object. It seems to me that 
when we describe someone as in an irritable or angry mood, what we’re 
partly describing is their proneness to angry emotional episodes, or their 
tendency to experience the world via anger. This seems to concur with the 
way Buddhists see the ‘roots’, which include greed, hatred, and ignorance, 
are salient qualities of the different emotions. They are the governing 
qualities that define the whole experience, just as Maria Heim puts it: “It 
colors and frames the rest of one’s experience”.52 
 
 The connection between emotions and moods is explained by 
Colombetti via an analogy with climate and weather.53 A given climate zone 
(e.g. tropical, Mediterranean) is characterised by specific conditions like the 
average rainfall, humidity and/or temperature, and these remain stable for 
long periods of time. Within these climate zones, the weather is changeable 
from day-to-day; some days will see rainfall, others sunshine, and so on. 
Likewise with moods and emotions: moods are protracted, and 
characterised by a tendency to induce certain changeable emotional 
responses. However, Colombetti also points out that some weather 
phenomena are only possible within certain climate zones. Again, she 
suggests, we can extend the analogy to moods and emotions: it is very 
difficult to be enthusiastic when we are in a grumpy mood. Moreover, 
dramatic shifts in the local weather patterns (for example, due to high levels 
of pollution) which then stabilise, bring about a change to that climate zone. 
Again, so with moods and emotions.  
 
 This, I think, is why Buddhism advocates so strongly against the 
negative emotions like anger, and suggests that it needs to be rooted out. For 
Buddhists, episodes of emotions and one’s character are closely connected. 
They go so far as to call a person who gets angry even once an angry person.54 
                                               
52 Heim, “Buddhism,” 23. 
53 Colombetti, The Feeling Body. 
54 Of course, they admit different degrees of an angry person, too. They liken a person who 
often gets angry and whose anger persists for a duration to a ‘line etched in stone’ which is 
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That is because an occasion of anger has to be based on one’s disposition 
(which also involves certain beliefs, feelings, desires, etc.) In turn, allowing 
oneself to respond angrily on an emotional level can bring about a more 
permanent shift in character, and the consequences of this are dire (see 
Chapter 2). The argument I develop in defence of eliminativism in Chapter 
4 will share a similar character to this observation of the effects of moods — 
I will go on to suggest that eschewing anger can fundamentally alter the way 
we experience the world, and that this way should be preferred. 
 
 The experience of anger, then, is one which can be pleasant, but is 
generally unpleasant. It often aims at something specific, desiring to 
eliminate what is obstructive. However, it does not always possess an 
intentional character, and can actually be characterised as a mood if it takes 
on a certain form. This mood can facilitate further emotional episodes of 
anger, and these can develop into a more stable character. But how does this 
character, i.e. that of the angry person, outwardly manifest itself at the 
physiological level? I turn to this issue now. 
 
 
4. Anger Unleashed 
 
 After examining the experience from the subjective perspective, it 
seems sensible that now we look at the observable aspect of anger, i.e. how 
anger is expressed.55 Anger, like other emotions, is psychophysical. This 
means that despite being essentially an attitude, anger frequently co-occurs 
with physical reactions. This intimacy between the psyche and the physical 
is no doubt striking in the case of anger. I have mentioned in 3.1 that anger 
is often accompanied by physiological changes such as increased heart rates, 
or blood pumping throughout the body, but those are bodily changes that 
are not directly observable to an outsider (i.e. they maybe observable via 
                                               
‘not easily erased by wind and water’. On the other hand, those whose anger doesn’t persist 
long are likened to a line etched in the ground (AN 3:132). 
55 It may be pointed out indeed that ‘expressions’ of anger can be distinguished in terms of 
physiological changes and behaviour or action. For some may argue that such physical 
changes as increased heart rates and so on necessarily accompany anger and so is 
recognised as involuntary expression, as opposed to voluntary action. However, the 
distinction seems absent in the Buddhist literature, perhaps, because it does not play any 
significant role in their ethical discussion which aims to eradicate anger in all forms anyway. 
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tools like stethoscopes or heart rate monitors). Unless the surging blood on 
your face gives it away, anger could go unnoticed. This section examines 
characteristic expressions of anger — from merely physiological changes to 
actions and behaviours. 
 
 Our body suffers typical physiological effects when we are angry. 
Some telltale signs of it, as Seneca observes, include quivering lips, pressing 
teeth, heavy and frequent sighing, and change of colour.56 Altogether it 
certainly forms a threatening look and communicates something to other 
people. An angry face is very distinctive and easily recognisable. In a recent 
study, Paul Ekman claims that angry face is recognisable even across 
cultures.57 This thus has a very powerful communicative effect. However, 
Buddhists rarely make an observation simply in terms of physiological 
changes, perhaps except when they describe them in evaluative terms i.e. 
that an angry person is ‘ugly’, which I believe is their preferred perception of 
facial expressions that are supposed to be threatening. 
 
 Rather than merely bodily reactions, actions in relation to anger are 
observed, notably those we typically see as violent and aggressive. This 
includes verbal and physical abuse, and in the most extreme cases, killing. 
Although these individual actions may lead to grave harm to others, they do 
not seem to play a significant part in the discussion in Buddhist texts. Those 
actions are not condemned for being constituted by violence as such. 
Rather, they are emphasised as a sorry result from getting angry, a result 
that is precipitated by an impulse to act without concerns for right and 
wrong.58 Buddhists pay more attention to treating anger in terms of 
character, tendency, or disposition. Sometimes it exhibits itself clearly. For 
example, in Buddhaghosa’s advice on meditation preparation, he 
distinguishes people in accordance with their temperament. The following 
                                               
56 De Ira I. 1.3-4 
57 Ekman, Emotions Revealed. 
58 Interesting enough, in AN 7:64, the moral wrongs the angry person commits are 
decidedly reprehensible and can be seen as self-inflicted. Killing one’s mother and oneself, 
who are dearest to ourselves, is a result of poor judgement that in the end makes us suffer 
most. 
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description is observed to be the behaviour of such character dominated by 
anger and its kin: 
 
“One of hating temperament walks as though he were digging 
with the points of his feet, puts his foot down quickly, lifts it up 
quickly, and his step is dragged along. [The stance] of one of 
hating temperament is rigid … One of hating temperament 
spreads his bed hastily anyhow; with his body flung down he sleeps 
with a scowl. When woken, he gets up quickly and answer as 
though annoyed.…grasps the broom tightly, and he sweeps 
uncleanly and unevenly with a harsh noise, hurriedly throwing up 
the sand on each side… When one of hating temperament sees 
even a slightly unpleasing visible object, he avoids looking long as 
if he were tired, he picks out trivial faults, discounts genuine 
virtues, and when departing, he does so without regret as if 
anxious to leave.”59 
 
 Again, it appears that the Buddhist analysis of anger is consistent 
with Colombetti’s account we have just discussed above regarding a 
treatment of emotions — here, anger — in terms of emotion and mood, i.e. 
contrasting the episodic and explosive nature of one, and the continuous and 
static nature of the other. Buddhists perhaps agree with Colombetti that 
someone who gets (episodically) angry habitually will form such a 
temperament, which in turn induces more episodic anger. I suppose this 
account is typically the kind of case in which we will judge someone an 
angry person. We expect that their behaviour has some indication of their 
proneness to anger; they walk fast, always appear in haste, seem careless, 
and get annoyed easily as if they are going to snap anytime.  
 
But, in contrast, an observation of an angry person in MN 21 is the 
opposite. This time, the angry person always appears calm, no indications 
(as described by Buddhaghosa) are observed. The story, which belongs to 
the same sutta of the Simile of the Saw, is told of a nimble and clever maid 
                                               
59 Vism III, 88-89, 91, 94 
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who works for a young lady named Vedehikā. The lady is known for being 
gentle and peaceful, while the maid has always done her work impeccably. 
The maid somehow wants to test Vedehikā, thinking, “How is it now, while 
she does not show anger, is it nevertheless actually present in her or is it 
absent? Or else is it just because my work is neat that my lady shows no 
anger though it is actually present in her?”60 The next morning, the clever 
maid deliberately wakes up late and fails to do her job properly. As she finds 
out, the lady Vedehikā shows her well-hidden side, becoming more growly 
and physically violent as days pass in which she tests her out. In this account, 
not all angry people have to show such typical behaviour. This is perhaps a 
good reason to focus on anger’s dispositions rather than its outward 
symptoms. 
 
 In normal usage, we tend to distinguish between angry people (i.e. 
those who habitually get angry and are more likely to get angry), and people 
overwhelmed by anger (i.e. those who have episodes of anger). The latter 
leaves out an implication of habit and tendency. This distinction appears to 
be absent in the Buddhist texts: those who rarely become angry, but still get 
angry, are treated as angry persons. While they may be different in terms of 
degrees of likeliness for having episodic anger, it is not significant enough for 
Buddhists to address such a distinction. Rather than different, they are seen 
as more similar in terms of the potential for them to become angry. 
 
 So, given the characterisation of anger and angry people above, we 
may then ask ‘What distinguishes angerless people from angry people?’. In 
section 2, we saw that two factors have to be met: an external situation 
comes together with our perception. The key difference, according to 
Buddhism, lies in the perception; imagine the exact same situation but 
where two people react to it differently; we find desirability and 
undesirability in the external factors based on our historical mental 
experience. In the case of Vedehikā, she is presented with two different 
situations: one orderly and in control, the other untidy and resistant, and 
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obviously she prefers the former to the latter, for whatever reason. Vedehikā 
does not change the way she sees the situation to become angry, but the 
situation changes into one that disturbs her. She has managed to establish a 
reputation as a gentle person only because the world operates in ways that 
have been so agreeable to her. As such, how one responds to undesirable 
situations is what differentiates angry from angerless people. This is made 
possible by a certain perception of oneself and the world that does not find 
unpleasantness of harmfulness in the situation, and that is the aim for the 
Buddhists to achieve. This perception is a significant part of the Buddhist 
argument in favour of elimination of anger, which we shall see in the 
chapters that follow.  
 
 A person like Vedehikā is not angerless. Although her anger is not 
always observable, it will emerge when she finds something displeasing or of 
which she disapproves. As the Buddha explains:  
 
“So too, bhikkhus, some bhikkhu is extremely gentle, extremely 
meek, extremely peaceful, so long as disagreeable courses of 
speech do not touch him. But it is when disagreeable courses of 
speech touch him that it can be understood whether that bhikkhu 
is really kind, gentle, and peaceful.”61  
 
This is not merely an issue about the discrepancy between 
experiencing and expressing anger, or observable and unobservable 
behaviour. It is about the latent quality of anger which is rooted in our 
mental and emotional character. As such, rather than the root cause that we 
need to deal with, episodes of anger, as the Buddhists see it, are a symptom 
of something more problematic in our mind. As long as the root cause is left 
untreated, anger will emerge again when it finds something unpleasing like 
the lady Vedehikā. This is probably why the Buddhists do not talk much 
about consequences of angry action per se, but rather about actions motivated 
by anger. Thus expressing or acting out of anger in any way, albeit typically 
with aggression, is a serious concern as it is a result of flawed character and a 
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cause that tends to reinforce the character. Buddhaghosa’s categorisation of 
people according to their temperament is much more relevant for this 
reason: it is part of a meditative scheme which is meant, partly, to rid oneself 
of anger.  
 
 We need to bear in mind, then, that the main focus of the Buddhists 
is anger as a motivation. The gap between feeling anger and acting angrily is 
important in this matter. Angry feeling does not always lead to angry 
behaviour, and conversely, angry behaviour does not always indicate angry 
feeling. While angry behaviour such as chastising, yelling, assaulting, etc. 
may be recognisable as aggression, some aggressive actions are not done out 
of anger. A woman in an abusive relationship may kill her partner out of 
fear, for example. So violence is not necessarily an angry act, it can even be 
motivated by some positive emotions, according to some Buddhist sources.62 
(This is an important point that will appear again in Chapter 3.) On the  
other hand, acting out of anger is not necessarily violent. I can get angry and 
demand an apology politely from an annoying child. As such, we have to 
distinguish carefully between angry behaviour or action (i.e. overt 
expressions that we recognise as fitting the angry phenomenological state) 
and an action motivated by anger (i.e. expressions that results from angry 
phenomenological state). When the Buddhist talks about angry action, what 
they mean is not simply the overt display that fits the description of anger, 
but also the motivation of anger. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Working across cultures and linguistic traditions, we have seen, can 
pose problems. However, by focusing on the phenomenological aspects of 
occasions of anger, as they appear in the Buddhist texts, we can begin to 
overcome some of these problems and find a starting point for our analysis. 
We have seen that occasions of anger typically involve instances in which 
                                               
62 For example, the story of the compassionate ship captain in the Upāyakauśalya Sūtra who 
made a compassionate killing by killing the man who intended to rob and kill all the traders 
aboard the ship. 
   63 
we, or something we value, suffer harm. The angry response usually 
demonstrates a number of key phenomenological aspects: painfulness (anger 
is unpleasant) or, on rare occasions, pleasure (anger is sometimes enjoyable); 
anger is also experience as conative i.e. it desires something, such as revenge, 
or an apology; relatedly, then, anger is experienced as intentional i.e. it is 
‘about’, or directed at, someone or something. However, I have also 
suggested that this latter observation need not always be true – anger can 
also be a mood, and this mood can effect the way we come to perceive the 
world. Because of this character, anger can manifest itself as both physical 
symptoms and behaviour. However, the Buddhist is primarily concerned 
with its mental or psychological effects, rather than its outward symptoms. 
This sets up the scope of the challenge for the Buddhist Eliminativist – not 
simply preventing angry actions, but preventing anger from arising 
altogether. I turn to their arguments in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two:  
BUDDHIST ARGUMENTS FOR THE 
ELIMINATION OF ANGER 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Having seen what is involved in anger in Chapter 1, we now turn to 
an examination of the Buddhist arguments against anger. The arguments 
essentially fall under three broad claims: (1) that our actual experience of 
anger shows it to be both unpleasant and unhelpful, (2) that anger impairs 
our moral development by hindering the cultivation of specific virtues, and 
(3) that anger follows from an epistemic or cognitive error. These latter two 
claims are intimately connected to the Buddhist notions of enlightenment 
and happiness, thus section 1 outlines these ideas in order to provide 
appropriate background to the Buddhist arguments against anger. The 
Buddhist notion of happiness differs from the hedonistic conception of 
happiness (i.e. as pleasure), and instead bases happiness in the development 
of virtues. In this way, anything which impedes the development of virtues 
leads us away from happiness and towards suffering. This connects, in turn, 
to two different aspects of enlightenment: moral and epistemic. The former 
concerns the development of virtues (and the eschewing of vice), and the 
second concerns achieving true understanding of the world. Enlightenment 
requires both aspects to be achieved, thus claims (2) and (3) above relate to 
these different aspects of enlightenment. Claim (1), by contrast, is not unique 
to Buddhism — this claim has been defended in Western literature, but is 
also present in Buddhist thought. This claim is pragmatic in nature — it 
concerns ordinary happiness, since it applies beyond the Buddhist approach 
to anger. However, as we will see below, this claim has been disputed in 
recent treatments of the topic of anger, essentially leading to two distinct 
positions on anger: Moderationism and Eliminativism, which we outline in 
brief in section 2.63 Moderationism is the position that at least some kind of 
                                               
63 This classification is owed to Peter Vernezze’s paper “Moderation or the Middle Way?” 
and Christopher Gowans’ “The Elimination of Anger.” 
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anger is sometimes good or right. Eliminativism, by contrast, holds that all 
anger is not good and thus should be eliminated. I will argue in subsequent 
chapters that the Buddhist approach to anger offers us stronger reasons to 
eliminate it altogether, contrary to the Moderationist position that seeks to 
defend some kind(s) of anger.  
 
With the necessary background work done in the first two sections of 
this chapter, sections 3 to 5 delineate the arguments enumerated above, 
providing an overview of the arguments the Buddhist offers against anger. 
Clearly, this traditional interpretation of Buddhism — that we should 
eliminate anger — has not persuaded everyone, as the Moderationist view is 
currently en vogue. Thus, this chapter sets the stage for an analysis of 
moderationist arguments in chapter 3. However, before we can properly 
consider my own response to those, one final piece of background context is 
required — the Buddhist view of suffering. Section 6 introduces and outlines 
the Buddhist understanding of suffering, which helps us to see precisely why 
they feel that anger ought to be eliminated altogether. With this background 
in place, we are positioned to begin building the central arguments of this 
thesis in the remaining chapters. 
 
 
1. Happiness and Enlightenment 
 
 According to Buddhism, anger can be considered harmful in a 
teleological sense; that is, anger harms certain ends that are held to be good. In 
other words, the Buddhist argument in favour of eliminating anger is, in 
part, grounded on its effects and consequences vis-à-vis such goals (see 
section 2). It will be a useful starting point for us, then, to outline precisely 
what the Buddhist sees as the ultimate goals in life — once we have 
established these, we can begin to outline and understand the three main 
kinds of arguments against anger. 
 
It is well known that the ultimate goal of Buddhism is enlightenment, or 
a cessation of suffering. Buddhists claim that anger is harmful precisely 
because it inhibits one’s progress to enlightenment (in various ways, as we 
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shall see below). However, while the Buddhist tries to convince us that 
enlightenment is what we should aim for, it nonetheless may not be the goal 
we want for ourselves. It is probably not mistaken to say that most people 
have a more mundane goal than enlightenment — namely, happiness. Even 
so, the Buddhist case against anger also applies to those who want to be 
happy because, according to Buddhism, happiness is another desirable goal 
harmed by anger. I think these two goals, enlightenment and happiness, can 
be the basis for our analysis of how anger is seen as a destructive emotion: 
anger is inappropriate because it impedes the pursuit of these desirable ends. 
 
Although it is not possible within the confines of this thesis to give a 
full account and analysis of the Buddhist notion of happiness (particularly 
given that there is no singular account in the Buddhist literature, just as 
there is not in the Western literature on happiness), given its significance in 
relation to the Buddhist arguments against anger we must attempt to outline 
the central ideas therein. Happiness seems to be the most evident and basic 
desirable goal, not just for Buddhists, but for most human beings. 
Nevertheless, the notion itself raises a lot of problems, for what makes a 
person happy seems to vary considerably from one person to the next. 
Hedonists may find sensual pleasure fundamental to what it means to be 
happy, while others may insist on our participation in a more refined sense 
of happiness. What does it mean, then, when the Buddhists talk about 
happiness, and how does it relate to enlightenment? 
 
 Once again, to overcome language barriers, it is probably a good 
idea to start by identifying the term to which we are referring. It is the term 
sukha, for which ‘happiness’ is adopted as its translation here, and it is this 
kind of happiness that we often find as a general life pursuit for ordinary 
people.64 Sukha varies in meaning slightly in different Buddhist contexts, but 
in the most common, conventional usage of the term it is characterised as a 
                                               
64 There is another term, pīti (or prīti in Sanskrit), that is close to sukha and so sometimes is 
translated as ‘happiness’. Both terms are sometimes referred together but not treated as 
exchangeable. See their subtle distinction in Appendix. 
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phenomenon of feeling.65 To be precise, it is a pleasant feeling arising from 
sensual contact with the external world. It is the experience of enjoying 
agreeable objects such as seeing a beautiful landscape, tasting the food one 
likes, or smelling a nice fragrance. But the factors that give rise to the 
experience do not necessarily originate from sensational contact with the 
external world; they can spring from one’s own mind as well. Another kind 
of sukha is often found in the meditative context in which it appears to arise 
at different levels of meditative progress.66 For example, SN 12.23 indicates 
that sukha can be found as a result of tranquility of the mind and pervades the 
body, thus happiness in the Buddhist sense can be regarded as (stemming 
from) “a deep sense of serenity and fulfillment that pervades and underlies 
all [of our] emotional states.”67 For that reason, it makes sense to equate 
happiness in the Buddhist sense with something like wellbeing. Despite 
different causes of sukha, it remains that the phenomenon is recognised as 
something to be felt. In other words, sukha is not only pleasure from 
sensations, but any experiences that contain pleasant feelings. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is one other notable use of the term. Sukha is 
occasionally used to describe the state of liberation as the highest happiness 
(nibbānaparamaṃ sukhaṃ).68 It is disputable how such a state should be 
understood: happiness of the highest intensity, or a categorically different 
kind of happiness. However, what we know for certain is that the state of 
liberation is said to be relieved of sensory pleasure. In that case, another 
option arises: it is simply a void of feeling albeit described as happiness. 
                                               
65 In a Buddhist categorisation of the mind, this element of feeling or sensation is called 
vedanā as opposed to other mental aggregates, namely perception (saṃjñā/saññā), mental 
formations (saṃskāra/saṅkhāra), and consciousness (vijñāna/viññāṇa). The affective quality of 
experience is classified into pleasant (sukha), painful (dukkha), and neutral (adukkhamasukkha, 
literally neither-pain-nor-pleasant). 
66 One finds such feeling across the early levels of concentrative absorption in which 
sensations are not yet abandoned. Steven Collins, relying on Pāli commentaries, explains 
that sukha as a result of Level 3 meditation is the highest level of meditation that still involves 
with sensation. He further explains that at Level 4 despite being said to be sukha, another 
type of happiness arises — upekkha or equanimity. This is not merely an absence of 
pleasurable and painful feelings, but a third kind of feeling that is peaceful and sublime. 
Ultimately at Level 9, i.e. nirvana, in which there is a cessation of perception and feeling, 
sukha is not a matter of feeling anymore. See Collins, Nirvana: Concept, Imagery, Narrative, 72-5. 
67 Ricard, The Habits of Happiness.  
68 For example, Dhp 203, 204. 
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While it’s possible that the state can be characterised by either of the three 
cases, they are in fact not necessarily exclusive from one another, 
particularly the last possibility (void of feeling) that could be compatible with 
either of the former two (sukha of greatest degree and a totally different type 
of happiness). For a void of feeling may either give rise to the most intense 
feeling of happiness (in the sense of traditional sukha), or a different kind of 
happiness that is superior to sukha but indescribable due to a lack of 
vocabulary. Nevertheless, the first option should not be the likely 
phenomenon when considering that if there’s a void of feeling, and if sukha 
involves feeling, then such state cannot be sukha in the traditional sense. So 
we are left with only three possibilities to think about the characteristic of 
enlightened state; a different kind of happiness, a void of feeling, or a void of 
feeling which then gives rise to a different kind of happiness. In any case, 
nirvanic sukha — or happiness that is not a feeling — is something 
unrecognisable for ordinary people and is not the supposed goal in this level 
of wellbeing. 
 
So, how does happiness (in the Buddhist sense) connect to 
enlightenment? Again, the answer is rather complex, but we can outline the 
main points as follows. Despite being an independent goal, the goodness of 
happiness cannot be independent from enlightenment because if the latter is 
the ultimate good, any thing or action has its value determined in relation to 
the highest end. That is to say, something is good insofar as it is conducive to 
enlightenment. Therefore, if happiness is recognised as a desirable end, it 
has to be at least instrumental — if not necessary — to an attainment of 
enlightenment. Yet it is important to observe that enlightenment involves 
two key aspects: moral development and epistemic insight. Our moral 
development connects to happiness because, for the Buddhist, our moral 
development depends upon developing a specific set of virtues e.g. 
generosity, patience, loving-kindness etc. In developing these virtues, we also 
develop the capacity to perceive and experience the world in a new way (i.e. 
in a more generous, or patient etc., way; see Chapter 4), which in turn 
enhances our wellbeing as we come to avoid frustrations, confrontations etc. 
Epistemic insight, too, affords us enhanced wellbeing because it is only when 
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we truly understand the nature of the world that we can exercise our virtues 
fully. It is when we achieve both the moral and epistemic aspects that we 
attain enlightenment. 
 
In this way, we can think of wellbeing as operating at two levels, as 
Christopher Gowans suggests: unenlightened wellbeing and enlightened 
wellbeing.69 Our ordinary wellbeing may be thought of as a happy life for an 
unenlightened person. In contrast, the ultimate wellbeing is the perfect kind 
of life that is exemplified by enlightened beings. On this view, the important 
distinction of unenlightened (or merely happy) and enlightened life lies in the 
presence of suffering, or lack thereof. Because we know, at least, that the 
nature of being enlightened is an absence of suffering, we also know that an 
unenlightened life must be tainted by some level of suffering. To that extent, 
it makes sense to think that the less suffering there is, the happier the life it is, 
or that life gets better as one is reaching towards the ultimate goal that is a 
cessation of suffering. In other words, there are varying degrees of happiness 
available to an unenlightened being, but no ordinary happy life is 
comparable with being enlightened. 
 
Given the essential quality of happiness is about feeling, pursuing the 
goal of an unenlightened life has limitations. Unlike the highest bliss, the 
kind of happiness that the unenlightened beings feel is as fleeting and 
fluctuating as everything else. Our nature dictates that the point at which 
our senses can be satisfied does not last. For example, even with food that is 
well-seasoned, we can still only enjoy it for as long as we are capable of 
eating it; too much of it will turn a delicious dish into a sickening one. It 
works similarly for other senses; no matter how good it is, one can’t 
experience a certain thing repeatedly without getting numb to or sick of it. 
Pleasure can only last for a while, either because the nature of the thing we 
like changes (e.g. grapes are out of season now, so they are not as good as a 
few months ago), or our tastes change (e.g. I don’t enjoy heavy metal 
anymore, I’m into K-Pop lately), or simply we have had enough of it, like 
                                               
69 Gowans, “Buddhist Well-Being.” 
   70 
food and sex — but only for now. And before long we will remember how 
good that experience was and crave for it again. Because of how short-lived 
this cycle is, we will always struggle as long as pleasurable feeling is our only 
goal. This is a form of suffering, which we will discuss in section 6 below. 
This is precisely why the Buddhist does not take happiness as the final goal. 
For mere happiness does not offer the complete absence of suffering. Yet, by 
striving for it one can become happier than others, and that already makes a 
lot of difference. From the Buddhist point of view there is a good reason why 
happiness makes for a suitable goal. The essential quality of sukha, i.e. 
pleasant feeling, is so simple and almost universally recognised as desirable. 
As most people have a leaning towards it, if anybody were to offer us a way 
to become happier, who wouldn’t be tempted? This may be a tactic many 
moralists would use to persuade us to cultivate virtues they endorse. If we 
are convinced by this promise from the Buddhists, then we are already led, 
perhaps unknowingly, to actually work towards enlightenment. 
 
 Sukha should not, however, be understood as merely a pleasant 
feeling, as we noted above. The extensive Buddhist teaching which 
prescribes us how to behave would have become pointless if happiness could 
be attained just by doing whatever we find pleasurable. Nobody needs to be 
taught what we were born capable to do. Instead, the Buddhists have a 
prescriptive sense of happiness that we should aim for. Nāgārjuna enjoins us 
to understand sukha in terms of an elevated state (abhyudaya). While abhyudaya 
can also translate to ‘happiness’, the more common meaning of it is ‘sunrise’, 
while other meanings include ‘increase’, ‘prosperity’, ‘good result’ — the 
meanings that relate to a sense of elevation (with a formation of two prefixes, 
abhi and ud, which express an upward motion, hence implying superiority in 
rank, place, etc.)70 This suggests how their sense of ordinary wellbeing 
involves more than merely self-gratification, which is undemanding and 
already embedded in our natural inclinations (although pleasant feelings are 
not excluded from this exalted experience). Therefore, this revised conception 
is only a starting point. More important is how to attain this state; Nāgārjuna 
                                               
70 The Institute of Indology and Tamil Studies, Cologne University, “Cologne Digital 
Sanskrit Dictionaries.” 
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then promises us that such happiness can be found through faith in the 
teaching and possibility of enlightenment, and practicing moral disciplines in 
our ordinary lives.71  
 
 This approach to the greater form of sukha is not at all 
unrecognisable in other Buddhist sources. The early Buddhist canon and 
later commentaries generally agree that the way one can find happiness is by 
cultivating virtues such as faith, generosity, and ethical practices, for a start. 
And they even provide specific instructions to achieving them. For instance, 
there are cautions specifically for householders in the suttas to avoid killing, 
stealing, adultery, lying, and consuming intoxicating substances. There are 
also instructions for people to actively engage in acts of giving. Essentially, 
these are ways to avoid creating more suffering for yourself, as the less 
suffering you experience, the happier you get. This is because these are 
actions that concur with, or are conducive to, a cessation of suffering 
(explored more in Chapter 4). It is interesting to note that these are laid out 
as suggestions, rather than rules, for us to follow since, if we didn’t follow, 
there would not be some external authority to punish us. However, failure to 
take up these suggestions would ensure that we would not be rewarded with 
the happiness we are after. In other words, the Buddhist motto is most likely 
to be “if you want to have happiness, work (as suggested) for it.” This sort of 
pedagogical approach is important in shaping my own version of Buddhist 
eliminativist argument, as we shall see in Chapter 4. 
  
 These demands are not detached from daily lives. Householders, i.e. 
those who do not want to give up material pleasure (which should be 
dissolved at the level of ultimate well-being), can find a middle ground by 
incorporating these virtues while going about their business. We tend to 
believe wealth, family, and some sensual pleasures are part of wellbeing, and 
Buddhists do not turn away from such practical struggles either. Sources 
from across Buddhist traditions indicate that they recognise the pursuit of 
wellbeing as including a possession of wealth, respect, good friends, a long 
                                               
71 Carpenter, “Aiming at Happiness, Aiming at Ultimate Truth.” 
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and healthy life, and good rebirth.72 Still, the real wellbeing in Buddhism 
requires another condition. In many instances in the texts that recognise the 
desirable goals, the emphasis is actually placed on the other part of the 
discourse, namely the ways to attain them. For example, in AN 4.61 it says 
“May wealth come to me righteously,” and adds cases of “wealth that has 
gone to good use, that has been properly utilised and used for a worthy cause.”73 
In this sense, wellbeing is closely married to moral concerns. Consequently, 
one needs to be careful not to think that we can use whatever means to 
achieve these goals. Genuine happiness, for Buddhists, only comes with 
actions that are based on moral goods,74 and this is what we should aim for. 
 
 These guidelines are in fact a part of the regime for enlightenment, 
leading both to happiness and an end of suffering. A prerequisite to a 
cessation of suffering is epistemological reorientation; that is, by 
understanding and internalising the nature of reality — as impermanent, 
interdependent, and lacking essential substance — and engaging with it 
accordingly. Such a view can be understood in the sense of dharma, which is 
about the ultimate truth or how things really are. Adopting this 
metaphysical position aids the development of moral virtues like patience 
and compassion, and thus in turn helps us to pursue actions which reduce 
suffering, enhance our wellbeing, and put us closer to enlightenment. We 
will explore the metaphysical picture underlying this epistemological 
reorientation in section 5 below, and we will come to see the same 
requirement that we adopt this metaphysical view applies to the elimination 
of anger in Chapter 4.  
 
 So, with these accounts of happiness and enlightenment set out, and 
their relationship established, we can start to turn our attention to the 
Buddhist arguments against anger. Although Buddhist commentators do not 
present their arguments in the way philosophers in Anglo-European 
                                               
72 AN 4.61 ff.; AN 7.64; MN 135; Dhp XV (Sukhavagga); Vism. I 23; BCA VI 3-5. 
73 Emphases are mine. 
74 See, for example, the Noble Eightfold Path, which summarises practices that lead to 
liberation. It recommends us to do right on speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, 
concentration, view, and resolve.  
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traditions are familiar with, I think we can still make sense of how they 
justify their Eliminativist position. What we shall see is that there are three 
main types of argument that the Buddhists raise against anger:  
 
(1) That our actual experience of anger shows it to be both 
unpleasant and unhelpful, thus harming our pursuit of happiness; 
(2) That anger impairs our moral development by hindering the 
cultivation of specific virtues, thus impairing our pursuit of the moral 
aspect of enlightenment, and;  
(3) That anger follows from an epistemic or cognitive error, thus 
stemming from (and reinforcing) a failure to attain the epistemic 
aspect of enlightenment. 
 
These arguments may be more broadly characterised in two ways. 
The first two can be considered teleological arguments. This relies on the 
negative effects that anger has on certain desirable ends, happiness and 
enlightenment, with the latter being the ultimate end. However, I wish to 
suggest in this thesis, this kind of argument alone is not sufficient to compel 
the Buddhist to conclude that anger ought to be eliminated. As we shall see 
in section 2, before revisiting the view in depth in Chapter 3, an argument of 
a consequentialist nature like this can be offered for the opposite position — 
Moderationists insist that anger yields positive consequences. This argument 
for the Buddhist, however, could succeed if it could be grounded in the 
position that anger is intrinsically bad because it arises out of a 
misconception of reality, which is the third sort of argument, involving an 
epistemic failure. This claim is interlaced with the Buddhist notion of ‘no-
self’ (anātman) and other related concepts such as the impermanent condition 
of things (anicca) and dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda or paṭiccasamuppāda 
in Pali). When we fail to see the world from this metaphysical position, the 
suggestion goes, then we end up with a view of the world that leans on a 
sense of a substantial, static, independent self, which can be harmed (and 
thus angry) while, in fact, there’s no such thing to be harmed to begin with. 
This makes every instance of anger inappropriate and irrational, leaving no 
middle ground to allow even for a moderation of anger. 
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 An initial problem might be thought to immediately arise from the 
characterisation just given — since the consequentialist arguments suggest 
the anger harms our prospects of happiness and liberation, but the second 
claims that no injury is actually done to ourselves by other people because 
there is no self to be harmed, then isn’t there an apparent contradiction? 
Why doesn’t the no-self assumption apply to both cases? The answer to this 
depends upon a complex Buddhist metaphysics that we cannot fully address 
within the scope of this thesis. However, we will see in Chapter 4 that there 
is a way to make sense of this issue. However, we must first detail an 
important distinction so far only hinted at, between Eliminativism and 
Moderationism. After doing this, we can begin to analyse their respective 
positions over the next two chapters. 
 
 
2. Eliminativism and Moderationism 
 
 As is the case of most philosophical traditions with a long history, 
several notions in Buddhist philosophy that have been passed on and 
interpreted are not univocal. Anger is one of those. Certainly anger has been 
largely treated as a threat to the Buddhist path, but although some recognise 
the urgency to uproot such a toxic emotion, others contend that it can be 
useful and compatible with Buddhist teaching — in other words, the views 
within the tradition are torn between Eliminativism and Moderationism. 
 
 It would probably not be a surprise, even for people coming from a 
different tradition, to find out that the Buddhists generally disapprove of 
anger. But this conception is not peculiar to Buddhism, it is a generally 
accepted one and, in fact, is an opinion actually shared by moderationists 
and eliminativists (though they disagree on what one should aim to do with 
such anger). Although the eliminativist view is not as widely held as 
moderationism, in Buddhist hands it offers an alternative and interesting 
insight into the nature of anger and ourselves (as I will argue in Chapter 4). 
The view is also notably represented by some of the giants of the ancient 
world, the Stoics. Traditional readings of Buddhism hold that the Buddhist 
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philosophical system requires an extirpation of anger, or claims that the 
Buddha does not advocate any form of anger; thus, Buddhism has 
traditionally been seen as a form of eliminativism. Irrespective of its 
justification, this view regards anger as always a bad emotion, as it is one of 
the root causes of suffering according to Buddhist thought. Also, the 
Buddha’s censure of anger is not restricted to overt displays of anger, it 
includes any angry thoughts and intentions too. That is to say, it is not 
enough to just suppress anger; while not showing angry behaviour, anger 
still lingers in our thoughts. As we saw in Chapter 1, a person with an angry 
thought is as much an angry person as those who express anger. Therefore, 
all forms of anger should be curbed when they arise, and it should ultimately 
be eliminated such that it cannot arise again. 
  
 A number of key texts appear to support the view that anger should 
not only be restrained, but ultimately needs to be removed from a person’s 
mind. The Dhammapada, an early Buddhist text, praises someone who 
controls anger: “He who can control his rising anger as a coachman controls 
his carriage at full speed, this man I call a good driver: others merely hold 
the reins.”75. However, the goal of this section of the Dhammapada (kodhavaggo) 
is explicitly stated in the opening verse: it actually encourages us to “forsake 
anger”76, not simply control it. Another source which supposedly is among 
the Buddha’s first teachings says, “[Monastics] shouldn’t be influenced by 
anger and conceit; they should live having uprooted these.”77 The thesis of 
absolute absence of anger is often represented by the following passage in a 
nikāya, a portion of the Sutta Piṭaka which partly forms the early Buddhist 
canonical texts: 
  
“If anyone should give you a blow with his hand, with a clod, 
with a stick, or with a knife, … you should train thus: ‘My mind 
will be unaffected, and I shall utter no evil words; I shall abide 
compassionate for his welfare, with a mind of loving-kindness, 
                                               
75 Dhp 222 
76 Dhp 221 
77 Fronsdal, The Buddha before Buddhism, 135. 
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without inner hate.’… Bhikkhus, even if bandits were to sever 
you savagely limb by limb with a two-handled saw, he who gave 
rise to a mind of hate towards them would not be carrying out my 
teaching.”78  
 
 The position they take is very extreme: despite brutal harms and 
great wrongs, one should not give in to anger. Indeed, our first thoughts 
reading the passage might include such questions as how we could be able to 
do that, or why we need to go that far when our anger is justified, questions 
we will discuss below. The significance in painting this horrifying picture is 
to warn us of the dangers of anger: that it may be more harmful than such 
physical torment. If we have to avoid it to the degree that relatively harmless 
responses such as simply cursing and feeling angry towards such cruelty is 
wrong, I suppose nothing can legitimise our anger, and thus there is no 
place for anger in a Buddhist moral life. Taking the sutta into account, Peter 
Vernezze also argues that anger does not exist in the Buddhist ideal life. His 
suggestion is that there is no evidence in the early texts for any endorsement 
of anger from the Buddha. And with an incident so extreme as The Simile of 
the Saw quoted above, we could expect him to permit such a normatively 
justified anger, but instead he recommends that we be concerned about the 
perpetrator’s wellbeing.79 Moreover, the thesis is also supported by the 
characterisation of Buddhist enlightened persons as having no anger.80 
 
 Apparently, most Buddhist philosophers and modern scholars 
concur that Buddhist ideals require the elimination of anger. Following the 
sutta tradition, they invoke The Simile of the Saw time and again. 
Buddhaghosa gives a direct reference to this passage by quoting it.81 
Similarly, Candrakīrti joins the tradition by alluding to the barbaric act of 
                                               
78 MN 21 
79 Vernezze, “Moderation or the Middle Way,” 3. 
80 For example, the Buddha declared that he was without anger (Sutta Nipāta 19, quoted in 
Milindapañhā III 12), and Sārīputta, one of the Buddha’s main disciple, is described as ‘the 
unresentful’ by a contemporary Buddhist scholar due to many provoking incidents to which 
he did not have an angry response. See Nyanaponika and Hecker, Great Disciples of the 
Buddha, 25. 
81 Vism. IX, 15 
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dismembering bodies,82 and also explicitly states that anger must be “wholly 
rooted out”.83 The advice does not only apply to bodhisattvas: common 
people too should follow it.84 In Śāntideva’s compilation, in contrast, 
although the sutta is not directly cited, the manner of offences (like tearing up 
one’s body) certainly conjures up a similar impression, and the instruction to 
harbour no angry feeling also encapsulates the central idea of the passage.85 
Some modern Buddhist scholars also see Śāntideva as representative of 
eliminativists, adding that the early tradition found in the Pāli canon shares 
the same negative view of anger,86 although it has been pointed out that he 
allows an exception when anger is directed towards itself.87 In a way, these 
philosophers seem to implicitly accept the anger elimination thesis, though it 
should not be concluded that those who do not refer to the passage do not 
share the view.88 However, I do not intend to rely simply on one quoted 
passage to determine the view of these thinkers either, and we will examine 
their arguments more carefully in the sections which follow. 
 
 Given the long history and many strands of Buddhism, it is possible 
to have many voices in the Buddhist doctrine. For no clear definition or 
definite account of anger has been articulated (at least in the way we think is 
clear) early on in its time. In this long tradition of interpretation, the 
Moderationist view has vigorously developed recently among Buddhist 
practitioners and scholars, in feminist Buddhists in particular. Generally 
speaking, with regard to anger, most people are moderationist, an attitude 
                                               
82 MA 3.2: “Their foes may torture them, though they be innocent, dismembering their 
bodies piece by piece, and cut their flesh and bones in lingering pain — but this serves only 
to confirm their patience for their butchers.” 
83 MA 3.11 
84 MA 3.9 
85 ŚS 185: “If all those beings should revile me and blame me, upbraid me, dishonour me, 
address me with lying and harsh words, bent upon doing wickedness; if they should tear up 
and cut up and destroy and annihilate my body in a hundred pieces like a jujube leaf; even 
so I must not conceive an angry thought against any being.” 
86 Gowans, “The Elimination of Anger?”; Lele, “The Rejection of Righteous Anger.”; 
Thurman, Anger. 
87 For example, in BCA6.41, he says, “It is better that I hate that hatred.” Amod Lele and 
Emily McRae (“Metabolizing Anger.” 475) see this as an exception to universal censure of 
anger. So it can be argued that Śāntideva is in fact a moderationist because he seems to 
allow a kind of anger despite it being directed at itself. But, even on this view, if not reading 
it as a rhetoric, anger has to be ultimately eliminated despite its usefulness nevertheless. 
88 Such as Geshe Lhundub Sopa (Sopa, Sweet, and Zwilling, Peacock in the Poison Grove, 41). 
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that can be traced back to at least the influential account of anger by 
Aristotle.89 It is our intuition that anger is dangerous, as it tends to be 
destructive. At times it’s also considered foolish when the object of our anger 
is not a moral agent, but instead an inanimate object (for example, when we 
stub our toe on a chest of drawers and become angry). But when we are 
wronged, we tend to think that anger is permissible (or even demanded), and 
as such it is often associated with such ideas as justice, righteousness, and 
self-respect. For instance, anger towards a bully is often lauded in popular 
culture. There are thousands of videos on YouTube celebrating victims 
standing up to bullies, with titles like ‘bully karma compilation’ and ‘bully 
gets owned’; in fact, simply typing the word ‘bully’ into YouTube’s search 
bar reveals a list of suggested titles, almost all of which indicate such a 
celebration of retaliation against alleged bullies. It is this ambivalent attitude 
towards anger, which permits (or even encourages) anger in some situations, 
that defines a moderationist. 
 
Generally, Buddhist moderationists embrace anger for its powerful 
energy, which then can be used to fight inequality and injustice. Unlike their 
Buddhist eliminativist counterparts, they argue that some forms of anger are 
justifiable and compatible with Buddhist philosophy; however, each of them 
has provided different arguments and opinions about what the acceptable 
nature of anger is like. Rita Gross, speaking from her own personal 
practices, claims that her anger as a feminist has “transmuted” into some 
sort of insight, which gives her intellectual sharpness while the same 
conviction and energy is still maintained. With transmuted anger, she could 
communicate more effectively in order to alleviate suffering caused by 
prejudices against women.90 Anita Barrows, in contrast, challenges the 
traditional Buddhist view that tries to subdue anger for causing yet another 
aspect of disempowerment. Insisting that anger does not equate to violence, 
she proposes what she calls “holy anger”, which is a positive kind of anger 
whose aim “would not be vengeance, punishment, humiliation, the suffering 
                                               
89 His oft-quoted passages (Nicomachean Ethics IV. 5) express his idea of a desirable virtue — 
there is a point at which one acts with anger is good. It is a mean between irascibility and 
meekness; excesses towards either end are equally condemned. 
90 Gross, Buddhism after Patriarchy, 171; Gross, “The Female Body,” 11-2. 
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of the offender…because its aim would not be to continue the cycle of 
suffering, but rather to interrupt it and establish something new in its 
stead.”91 Wendy Donner, alternatively, thinks that anger can be rooted in 
compassion, and when used skillfully it can alleviate the suffering from 
gender inequality.92 We will look further into these arguments in Chapter 3. 
 
 A recent Buddhist scholar, Emily McRae, also contributes to the 
moderationist position with a unique insight from reading Dharmarakṣita, 
one of the Tantric masters. McRae argues that the Tantric Buddhist 
doctrine recognises a special kind of anger, namely a “tantric anger”, 
described as “that which is like anger”, which is morally effective and 
without the destructive effects that ordinary anger has. But this is not a feat 
that anybody can pull off immediately; it requires a great deal of practice 
and can only be achieved by accomplished moral agents, i.e. bodhisattvas, 
through meditative and contemplative trainings. She also emphasises that 
the ‘metabolisation of anger’ is not anger that is feigned (i.e. the agent is not 
angry, but acts as if she is), but anger which has arisen and been transformed 
into a kind that is not compulsive nor intended to harm. And yet it is not an 
emotion transformed into compassion, or at least not directly. She also 
argues that this kind of anger is closely linked to the idea of ‘no-self’ in 
Buddhist metaphysics (we will return to McRae’s view in the next chapter).93 
 Moderationism about anger in Buddhism is a position that has 
emerged from a recent surge in reinterpretations of the doctrine, largely 
from the feminist point of view, over the past few decades. However, their 
interpretations are not without basis. Instead of heavily focusing on specific 
texts, what they do is revise the Buddhist tradition (which has been 
predominantly influenced by male members of the religious order) by 
amplifying some values in Buddhism such as compassion, emptiness, and 
Buddha Nature.94 McRae’s work is an exception, since her analysis is based 
on both of Dharmarakṣita’s texts, i.e. The Wheel-Weapon and The Poison-
Destroying Peacock, although she admits that not many examples of tantric 
                                               
91 Barrows, “The Light of Outrage.”  
92 Donner, “Feminist Ethics and Anger.” 
93 McRae, “Metabolizing Anger.” 
94 Shotwell, “If Buddhism, Then Feminism.” 
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anger are found.95 It is worth noting that moderationist views vary with 
regard to their attitudes towards how willingly we should embrace anger, 
thus these views differ over the issue of what qualifies anger as ‘moderate’. 
Some, such as Gross, endorse the use of justified anger in a worldly context 
while others, like McRae, emphasise that justified anger (i.e. metabolised 
anger) can be achieved by only a few morally accomplished persons. In 
contrast, eliminativists have no other option but to condemn all anger, albeit 
for different reasons. 
 
 While the aforementioned commentators lay bare their positions 
about anger, some others’ are rather obscure. They usually take a rather 
negative view towards anger, but point out ways to think about or deal with 
it positively. For instance, Thich Nhat Hanh mainly focuses on how to deal 
with and prevent anger from arising; the Dalai Lama adopts the same 
approach, but also explains why anger is bad. Their intention to exhort us to 
curb anger is evident, but to which extent they want anger to be curbed is 
not explicitly pronounced. Although Thich Nhat Hanh talks about 
embracing and transforming one’s anger into positive energy, it does not 
seem to be an enjoinment to get angry so that one can make use of it. Rather, 
he suggests that, if the undesirable emotion arises, we need to immediately 
attend to anger by embracing it in order to make it disappear and stop its 
cycle.96 His approach is after the fashion of eliminativists, who believe that 
it’s best for anger to not exist at all. He does not endorse an arising of anger 
to make use of it, but does encourage us to acknowledge it when it arises and 
offers a way to deal with it at that instance. On the other hand, we may 
think that the Dalai Lama implicitly subscribes to moderationism when he 
says: “On the basis of compassionate motivation, anger may in some cases 
be useful because it gives us extra energy and enables us to act swiftly,” but 
still admits that it usually leads to hatred, which always has negative energy.97 
His line of thought appears to resemble to that of feminist Buddhists, despite 
                                               
95 McRae, “Metabolizing Anger,” 475. 
96 Hạnh, Anger. 
97 Dalai Lama XIV, The Dalai Lama’s Book of Wisdom; Gyatso, “The Monk in the Lab.” 
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the remaining treatment denouncing anger. In this way, he defends a form 
of anger that is rooted in compassion. 
 
 I think the Buddhist views in relation to anger can by and large be 
captured by an eliminativist-moderationist distinction nevertheless. The 
issue that divides them is whether anger should ultimately be rid. 
Eliminativists advocate its extermination despite some perceived benefits of 
anger, while moderationists favour a less radical measure against it because it 
can be evaluated as good in some way. However, the rich nuances among 
these views have to be navigated carefully to avoid sweeping generalisations 
which fail to consider the overall goal of each account. As we have seen, 
some eliminativists may take a softer tone against anger, by counseling the 
mitigation of anger that has already arisen (like Thubten Chodron and Nhat 
Hanh). However, one has to be reminded that ultimately, if you were to 
become an accomplished eliminativist, you would not get angry even if we 
were to be cut limb by limb. And some moderationists may not advocate 
anger, but only permit very few instances of anger (such as McRae). 
  
 Having set up the background, some further remarks are in order 
here. It is not my intention to determine whether moderationism or 
eliminativism is the correct reading of Buddhism in relation to anger. After all, 
what Buddhist authors have done throughout its history, subsequent to the 
Buddha himself, is interpret his teaching. But that is not to say that we 
cannot demand more arguments to support our respective views. Therefore, 
I will analyse both approaches to anger, but ultimately defend an 
eliminativist position, for a few reasons. First of all, the view that aims at an 
eradication of anger appears to be a historical view that spans over a long 
period of time and across sects. As such, in order to appreciate the 
eliminativist view properly it requires a sufficient level of context 
surrounding the thesis, e.g. the ultimate aim of Buddhism, which explains 
why anger needs to be eliminated. Secondly, as eliminativism about anger is 
not a common view among moralists — ancient or modern — in general, it 
will be an interesting inquiry into why they are compelled to abandon anger. 
And as will be clear, their reason for the elimination is a distinctive way of 
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thinking about anger, which in turn owes its validity to the notorious 
Buddhist metaphysics (see Chapter 4). 
 
 In contrast to eliminativists, Buddhist moderationists appear to — 
though not exclusively — bring political agendas to the fore, in particular 
women’s struggles in patriarchal societies and the independence of the 
minority people. I believe their aim is to employ a Buddhist perspective to 
take on the issues and so it is possible that they are influenced by the modern 
reception of anger. If that is indeed the case, I find this an interesting 
approach to examine how a Buddhist can deal with anger while 
simultaneously being actively engaged with current social problems. For 
without addressing such concerns, many may find Buddhism irrelevant, 
especially now that anger has become part of normal discourse in politics. 
Therefore, with that aim in mind, I will try to take up a challenging task of 
defending the eliminativist view, which comes across to many as queer, 
overly ambitious, and belonging to the distant past. My attempt is to offer a 
reading of Buddhism that is appealing to contemporary audiences and 
‘ordinary’ people, showing that it is practicable, not just a theory for the 
exceptional. Indeed, my intention to defend Buddhist eliminativism thus also 
constitutes an attempt to draw greater attention to this view, running against 
the contemporary tendency towards moderationism.  
 
With that in mind, I will now turn to the Buddhist arguments against 
anger. The latter two (in particular) of those three kinds of arguments 
identified above will be adapted and adopted in support of the Eliminativist 
thesis in subsequent chapters. As such, this chapter will focus more heavily 
on the first kind of argument, and outline the latter two in general terms, 
developing them substantively in the two chapters which follow. 
 
 
3. Anger and its Negative Effects 
 
 Let us now examine the first kind of argument we see against anger 
— that our actual experience of anger shows it to be both unpleasant and 
unhelpful, thus harming our pursuit of happiness. By examining the 
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phenomenology of anger in Chapter 1, we have already seen that the 
experience of anger is often described in Buddhist texts as unpleasant. There 
we concluded that, for the Buddhist, anger has an inherent unpleasant 
feeling and usually involves a wish to retaliate, maybe simply wishing ill of 
the person who has done wrong by the subject. As such, it inevitably causes 
harm to both the angry person and also the target of the emotion. The 
target might well be innocent, and others who were not involved in the 
harmful act could be caught in the crossfire (as might be the case for the 
child of a bitter divorce). There is hopefully little need to revisit the material 
already outlined in Chapter 1 in much detail here, though it might serve to 
highlight some other sorts of evidence that supports some of the claims made 
in the texts discussed there. I will, therefore, begin by looking at some 
empirical evidence on the effects of anger. Research into the physiological 
components and effects of anger is (perhaps surprisingly, given its universal 
appearance across human populations) still relatively understudied.98 
Nonetheless, there is a growing interest in examining the physical and 
neurological basis of anger, as well as its impact upon cognition and 
behaviour. Many of these studies offer empirical support for the general and 
anecdotal observations made about anger in the philosophical literature 
discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
We have probably all observed that anger can feel unpleasant. It is 
not uncommon for us to be left trembling with rage after incidents that 
really test our temper. However, as we have also already noted, anger isn’t 
always unpleasant, and nor is it always without utility. And there are some 
interesting findings on the motivational force of anger (something the 
moderationists, we shall see in Chapter 3, count very much in its favour). It 
has been hypothesised that there is an asymmetry in the brain’s processing 
of emotions, with the left hemisphere showing a dominance in the case of 
positive emotions like happiness, and the right hemisphere showing a 
dominance in the case of negative emotions like anxiety.99 Alongside this 
                                               
98 Garfinkel et al., “Anger in Brain and Body.” 
99 See, for example, Alves, Fukusima, and Aznar-Casanova, “Models of Brain Asymmetry 
in Emotional Processing.” 
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supposed asymmetry in processing, is an apparent correlation in the 
motivating properties of these emotions, with negative emotions making us 
more prone to ‘withdrawal’ and positive emotions making us more prone to 
‘approach’.100 In other words, whether we actively engage with a person or 
situation (‘approach’) or we seek to avoid that person or situation 
(‘withdrawal’). Yet, despite anger being considered a negative emotion, 
findings suggest that it may be more closely associated with the left prefrontal 
cortex,101 and thus also more closely associated with the ‘approach’ response. 
It is suggested by Fox that this is because anger activates a response of 
aggression, which is an outward behavioural manifestion of anger e.g. 
attacking someone verbally or physically.102 
 
 What is interesting about this is that we have observed that anger 
can sometimes feel satisfying. It is clear that by preparing us for action, 
anger will trigger physiological changes that might be shared by other 
positive emotions, thus creating a confusing bodily signal for us to process. 
For instance, when we’re angry we experience an increase in heart rate and 
blood pressure, as well as increased testosterone and decreased levels of 
cortisol (associated with stress). However, these symptoms are all also 
associated with sexual arousal,103 which we might otherwise consider a 
positive or pleasurable sensation. Anger has also been linked to optimism 
and positive expectations by Lerner and Keltner,104 and Gendolla and 
Silvestrini,105 found that anger can make us perceive task completion in a 
more positive light too i.e. that we perceive tasks as easier to complete when 
we’re angry. So there is also tentative empirical support for our observations 
about the pleasantness of anger: its physiological symptoms have pleasant 
close correlates, and it can make us more optimistic both in general and with 
regard to accomplishing tasks. 
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 Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that the Buddhist descriptions 
of the positive aspects of anger were restricted to a single instance, and this 
weighting is arguably a fair reflection of anger’s actual effects in the real 
world. More often than not, anger both feels unpleasant and is channeled in 
ways which ultimately do not help us, or which do not seek to change our 
own (or someone else’s) situation in a positive way. It is for this reason that 
Buddhists (though certainly not uniquely) note that anger is often damaging 
to our relationships. And, again, we can see empirical evidence supporting 
this suggestion. One notable finding in Harrison et al. was that when we 
observe anger in others we tend to demonstrate either of two ‘mirroring’ 
responses: either we also display anger, or we display fear (with their 
accompanying physiological symptoms e.g. increased heart and respiratory 
rates).106 These are, according to Garfinkel et al., the two aspects of the fight 
or flight response.107 It is perhaps unsurprising then, that anger tends to elicit 
avoidance behavior in others108 — both because we might perceive someone 
who is angry to be a threat, but also because we tend to ‘mirror’ their anger 
either like-for-like, or as a fear response — both responses which we 
typically see as unpleasant. It is fairly obvious how this empirical observation 
supports the suggestion in Buddhist texts that anger is detrimental to our 
relationships. Consider cases of road rage, for example. In these sorts of 
cases what tends to occur is that one driver reacts angrily to another’s 
driving, and in response the second driver reacts angrily to the first driver’s 
anger. This has often led to violence in the real world, sometimes with fatal 
consequences. But the same can be true in much closer relationships — 
when our partner is angry, we often react in kind, whether this is reasonable 
or not. But the fear response does not make for any better a relationship — 
it is the cycle of anger and fear that, in part, describes the nature of the trap 
in which victims of domestic violence are caught. 
 
The real harm of anger in the senses just outlined, however, is said to 
be with regard to our pursuit of happiness. It is because the unpleasant 
                                               
106 Harrison, Kreibig, and Critchley, “A Two Way Road.” 
107 Garfinkel et al., “Anger in Brain and Body.” 
108 Marsh, Ambady, and Kleck, “The Effects of Fear and Anger Facial Expressions on 
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sensation and harm to our relationships impacts upon our happiness that 
anger is bad from the Buddhist perspective, since that is one of two central 
life pursuits (the other being enlightenment). In this sense, Buddhist cautions 
against anger are concerned with both productivity (i.e. our ability to 
generate opportunities for happiness) and worldly wellbeing (i.e. happiness, 
construed in a way which is conducive to achieving the ultimate goal of 
enlightenment). On this view then, anger is harmful because its unavoidable 
consequence is the disruption of one’s ability to achieve happiness in this 
current life, resulting in future lives and thus delaying our attainment of 
liberation. Once again, Śāntideva contributes to our discussion of anger 
here; he warns us of specific ways that anger could harm an angry person, 
specifically with regard to happiness: 
 
“The mind does not find peace, nor does it enjoy pleasure and 
joy, nor does it find sleep or fortitude when the thorn of hatred 
dwells in the heart. Even dependents whom one rewards with 
wealth and honours wish to harm the master who is repugnant 
due to his anger. Even friends fear him. He gives, but is not 
served. In brief, there is nothing that can make an angry person 
happy.”109  
 
These verses are only some of the many examples found in Buddhist 
literature, about which Śāntideva concludes that anger inhibits one’s pursuit 
of happiness. In other words, on this account, his assessment of anger (which 
is clearly negative) rests on whether it is conducive for beings to flourish on 
the path leading to happiness. Cautioning against anger on the basis of the 
harm that it does to our happiness actually reflects the strategic role that an 
argument relating to happiness can have in appealing to ordinary people (an 
important consideration, I will suggest in Chapter 4). The damages of anger 
should not be focused on enlightenment alone as we can also see this 
relationship from the other end. If there are some elements of enlightenment 
in happiness, then what harms prospects of enlightenment also harms 
prospects of happiness. This understanding is important for attracting the 
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wider audience because it is more accessible, in the sense of 
comprehensibility as well as attainability, than enlightenment. And I think it 
is probably not mistaken to assume that most people want to be happy, too. 
In fact, this seems to be the tactic used by many ethicists in ancient Greece 
and India. Amber Carpenter suggests that they tend to use a ‘bait-and-
switch’ strategy, which promises us that if we follow their advice, happiness 
will follow, leaving us only to discover that what they meant by happiness is 
something else altogether — not happiness in the sense of self-indulgence 
like most of us would expect, but a sense of virtue and self-cultivation.110 On 
this thought, once the persuasion succeeded, the practitioner has already 
been on the path to the ultimate good. Although we aim for the pragmatic 
effects when we set off on this quest, we end up — despite unknowingly — 
walking on the path to enlightenment. At this point there’s a chance, upon it 
being proven that the suggested course of actions works (as the Buddhist 
promise — and surely they are confident because it is the truth!) that we 
pursue enlightenment deliberately later on, which involves full acceptance of 
their metaphysical view. It is this kind of argument I will develop in Chapter 
4. 
 
Given the ‘bait-and-switch’ strategy employed, it is fairly obvious 
that Buddhists see anger’s impeding of enlightenment as bad in itself. But 
what about impeding happiness? Because happiness derives its value from 
enlightenment, we may think that disrupting happiness as such is not a 
problem; but disrupting happiness which ultimately impedes the progress to 
wisdom would, of course, be a problem. There are a number of ways of 
interpreting this claim. One interpretation not only considers happiness as 
derivative of enlightenment, but also as of instrumental worth to it. By 
contrast, we could also say that anger is considered harmful because it 
impedes happiness as well as enlightenment. This is a reading that does not 
take the secondary end of happiness as simply instrumental to 
enlightenment, but as a connected yet distinct goal, because happiness is a 
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goal worth pursuing in and of itself.111 In any case, with all its harmful 
effects, anger is ultimately problematic in a teleological sense, viz. being an 
impediment to the progress of Buddhist moral life, hence, most importantly, 
perpetuating suffering for as long as enlightenment is unattained. We will 
return to the notion of suffering in more detail below, after we have outlined 
the remaining arguments against anger. 
 
The Buddhists have a lot to say about the self-destructive power of 
anger, perhaps because what it fundamentally affects is the subject of 
experience. First of all, there are adverse effects on our feelings. Mental 
health is obviously of great concern. In Chapter 1, we saw that the Buddhist 
characterisation of anger suggests that its inherent affective quality is 
unpleasant — simply getting angry is an agitating experience, although it 
can occasionally be satisfying. If a pleasant feeling is a dominant feature of 
happiness in the Buddhist definition, being angry is in itself not (typically) a 
happy experience. Furthermore, the effect of such an unpleasant feeling is 
certainly perceptible, and although some may not find it remarkable, it 
should not be taken lightly, for it can be very powerful when it strikes hard, 
with distinctive symptoms: a clenched jaw and fists, trembling, and all the 
other indications noted by Seneca and discussed earlier.112 While an 
experience of mental disturbance, mild or intense, can be said to be 
undesirable in itself, it also inevitably interferes with our wellbeing in other 
ways. This appears to be very important for the Buddhists (e.g. AN 7.64 also 
offers a similar line to Śāntideva’s) because it can take a toll on leading a 
healthy life. For example, the Buddhists say that you cannot sleep well as a 
result of angry thoughts, and I think our own experience can confirm that 
too. And, unfortunately, sleep deprivation does have physical effects such as 
an inability to focus and impairments to working memory,113 which impacts 
our day-to-day life. In short, a disturbed mind hinders our wellbeing in 
                                               
111 This interpretation is proposed by Carpenter (2016) who offers an analysis of how both 
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Madhyamaka philosophy. 
112 De Ira I 1.3-5 
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general, and also to the Buddhist specifically it can impede mental training 
integral to advancing to the highest goal i.e. enlightenment. 
 
 In addition to the unpleasant affect of anger, there’s also an effect on 
cognition. This is the result that has already been discussed in the previous 
chapter, that anger clouds our judgement; it prevents us from seeing things 
clearly and correctly. Incidentally, the Stoics, another group of anger 
eliminativists, shared a similar thought about this effect of anger, perhaps 
offering a more detailed analysis. Seneca, for example, describes anger as “a 
brief madness,” and goes on to explain that “it’s no less lacking in self-
control, forgetful of decency, unmindful of personal ties, unrelenting intent 
on its goal, shut off from rational deliberation, stirred for no substantial 
reason, unsuited to discerning what’s fair and true,…”114 On this ground, 
anger is charged with undermining the capacity for rationality — the most 
important attribute that mature human beings alone have in common with 
the gods. Therefore, anger is a vicious emotion as it engenders the failure of 
reason. The Buddhists, however, do not make such a strong claim about 
human rationality (not to mention whether they share the same conception 
of what ‘rationality’ is) although, roughly speaking, they recognise that right 
thinking is a necessary condition for enlightenment. The idea of their 
objection is thus: when our thinking is under the influence of anger, we lose 
sight of the good because anger — or so to speak, a state in which virtues 
such as shame and fear of wrong have been lost — decreases awareness of 
what one should do for the benefits of oneself and others. Buddhists also 
have an additional argument relating to anger and cognition, which we shall 
examine in section 5 below. 
 
 Anger does not stop at perturbing the subject’s mind alone, as most 
anger is expressed in one form or another, typically with violence. Such 
careless actions affect one’s own wellbeing on many levels. Śāntideva’s 
advice against anger above, for example, shows what is potentially damaged 
is one’s private life, particularly in terms of our personal relationships (a 
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claim for which I outlined some empirical support above). For example, an 
angry ‘master’ loses his or her reputation and respect from subordinates, 
while friends become cautious around him. It does not take much to see why 
they want to avoid an angry person; rather, it would be odd if anybody takes 
pleasure in being on the receiving end of someone else’s temper, especially 
when they are not enemies. Perhaps the reason why angry people are often 
avoided is because of fear that such hostility can turn towards them at whim, 
whether deserved or not. Imagine your partner comes home after getting 
angry at a colleague and abuses you instead, you probably think it’s unfair 
for you to be the victim of such anger. In effect, anger can alienate people 
even though it is not directed at them. With poor judgement the result of the 
emotion, there’s a good reason for the Buddhists to be concerned about 
misdirected anger as, practically speaking, it indeed occurs regularly. 
 
 As far as public life is concerned, similar situations can damage one’s 
interests. Some moderationists also acknowledge this consequence of anger 
in a political context. Pettigrove115 and Nussbaum116 discourage anger 
despite unjust treatment as it alienates potential allies, which in turn hinders 
progress of justice as a whole. One putative example of this is the opposition 
to Donald Trump’s presidency in the US. Rather than persuading others to 
see Trump’s very real flaws, the rhetoric of the self-described ‘Resistance’ 
often exceeds what is reasonable when, for example, they describe all 
Trump supporters as Nazi’s, and hurl the term at those attending his 
political rallies. Such behaviour, Trump’s own supporters openly and often 
suggest, only persuades them to double-down on their support of Trump — 
arguably, Hillary Clinton’s biggest mistake during the election campaign 
was in labeling Trump’s supporters ‘The Deplorables’, a term which they 
subsequently embraced and rallied around.117 Thus, the danger of the 
alienation anger can cause is in the (often unpredictable) negative reactions 
that follow, potentially creating enemies. The sutta, too, points this out: “He 
shows recalcitrance as a fire does a smoky crest. When his anger spreads 
                                               
115 Pettigrove, “Meekness and ‘Moral’ Anger.” 
116 Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness. 
117 Jacobs, “Hillary Clinton Regrets.” 
   91 
outward, people become angry on his account.”118 Angry expressions, which 
are likened to smoke, are irritable, and surely no one likes to be surrounded 
by it. Instead of making other people sympathetic to your cause, they drive 
people away. With anger, for the Buddhists apparently, it is difficult to 
establish a healthy relationship on any level, whether personal or political. 
These are the harms of anger from the subject’s perspective grounded on an 
assumption about human interaction: Śāntideva’s statement ‘he gives, but is 
not served’ implies the idea of reciprocity — that in normal circumstances, an 
act of giving prompts the recipient to want to return the favour. But acting 
angrily disrupts such reciprocal transactions as it puts people on edge. 
   
 For better or for worse, the effects so far do not directly harm the 
angry subject. While the agent may indirectly suffer from spoiling 
relationships of various sorts (friends and family wanting to avoid her, 
potential allies being alienated etc.), anger also provokes others to actively 
seek to harm her. The most vicious thing about anger is probably its desire 
for retaliation, which is manifested in an act of harm, and often violence. 
But payback will only provoke more anger and a vicious cycle of revenge, as 
a verse in the Dhammapada warns us: “For hate is not conquered by hate: 
hate is conquered by love. This is a law eternal.”119 Despite sounding like a 
platitude, it is reasonably sage advice. In fact, the fascinating tale behind this 
verse in the Dhammapadāṭṭhakathā, or the Commentary of the Dhammapada, 
better justifies the Buddhist antagonism against anger.120 Said to have 
happened long before the Buddha’s lifetime, it is a story of two wives in a 
polygamous marriage, the first of whom was barren. The barren wife, in 
fear of losing status, caused her husband’s second wife to have miscarriages, 
ultimately causing her death in childbirth. Upon her deathbed, knowing 
who inflicted those pains on her, the second wife wished to be reborn so that 
                                               
118 AN 7.64 
119 Dhp 1.5 
120 It is translated as Buddhist Legends by Eugene Watson Burlingame (170-75). It is a text that 
tells the stories in which each 423 sayings of the Buddha was uttered and collected as the 
Dhammapada. I would like to thank Amber Carpenter for drawing my attention to this 
fascinating tale. She also offers an insightful and nuanced analysis of the story in Carpenter, 
“Buddhism and the Problem of Evil.” Cf. Obeyesekere and Obeyesekera, “The Tale of the 
Demoness Kāḷī: A Discourse on Evil.” 
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she could exact revenge upon her enemy. Her wish was granted and she had 
her revenge, but in turn this provoked her enemy, the barren wife, to wish 
the same. So, in her next life, the barren wife too saw her wish come true. 
This cycle kept going for life after life until, as Obeyesereke and 
Obeyesereke observe, it was no longer possible to keep track of who was the 
perpetrator and who the victim. Retribution does not end one’s suffering but 
perpetuates it, and, just as Seneca forewarns, “greedy for vengeance…draws 
down the avenger with it.”121 
 
 In the story above, the Buddha appeals to a practical reason that is 
not retrospective, which is the nature of retribution. He asked the ogress 
who was the perpetrator in his present life: “Why have you so done?”, not 
wishing to hear justifications from the past, adding, “Had you not come face 
to face with a Buddha like me, you would have cherished hatred towards 
each other for an aeon.”122 He did not care to learn who started it (although 
with clairvoyant power he already knew anyway), what made her want to 
harm the young woman, and so forth, before judging the situation and 
giving advice to the ogress. Instead he focused on what it might happen in 
future by inviting her to consider the effects of her attempt, and concluded 
what should be done in the present is to cease harming each other. When a 
retaliation to wrongdoing, however justified it is, tends to escalate the 
situation by provoking more anger, it is not clear why anyone should keep 
up with such destructive actions. With a human tendency to reciprocate, 
one can certainly expect enemies to reciprocate in kind. And it seems, for 
the Buddhists, the principle of reciprocity also extends to positive virtues, as 
towards the end of the story we find the frightened young woman, who 
could have fallen victim to the ogress had she not met the Buddha, 
overcame her fear and treated the ogress with generosity. The ogress then 
returned the favour and, in the end, they both flourished. This, we will see 
below, hints at the Buddhist encouragement to replace negative emotions 
with positive ones, rather than simply removing them (and this is a very 
important feature of Buddhist eliminativism, and will inform my own 
                                               
121 De Ira I 1.1 
122 Burlingame, Buddhist Legends, 1:174. 
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approach in Chapter 4). Moreover, payback is a transgression in itself; a 
distinction is not made between wrongdoing and wrongdoing as a response 
to being wronged, as far as the Buddhists are concerned. It doesn’t make 
sense to say we should commit wrong to the other person because she 
committed wrong to us first, which is the kind of thinking that feeds vicious 
revenge cycles. Just as the famous Poisoned Arrow Parable suggests,123 it is 
therefore of practical reason to attend to the most immediate and urgent 
issue that afflicts everyone alike, suffering. Asking who started it is not the 
priority, and in many cases does not stop the fight. Not retaliating, rather, 
prevents potential damages and does not risk committing wrong yourself. 
 
 To sum up, the practical dangers of anger are multifaceted, 
according to the Buddhist accounts. They include the inevitable 
uncomfortable feeling associated with anger, causing poor judgement which 
misguides us to do something inappropriate, the difficulties caused for 
establishing healthy relationships, and ultimately the provocation of more 
anger. If we were to accept that things like material gain, friendship, and 
mental and physical health contribute to a happy life, it could perhaps be 
agreed that anger does not seem to promote that worthy end. Moreover, the 
apparently positive outcomes of anger may not be problematic as counter-
examples, as anger advocates will want to contend. Moderationists say we 
should balance our anger — we should not be excessive in our anger, but 
cannot be too restrained either, and our anger has to be justified — so, if it 
could be demonstrated that indeed anger occasionally brings about 
happiness, then we might think that the Buddhists would not be able to 
defend their eliminativist position. However, we have also seen that one’s 
justified anger can tip easily from being moderate to disastrous, from good 
to bad. Even if the Buddhist eliminativists were to concede that there is a 
point where moderate anger is good, which indeed they are not, they still 
                                               
123 MN 63. The story is about a sceptic man who after being struck by a poisoned arrow, 
refused to receive treatments unless he knew which caste the man who wounded him 
belonged to, what he looked like, where he lived, what kind of bow it was used, and so on 
— in other words, questions irrelevant to his treatment. It is intended to illustrate the 
urgency of the current human condition that are stricken with suffering, and yet some 
people do not recognise such urgency to attend to it and instead inquiring about something 
not useful to solving the immediate problem. 
   94 
think you should not be a moderationist because getting it right is too 
difficult, and getting it wrong is too costly, and thus unpragmatic. 
 
Besides this, it is essential to keep in mind that Buddhists conceive of 
happiness in a way that involves a certain moral element. This moral 
element is, in fact, a prerequisite to happiness. This is why the Buddhists say 
an angry person can never be happy, for anger is never a part of the good. As 
a result, whatever effects anger may cause, happiness, which is a complex 
state of mind that cannot be achieved only by external conditions, does not 
come to pass with a person harbouring resentment. Now, how anger has 
such a negative moral status is our next question. We will examine this claim 
in detail in the next section. 
 
 
4. Anger and Virtue 
  
Given the intimate connection established above between 
enlightenment and happiness, it’s clear that there are two perspectives from 
which to consider the destructive consequences of anger. We have already 
seen that anger is harmful because it impedes our pursuit of happiness, but 
in this section we will also see that it is morally harmful because it impairs 
the development of specific moral virtues, which in turn disrupts our 
progress towards enlightenment. I will not address this argument in full here, 
because in order to do so we need to look in more detail at some specific 
moderationist and eliminativist arguments — we will do this in Chapters 3 
and 4 respectively. However, we can nonetheless begin to outline the central 
aspects of this Buddhist argument against anger here, ultimately framing the 
discussion as one which suggests that an adequate defence of an eliminativist 
thesis depends upon a realignment of the Buddhist metaphysics with our 
understanding of how to pursue a moral life. So far, we have only seen the 
Buddhist objection to anger on the grounds of concerns for our wellbeing. 
However, in order to justify the eliminativist stance I am advocating, it 
seems like we need an argument that can persuade us that all actions 
motivated by anger are wrong, or else that position will be vulnerable to a 
simple counter-example. The view we shall explore in this section, that 
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anger harms our moral development and thus should be avoided, can be 
thought of in a teleological sense (just like the first kind of argument), but this 
time with enlightenment being the goal obstructed by anger. However, 
because of that, it is susceptible to the same issue just highlighted. For that 
reason, we must develop an alternative version of this argument in order to 
adequately defend the eliminativist position, and this challenge is taken up in 
the chapters which follow. 
 
On the Buddhist view, anger is highly undesirable for those who look 
beyond ordinary goods. It is especially obvious in the context of aspiring 
bodhisattvas in Mahāyāna tradition, whose bodhisattva path involves the 
practice of ten ‘perfections’ or ‘virtues’ (paramitā).124 Patience (kṣānti), which is 
an antidote to anger, is one of the perfections they need to cultivate for 
moral progress. In the chapter focusing on the virtues, Śāntideva states that, 
“There is no evil equal to hatred, and no spiritual practice equal to 
forbearance. Therefore, one should develop forbearance by various means, 
with great effort.”125 On the other hand, when one breaks with the virtue, 
anger has to power to destroy all the efforts for moral development, as 
Candrakīrti says, “Indeed all anger felt towards a Bodhisattva destroys 
within an instant merits that arise through discipline and giving of a 
hundred kalpas. No other evil is there similar to wrath.”126 Interestingly 
enough, Buddhists were not alone in thinking that one can attain certain 
power with patience and then be instantly broken just by getting angry. The 
notion tapas has a similar characteristic in ancient Indian asceticism. 
                                               
124 I use the term 'virtue' in the Buddhist context to denote positive affective and cognitive 
states which are cultivated through moral training. Notable Buddhist virtues include the 
four Divine States (loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity) and the 
Six Perfections (generosity, moral discipline, patience, vigour, meditative absorption, and 
insight). These virtues are instrumental to and at least partially constitutive of the 
enlightened state. In this sense, it is similar to an understanding of virtues in virtue ethics in 
that they are excellent traits of character, motivations, dispositions, or attitudes that are 
expressed in good actions and enable us to achieve the Good. However, it is an open 
question whether we can look for similarities beyond that, especially in terms of the moral 
frameworks in which these virtues operate. Some have looked for possibilities for 
reconstructing versions of Buddhist virtue ethics (e.g. Keown, MacKenzie) while others 
criticise that such attempts distort the aim of the Buddhist project (e.g. Garfield) or suggest 
that Buddhism, at least in Theravada tradition, is ethical particularism (e.g. Hallisey). 
125 BCA 6.2 
126 MA 3.6 
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Literally meaning ‘heat’, and associated with creative activities in the cosmos 
in the early Vedic period, tapas later became ethicised and equated with 
patience. Similar to wealth that one can possess, tapas can be lost when one 
indulges in sensual pleasure or anger.127 One has to wonder why anger has 
such a powerful destructive power against moral progress that it is said, “No 
higher rule, the Buddhas say, than patience. And no nibbana higher than 
forbearance.”128 Yet, it is also notable that the Buddhist view sees patience as 
the most effective virtue in the elimination of anger. The position I develop 
in Chapter 4 makes the case for a certain understanding of patience as the 
basis of that elimination. 
 
 A passage from Upāli-paripṛcchā Sūtra, an early and influential 
Mahāyāna sutra, might give us a clue as to why anger sabotages all the effort 
to save all beings to which a bodhisattva has been committed: 
 
“If, while practicing the Mahāyāna, a Bodhisattva continues to 
break precepts out of desire for kalpas as numerous as the sands of 
the Ganges, his offence is still minor. If a Bodhisattva breaks 
precepts out of hatred, even just once, his offense is very serious. 
Why? Because a Bodhisattva who breaks precepts out of desire 
[still] holds sentient beings in his embrace, whereas a Bodhisattva 
who breaks precepts out of hatred forsakes sentient beings 
altogether… if he breaks precepts out of hatred, it is a grave 
offense, a gross fault, a serious, degenerate act, which causes 
tremendous hindrances to the Buddha-Dharma.”129 
 
This account seems to put concerns for what we do to other human 
beings as central to the consideration. Compared to a wrongdoing 
motivated by attachment (see section 5 below), that by anger seems to be 
more dangerous because one tends to seek to harm another out of anger, 
but not out of attachment.130 And as a bodhisattva who makes a vow to help 
                                               
127 Olson, Indian Asceticism. 
128 DN 14.3.28; Dhp 184 
129 Chang, Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtra, 270. 
130 One can argue that it is not necessarily true. For we can think of a case in which 
someone harms other persons out of ‘love’ and jealousy. These attitudes are clearly forms of 
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all beings out of suffering, if she does the opposite by harming them instead, 
it is tragic and very wrong. 
 
 If harm against other moral agents is what makes anger so 
distasteful, then one way to see what is problematic about anger maybe lies 
in its characterisation that it involves a desire to harm. This feature of anger 
has already been discussed in Chapter 1. When such a malicious desire is 
aimed at another agent, our instinct certainly admits that it raises a moral 
question. A possible analysis of why anger is wrong based on this 
characterisation of it may be taken from Martha Nussbaum.131 The first 
thing that the angry person focuses on is the wrong done to her, so she wants 
to get back at the object of her anger hoping it will “set things right, 
somehow counter-balancing or annulling the offence.”132 But this kind of 
anger does not make sense because payback cannot right the wrong. 
Another way to think of what anger aims to harm is that, borrowing 
Aristotle’s account that anger is occasioned by ‘down-ranking’, the angry 
person focuses on the injuries done to her status rather than the 
wrongfulness as such. Such obsessive focus on herself and her standing in 
relation to others is troubling because it involves narcissistic values.133 
 
 No matter how appealing the argument sounds, such analysis 
certainly cannot fully explain the Buddhist attitude towards anger as it 
doesn’t apply to all kinds of anger. Nussbaum’s account puts payback as an 
identifying characteristic of anger, which is not necessarily true for Buddhist 
accounts. This leads to a few problems if Buddhists, as eliminativists, were to 
adopt such an explanation. This is because it can’t explain that every 
occurrence of anger is morally harmful as not all anger wants ill of others. If 
there is indeed such anger, which we can question separately, then it is not 
                                               
attachment, a desire to possess another person or to refuse the loss of them. And too often, 
ironically, the victims are none other than those who are regarded to be the object of ‘love’ 
themselves. 
131 Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness. 
132 Nussbaum, 27. 
133 Nevertheless, Nussbaum does not condemn all kinds of anger, just those that centralise 
payback. She believes that there’s a kind of anger that is acceptable; she calls it Transition-
Anger which is forward-looking, rather than looking for retribution, but she thinks it is 
extremely rare. 
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an ideal explanation for why anger is so morally destructive for Buddhist 
eliminativists. Moreover, despite no clear definition of anger, Buddhists 
appear to recognise some forms of anger, according to their categorisation 
seen in Chapter 1, that do not necessarily involve malicious intent directed 
at a moral agent, such as frustration and annoyance. These mental 
phenomena are occasioned similarly to anger — that is by a perception that 
the subject (or whatever is in the subject’s concern) is being harmed or 
thwarted — and can be said to be a milder form of anger. That is, it could 
be the case that one does not have any ill will towards another moral agent, 
but simply feels annoyed when a friend does not show up on time, for 
example. Or it could be the case that one’s anger involves an urge to harm, 
not another human being, but some inanimate object. Such cases are not 
only excluded from the above explanation, but also defy our instinct that it 
could cause a moral harm. So if it is not because anger inflicts pain on other 
people that we should eliminate anger, then what could be the reason? 
 
There is another problem with the Buddhist argument given above, 
which is that it is applied specifically to those seeking the highest of ethical 
lives — the Bodhisattvas. As we have noted previously, it is possible that 
ordinary people might not have such a life as their aim, and so are unlikely 
to be persuaded by such an argument. We could, perhaps generalise the sort 
of argument given in the Upāli-paripṛcchā Sūtra, to make it more applicable to 
the ordinary person. This would constitute another argument from 
pragmatism that the Buddhist might employ against anger, but this time 
relating to our moral development. Such an argument might run as follows: 
in order to develop the virtues of compassion or patience, we must practice 
them. This requires acting in situations where such responses are genuinely 
available to us. As a well-known Tibetan proverb suggests: “Without 
someone to make you angry, how can you practice patience?”134 One 
cannot practice patience, for example, with someone who does not frustrate 
us, or make us wait, or present us with some other situation in which 
patience is an available response (we will examine the specifics surrounding 
                                               
134 Bommarito, “Patience and Perspective,” 272. 
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patience in more detail in Chapter 4). Philippa Foot makes a similar point 
when she suggests that our moral concepts are ‘fixed’ to facts about the 
world.135 In Foot’s view, we can’t describe just anything we like as ‘rude’, just 
as we cannot be ‘proud’ of the sky. To be proud of something, it seems like 
we must have some personal connection to it e.g. that we created it, 
nurtured it, were involved in its development, etc. Whether a moral concept 
applies in a given situation is, according to Foot, dependent upon whether 
the descriptive content for that concept matches up with the facts about the 
world. In the case of being proud of the sky, it simply isn’t true that we can 
be said to have created it, nurtured it, and so on. As such, we cannot rightly 
apply the moral concept of pride in that situation. In much the same way, 
then, there are only certain situations in the world in which moral concepts 
like patience or compassion can be said to correctly apply. 
 
What is important to note about anger and virtues like patience and 
compassion is the overlap in real-world situations in which those concepts 
correctly apply. Consider, for instance, the road rage example mentioned 
above — when a driver does something we would have preferred them not 
to have done, we could respond angrily, but we could instead exercise 
patience. Given that virtues are cultivated through practice, there will only 
be a finite number of opportunities in which circumstances are such that we 
can actually be patient (or compassionate, etc.), and thus there are limited 
opportunities for us to practice the virtues. Since there is much overlap 
between the situations surrounding anger and these opportunities to practice 
virtues, as a practical matter for those interested in developing a good moral 
character, every angry response is a missed opportunity. And there is every 
reason to think that most people value the development of a good moral 
character — very few people appear to be immoralists i.e. people who think it 
is good to be (morally) bad, and it is clear that people at least want to be seen 
as virtuous. This discussion is reflected in the first book of Plato’s Republic, 
where Socrates is shown to be responding to the challenge of immoralism, 
and where he also argues that we don’t merely want the benefits of virtue’s 
                                               
135 Foot, “Moral Beliefs.” 
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accompanying reputation. We need not get into those arguments here, since 
the argument from pragmatism just offered can be said to at least apply to 
those who are genuinely interested in their own moral development. 
  
 Still, it is clear that this argument from pragmatism has the same 
limitations as the one outlined in section 3 — that it probably does not fully 
establish the case for eliminativism. Do we need to practice the virtues 
exclusively in order to develop them? If this were the case, the bar would be 
set very high for any virtue theory, and thus it would be unlikely to 
encourage anyone to take up this approach. The purpose of this sort of 
ethical approach is to get us to strive towards the virtues, and to discourage 
vicious behaviour, so it is important to see bouts of anger as moving us away 
from enlightenment (we will revisit this notion later, as I wish to argue that 
anger shouldn’t merely be seen as a step backward, but instead as orienting 
us away from enlightenment — thus, the moderationist position points us in 
the opposite direction to our ultimate goal). We should always try to 
remember that the Buddhist version of virtue ethics differs from its Western 
counterparts in that Western virtue theories tend to posit the aim of moral 
life as attaining only wellbeing (whether that is cashed out as happiness, 
Eudaemonia, or whatever else). However, this is only one of the goals for the 
Buddhist — the other aim being achieving enlightenment. We have already 
suggested that moral development is central to this, since our moral 
development directly impacts upon our happiness (section 3), and happiness 
and enlightenment are interdependent. We have seen, however, that there 
are also two aspects to enlightenment: one related to our moral 
development, and another to do with our epistemic or cognitive 
development. It is this latter issue to which we turn in section 5. 
 
 
5. Anger and Epistemic Failure 
 
While the pragmatic arguments against anger raised above arguably 
leave the eliminativist position open to the charge that anger can also be 
fruitful, the final kind of argument offered by the Buddhist attempts to 
demonstrate a specific way in which anger is always bad. I will ultimately 
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argue in Chapter 4 that understanding the relationship between the kind of 
argument being given here and the Buddhist notions of enlightenment, 
happiness and a moral life is central to coming to accept a specifically 
Buddhist form of Eliminativism. Such a position will no doubt initially seem 
unpersuasive, and perhaps unintuitive, since it depends upon what is likely 
to be a metaphysics alien to most Western audiences. However, I will go on 
to suggest in later chapters that the alternative view, Moderationism, is not 
without problems of its own, and that the way we utilise the Buddhist 
metaphysics — both in practice, and in our arguments for Eliminativism — 
is of central importance to eliminating anger. 
 
The final kind of argument we are looking at suggests that anger 
follows from an epistemic or cognitive error, thus it stems from (and 
reinforces) a failure to attain the epistemic aspect of enlightenment outlined 
in section 1.  With this, we arrive at what is, for the Buddhist, the root cause 
of anger. As noted in Chapter 1, Buddhists tend to call someone who is 
angry a ‘fool’, suggesting that the problem with anger is associated with our 
cognition. As much as anger is a social emotion (i.e. being triggered by 
external factors), a precondition for anger to arise, however, is a certain way 
of seeing ourselves, the world, and the relation between them (see Chapter 
1, section 2.2). Coupled with the distinctive Buddhist metaphysical position, 
these things are fundamental to the argument for the elimination of anger.  
 
Broadly speaking, here’s how the argument goes: anger is a 
manifestation of an epistemic failure to recognise the world as it actually is; 
oneself and other agents, as well as our surroundings, are impermanent, 
interdependent, and lacking of essence i.e. they are (ultimately) not real; 
since anger involves one’s being angry at some agent, because of some harm 
they have caused oneself or one’s property, valued possessions, etc., then 
anger is irrational because our beliefs do not correspond with the truth. Put 
another way: the reality of Buddhist metaphysics does not warrant us to feel 
wronged, and the problem lies in our (mis)perception of reality. And, in 
turn, responses based on such irrational thoughts and misperceptions are 
what perpetuate suffering. In other words, anger is both a result of 
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ignorance i.e. an epistemically unenlightened state, and itself causes suffering 
(which perpetuates that unenlightened state). The moral problem of anger 
discussed above is thus underpinned by an epistemic problem — we cannot 
achieve enlightenment through moral development alone. Let us now 
unpack this argument. 
 
 Anger makes an important ontological assumption. It is an 
assumption about the agency of both the agent and the patient. Victims of 
perceived injuries become angry because, in normal circumstances, they 
believe that the aggressors deliberately harm them, or if it was an accident, 
they might still be angry because they believed that those who caused the 
harm were not careful enough, for example. But if they lacked full capacity 
to act (e.g.’s, ‘she is a child’, ‘she is schizophrenic’, ‘she was coerced to act’) 
then we tend to pardon the apparent aggressor. What differentiates these 
cases from ones which typically trigger anger are whether we see the 
perpetrator as a fully responsible agent.136 The agent (the supposed wrongdoer) 
is recognised as a distinct individual, with a capacity to fully control herself 
and who is not acting under determining influences of other persons or 
circumstances. On the other hand, the patient (the offended) also conceives 
of herself in the same way; an autonomous and independent entity who, in 
this particular case as a patient, is totally innocent or undeserving of the harm. 
 
 This view is precisely the mistake in our thinking, according to the 
Buddhist, because ultimately it is self-fabricated. Buddhist philosophers call 
into question our deeply rooted sense of the self, suggesting it is not in line 
with reality. Consider some thought from Buddhaghoṣa:  
 
“Since states last but a moment’s time, those aggregates, by which 
was done the odious act, have ceased, so now what is it you are 
angry with? ‘Whom shall he hurt, who seeks to hurt another, in 
                                               
136 Let us be reminded by the discussion in P. F. Strawson’s monumental essay “Freedom 
and Resentment” 
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the other’s absence? Your presence is the cause of hurt; why are 
you angry, then, with him?”137  
 
This passage calls upon the notorious ‘no-self’ thesis, which works 
closely with the claims that all is impermanent and independent. A person is 
referred to as a heap of aggregates (as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
skanda/khandha), and Buddhaghoṣa wants to undermine that commonly 
mistaken self — rigid and self-defining — by pointing out how, as a person 
(as well as everything else), we change all the time. The problem pointed out 
here starts with our thinking that demarcates between oneself and the 
others. By identifying with any sense of a self, we start to draw the line and 
form a circle around the I — ‘this is my friend’; ‘such and such belong to me’; 
‘I am the humblest person in the world’ (how ironic such an announcement 
is!)138 The more you attach yourself with such modifiers, the ‘bigger’ you 
become. And this is significant in creating more chances for the arising of 
anger. As discussed in Chapter 1, anger is triggered when there is a perceived 
harm to oneself and whatever one values. That means that when whatever 
you identify as or with yourself suffers, you become angry. 
 
 Aristotle’s account of anger (Rhetoric II. II 5-7), which incorporates a 
condition about social status, actually illustrates the Buddhist point very well. 
In Aristotle’s view, anger can only arise when the superior are slighted by 
the lower classes, but not vice versa. This interaction is tied to the worth of the 
sufferers; the more worth the person has, the angrier she is (allowed) to 
become, for the superior have more worth, while those who are ‘worthless’ 
do not get to get angry. But ‘worth’ is not something that always remains 
unchanged and true (just like the worth, or worthlessness rather, of slaves no 
longer exists), it is something constructed. The worth of yourself is about 
what you see yourself as. That is to say, it is an appraisal of oneself which is 
determined not just by oneself, but also influenced by other factors such as 
                                               
137 Vism IX, 22. Emphases belong to the original text. 
138 As Peter Harvey notes about the idea of self in Buddhist philosophy, “Self is practically 
equivalent to ‘what pertains to Self’, I, mine, ‘I am.’” (The Selfless Mind, 50) 
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social norms (although in the ancient Greece the worth of a person 
according to classes was largely determined by the latter). 
 
 Further passages from the Buddhist texts gesture us towards the 
bigger picture of reality, inviting us to see all phenomena as embedded in 
chains of events. This time, let Śāntideva speak: 
 
“Whatever transgressions and evil deeds of various kinds there 
are, all arise through the power of conditioning factors, while 
there is nothing that arises independently.”139  
 
“The much-sought-for ‘primal matter’, or the imagined ‘Self’, 
even that does not come into being after deciding ‘I shall 
become.’”140  
 
As introduced in the discussion about suffering, all things are 
inevitably affected by something else, and at the same time themselves 
become the factors that affect other things; this is the principle of dependent 
arising. No-one and nothing is free from conditions — Śāntideva is appealing 
to that truth. There is no ‘Self’ that could conjure something up out of sheer 
will. As much as we cannot decide to walk on the Sun and succeed (due to 
our biological and physical restrictions), we cannot decide to transgress 
without the influences of conditions. If we had to identify what gives rise to 
the evil deeds, it has to be all the conditions which have to be traced back 
through a tremendously complex web of interconnection, and perhaps it 
might include what the sufferer has done herself.141 But as the point stands, 
seeing oneself as distinct from the problem is an oversight. And it is probably 
not an exaggeration to say that tracking down all the causes is impossible.142 
                                               
139 BCA 6.25 
140 BCA 6.27 
141 In BCA 6.42, it says: “Previously, I too caused just such pain to living beings. Therefore, 
this is just what I deserve, I who have caused distress to other beings.” The same thought 
can be found in BCA 6.45, 47, 49. 
142 This reminds me of an example from a comedy series called Santa Clarita Diet. It is about 
a woman who was turned into a human cannibalistic zombie. All madness engulfs her and 
her complicit family because she has to eat human beings in order to survive. At one point, 
they start to discover that the cause for her transformation into a human flesh-eater is the 
clams she ordered for the dinner on a night out. Then she starts to blame herself for 
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 Here, Śāntideva treats all causes equally and suggests that this is how 
we should also see things. This is made clear in BCA 6.22: “I am not angered 
at bile and the like even though they cause great suffering. Why be angry at 
sentient beings, who are also provoked to anger by conditions?” Whether 
bile or a sentient being, they are treated equally as causes of pain here. But 
we tend to treat these causes differently: we don’t blame ‘bile’ for the 
suffering it causes to our body (like when a friend feeds us spicy food at a 
dinner party that causes us an upset stomach).143 This impersonal view is 
significant in our therapising of anger. By recognising that we and our 
offender are just like everything else, not independent from conditions and 
in total control, we lose the sense of agency that holds someone in particular 
as the sole cause of our pain. We will return to this idea of utilising the 
Buddhist metaphysical view as a cognitive tool in the treatment of anger in 
Chapter 4.  
 
 Such a theory of anger is strongly cognition-orientated. The 
occasions of anger that appear to give rise to anger are only the immediate 
factors that contribute to its arising. Yet, we blame the person. Digging 
deeper we will find that the thought that ‘I am made to suffer by a responsible 
agent’ requires a more basic assumption. Such an appraisal of the situation 
supposes agents in a way that they are completely independent, which, the 
Buddhists argue, is wrong. Therefore, anger can never be justified because it 
results from our failure to recognise things as they actually are. An 
implication of this conception is that they do not consider anger as an 
instinctive reaction i.e. being simply somatic or non-cognitive feedback, 
because all anger is considered to be processed through one’s 
(mis)apprehension, of which most of us are unaware, before we react. In 
                                               
ordering the dish, then remembering how her decision was influenced by the waiter. But 
her husband thought it might have been because of him, because that night a football 
match was on, so he wanted to watch football instead of cooking before she came back. And 
he also lied to her to get out of trouble and suggested going out instead. They kept tracing 
the course of events back to find out that it seems to go on indefinitely. In the end, when 
they try to pinpoint a single cause that is responsible for her becoming a zombie, they were 
bogged down by the ever-increasing factors upon thinking back on all that happened. 
143 See further detailed analysis of Śāntideva’s arguments against anger in Chapter 4.  
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fact, even our likes and dislikes, which are sometimes seen as a natural 
disposition are, according to this argument, also founded upon these 
epistemic assumptions. It could be instinctive only in the sense that anger is 
triggered impulsively from an already-formed attitude which is partly 
constituted from beliefs. 
 
 In a sense, this is good news for those who genuinely want to eschew 
anger: if the problem lies in our misunderstanding, there’s a solution. This 
formulation of anger, as such, allows the Buddhists to deal with every instance 
of it, rather than having to admit to uncontrolled anger. Although Buddhist 
eliminativists may offer different methods to deal with anger, the necessary 
requirement for eliminating anger altogether is by correcting one’s belief to 
align with reality. Suppressing, subduing, or controlling anger would only 
calm anger temporarily, but as long as the misconception still persists it can 
resurface anytime. Thus to ‘uproot’ that false attitude is a very apt 
expression for the elimination indeed, for it could be likened to a root, most 
likely, of grass: as long as its roots are left untouched, you will definitely see it 
grow though there may only be a few drops of rain. 
 
 It might very well be observed that such cognitive transformation 
does not come by easily. A person inflicted by such a state of ‘ignorance’ or 
‘confusion’, otherwise known as moha, cannot be undone by just learning 
about the metaphysical facts. False belief is not simply a lack of information 
or absence of knowledge about this metaphysical reality, otherwise we would 
immediately attain enlightenment as soon as it is explained to us. Instead, it 
is a positive imposition of one’s beliefs on the world, and we must actively 
engage with the world in ways that correspond with this belief. Thus, an 
eliminativist argument must go further than merely pointing out the 
epistemic error — it must provide a path towards acting in accordance with 
correct understanding (which, I hope, is what my own thesis offers). Moha is 
considered, like hatred and greed, a mental affliction or kleśa. It is something 
that requires complete removal because it is deeply rooted and actions that 
stem from it become habit. It is for this reason why the second kind of 
argument above, regarding the importance of moral training, is significant 
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for the eliminativist argument. We will therefore return to this in due course. 
Before doing so, however, we will examine problems with the Moderationist 
alternative. More immediately, however, we need to say something about 
why we should pursue the Buddhist goal of enlightenment by trying to 
eliminate anger. 
 
 
6. Suffering and Enlightenment 
 
 We have talked a lot above about the Buddhist ultimate goal of 
enlightenment, and we have identified two aspects of how we go about 
achieving it. Yet, it is still unclear what kind of feeling one has when 
enlightened. With a description like ‘happiness without a feeling’ (i.e. the 
void of feeling described above), it leaves us perplexed as it is such an 
unimaginable experience for anyone who has never experienced it, and that 
is probably almost all people. How can we feel happy without feeling it? Is it 
really going to a be a pleasant experience then? This may make us wonder if 
such a goal is actually worth pursing. Other goals, such as survival or 
pleasure, are understandable because their value is self-evident and everyone 
knows more or less what they mean to us. For us to see that the Buddhist 
goal is really desirable, it has to be explained in relevant terms. So instead of 
spelling it out as the positive state “happiness without a feeling”, 
enlightenment can be better appreciated by a negative thesis, which is a 
complete absence of suffering. 
 
 Now an assumption is being made here, and it is a very important 
one: that there is suffering in our life. This perception about life seems to be 
true and it is agreed that suffering is not something desirable. And 
Buddhists, then, are right in convincing us to get rid of it altogether. 
However, simply ‘there is suffering’ is not precisely true of Buddhist thought 
because the quantification is not right. While we tend to believe that our 
lives are sporadically filled with suffering, Buddhists claim that everything is 
suffering. This is a contentious claim that many may not find exactly 
accurate. Surely, we do have bad moments like when we have toothache, or 
lose our job or a loved one. But there are good moments, too, like winning 
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the lottery, seeing our children grow up happily, and so on. The proportion 
between happiness and suffering may differ from one person to another, but 
generally we think that life is a mixed bag of good and bad. Despite illnesses 
and disappointments, most of us whose lives are quite decent (for certainly 
we are fortunate enough to afford to contemplate this matter, rather than 
just worrying about survival) do genuinely enjoy pleasure in life — we are 
not always pervaded by suffering. And so perhaps, we think, suffering is not 
necessarily bad because there’s some good in among this bad, and the bad 
times highlight the good ones. Without suffering to highlight the good 
moments, we can’t appreciate how good life is, and certainly suffering does 
not define life itself. Apparently, this attitude towards life is at odds with the 
Buddhist claim. To successfully persuade us that enlightenment is actually 
worth pursuing, Buddhists have to show that there’s actually a ubiquity of 
suffering in life and that it is something we should seek to eliminate. 
 
 The Buddhist analysis of suffering (dukkha or duḥkha) cannot be simply 
equated to the term ‘suffering’ as we use it, because it’s meaning is more far-
reaching. We often associate suffering to undesirable conditions that 
someone has to endure or deal with over a period of time. For example, 
people living in poverty or having chronic diseases are said to be in 
suffering. We also use the verb ‘suffer’ when we lose something (e.g. ‘She 
suffered a loss of her family in the fire.’) or encounter something undesirable 
(e.g. ‘The nation has suffered economic recession for over half a decade.’) 
From our way of using the term, suffering is an undesirable condition that 
tends to be relatively more severe than what other people have to face. But if 
we consider our own experience, it doesn’t have to be that extreme to make 
our life suffer as it can come in many subtler ways. Suffering spreads 
through every aspect of life, from “[B]irth, ageing, death, sorrow, 
lamentation, pain, grief, despair association with the unloved, separation 
from the loved, and not to get what one wants.”144 We live everyday with 
some sort of uncertainty, anxiety, and unsatisfactoriness; we are pained by 
illnesses, stressed out by overwhelming loads of work, bored with 
                                               
144 SN 56.11 
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commuting, nervous about a job interview, disappointed by our football 
team’s results, grief-stricken by our parent’s death, fearful of our own death. 
These phenomena are the many faces of our suffering that is more pervasive 
than we thought, and so we need to figure out a sense of ‘suffering’ that 
embodies all of them. 
 
 There are many senses that can be employed to refer to suffering. 
The first sense is rather obvious. It is a crude sense of physical pain that is 
allowed by our natural make-up as a corporeal being. We have some pains 
which are just mild discomfort, from simply hunger and thirst to headaches 
and small cuts from a knife, and some that are so excruciating like 
childbirth. It’s impossible for anyone to avoid this kind of suffering 
throughout the cycle of life despite our efforts. Still, it doesn’t dominate 
every moment of our existence, at least for the vast majority of us; there are 
times that we can walk without the aid of a cane, where we have enough to 
momentarily satiate our appetites, where don’t have to sleep rough on the 
street. Not every moment we are faced with is suffering, and bar those 
moments we think we have a happy and good life. 
  
 But there is also a form of suffering that is subtler and more complex 
than the previous sense. It is the mental phenomena that react to pain. 
Because we want to avoid such pain, we become anxious, uneasy, miserable 
and fearful. But this kind of suffering doesn’t arise only from physical pain, it 
includes other sources that we usually associate with painful feeling, such as 
‘separation from loved ones’ and ‘not getting what one wants’. This 
association deepens and widens the notion of reflexive suffering because of 
the discrepancy between our desires and the way the world works. We want 
things to go as we wish but most of the time they do not. And sometimes in 
spite of all the efforts we make to achieve our desire, we still fail. Our lack of 
control of the world will often leave us frustrated and disappointed. This is 
due to the fact that everything changes, whether it is our aging body that 
aches more and more everyday, or our children who once the source of our 
happiness suddenly have a premature death. In any case, nothing is 
permanent, not even happiness. 
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 The final sense of suffering is the most profound and all-embracing. 
It is the suffering of dependent arising — the pervasive condition that 
nothing is independent from other things, noted above. Our lives are 
affected, whether good or bad, by other conditions that are not in our full 
control. For example, the safety of Syrian citizens was suddenly and 
dramatically undermined as soon as a war broke out; likewise, when there is 
an outbreak of disease we become more vulnerable to sickness and death; 
and infants are helpless with regard to their own survival, and can survive 
only when they are nurtured by someone else. Our failures and successes are 
not guaranteed by our own efforts only, but also depend on other things that 
have effects on us. This is pervasive as every other thing is also subject to the 
same condition i.e. it is dependent on something else beyond its control. And 
the lack of complete control is itself suffering because we are in the position 
where we are being acted on, being made to suffer. This is suffering at the 
deepest level because the fact about causal dependence, together with 
impermanence, pervade everything and cause us to feel worried that 
misfortunes will befall us at anytime. Even when we are not aware of the fact 
and live our lives happily, our impotency and dependency are still ultimately 
inescapable. One may have the happiest moments in life, but the complex 
conditions that cause such desirable outcomes are subject to change without 
us being in full control of it. As such, suffering is seen as an unwanted 
condition.145  
 
 Now if suffering dominates and pervades our life to that degree, one 
may ask, what’s the point of knowing about this and what is Buddhist 
teaching is for? Surely this is inescapable!146 Despite this seemingly grim view 
towards life, all is not lost, for Buddhists are actually optimistic that there is a 
                                               
145 Also see Carpenter, Indian Buddhist Philosophy, particularly Chapter 1, for detailed 
discussion of suffering as well as Four Noble Truths, and Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, 6-9. 
146 There’s also an interesting discussion about suicide as a way to escape suffering. The 
debate whether Buddhists should hold on to the idea of the afterlife or reincarnation, or 
renounce it (as those who advocate the naturalised reading of Buddhism would have it) is 
the context in which suicide plays a crucial role. The latter position believes that mental 
activities stop with the end of the physical body. And if life ends there then it is a sensible 
solution to end suffering by ending one’s life. See further discussion and some proposed 
solution to the problem in Westerhoff, “Buddhism without Reincarnation.” 
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way out of this malady. Using the same principle of causal dependence, one 
can arrive at the conclusion that there can be a cessation of suffering: 
suffering has to arise due to certain causes, and if we can identify the causes, 
then we can prevent suffering from arising by eliminating the causes. It 
cannot be emphasised enough how this premise that life is pervaded by 
suffering is important to Buddhist philosophy — so much that it can be said 
that the whole Buddhist theoretical and practical system has been developed 
in order to eliminate, or at least alleviate, suffering. And at the same time, 
the opposite of it, viz. the end of suffering, has to be emphasised even more, 
and that’s the whole point of practising Buddhism. For if anyone really sees 
the truth about suffering, they would have a sense of urgency and see that 
it’s worthwhile to try to eliminate suffering. Now, before proceeding to see 
how to eliminate those causes for suffering, they first have to be identified. 
The Buddhists conclude that certain mental attitudes are the cause for 
suffering, and this is where the focus of this thesis comes in — anger. 
 
 From the above analysis of suffering, we may appreciate the 
phenomenology of suffering from two aspects: suffering as an objective fact, 
as reality of the world, and suffering as a felt phenomenon, as a subjective 
response to such reality. This distinction is helpful for recognising that not 
all suffering is inevitable. Indeed, the former sense, metaphysical suffering, is 
fundamental to the structure of how the world really is; that things are 
impermanent, lacking of essence and not self-determining. As such, there’s 
nothing much we can do to change that structure of reality. But the latter 
sense, phenomenological suffering, is a consequence of your interaction with 
the world. Though ubiquitous, it is in fact within your control to a certain 
extent. Because it is not something embedded in the world, but something we 
do, it’s the way we think, this gives us a clue about the kind of suffering that 
we can alter — either by eliminating or perpetuating it. 
 
 Desire is precisely what conditions suffering. Desire, or ‘craving’ as 
often used in the Buddhist term, is not a general kind of mental activity, as 
distinct from intention, cognition, feeling, and so on, which is the subject of 
contemporary philosophy of mind. It has a connotation of desire, like the 
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word ‘craving’ suggests, that is powerful, incessant, excessive — like I crave 
for a bar of chocolate or thirst for a pint of beer; the thought of it is really 
tempting that I have to have it, and as it turns out it tends to lead to another 
bar or pint or many more; but once I’m satisfied soon I’ll crave for it 
again.147 A desire for something in this sense makes us suffer because of the 
impermanent condition of both the object of desire and ourselves; it could 
be that my favourite chocolate might change the recipe due to an increased 
price of cocoa which makes it not as delicious as it once was, or I have had it 
everyday for two weeks such that no matter how heavenly it was I started to 
feel sick of it. And, in fact, we have an inexhaustible number of desires like 
this, so simply chasing every one of them is a hard work, let alone the fact 
that some of them cannot be fulfilled and those that can be succeeded will 
not stay forever. Most of us want to have material comforts so we have to 
work hard to buy them, but once we have those possessions they become a 
burden, for fear that they would be damaged, lost, stolen, or burnt down. As 
it turns out, the fulfilled desires also come with a constant fear of losing what 
we have. 
 
 Indeed, it is not the material things per se that we desire; we want to 
experience pleasurable things, whether it is actually a thing or a state in 
which we associate with pleasure. On the other hand, we also want to avoid 
things that appear to be painful. From such inclinations, it’s only to be 
expected that we want continued existence of things we like, and non-
existence of things we don’t like. If I had a child, I would want her to grow 
up happily, and of course for my life to be long enough to see doing so. At 
the same time, I would fear the thought of my child choosing the wrong 
path, hurting herself, or some accident depriving me of her, or that I 
contract cancer and die, preventing me from seeing her grow up. This is 
indeed life, and we see that people have different levels of ability to cope 
with it. The more attached you are the harder it is for you to cope when 
                                               
147 Physical desires are typical examples of craving in Buddhist literature. While it resonates 
with Plato’s idea that this kind of desire needs to be restrained, Gowans (Philosophy of the 
Buddha, 131) points out that for Buddhists there is also a sense of one kind of desire higher 
than another. However, it is not because it is bodily that makes it a lower desire, but 
because craving (tanhā) is the most undesirable kind of motivation.  
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something is lost, the more averse you are the harder it is for you to live even 
when you have everything you want. It is either sorrow or constant fear of 
sorrow. We are made to suffer by our own desire because the wish for 
continued existence of pleasurable things and non-existence of painful things 
is a wish that cannot be fulfilled by the world that constantly changes. 
Unfortunately, this is what we tend to do when there are incongruities 
between our desire and the world; instead of accommodating ourselves to 
the world, we assume that the world has to bend to fit our needs, which 
cannot always been done. However, this should not be understood as an 
exhortation to become apathetic, for the concern for the wellbeing of oneself 
and others also has to be cultivated, as we shall see in the discussion of 
compassion — an emotional state that requires an ability to recognise other 
beings’ suffering — in a later chapter. 
 
 Aversion is like the other side of the same coin as attachment. If the 
latter pulls us to things we like, the former pushes us away. As we noted in 
Chapter 1, anger and hatred are treated similarly in Buddhist literature. 
This is because they are rooted in the same form of desire, aversion (dveṣa, 
dosa). Anger is a phenomenological occurrence that involves a desire to avoid 
the object of harm, or for the object to cease to exist or to exist differently. 
For this reason, when being harmed, we have the tendencies to retaliate 
against the apparent cause of pain in order to remove it. For example, when 
stubbing a toe on a chair, some people get angry and kick it (foolishly 
thinking, knowingly or unknowingly, that harming it would stop it from 
harming them again). Or similarly, people also want to retaliate against their 
enemies, or even obliterate them, so that the source of harm becomes non-
existent. Wishing an ill upon another is fundamentally a manifestation of a 
desire that something that makes us suffer stops existing, and because we 
associate another as a cause of our pain, we want that person to stop causing 
us pain by harming or even eliminating them. Yet, even when anger doesn’t 
wish ill of another, it still has the same desire, i.e. to get rid of what there is 
or what is in our possession and avoid what we do not have that we don’t 
like. Again, we make ourselves suffer for fear that we won’t be able to avoid 
what we don’t like, which is not always possible to do, especially if there are 
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many things you are averse to. In fact, the more desires you have, the more 
likely you are met with disappointment by the unfulfilled desires. As such, 
craving is not appropriate and has to be eliminated because anger and other 
actions that are rooted in craving perpetuate the suffering that is already 
entrenched in the world. The fundamental problem of desire lies in its 
presupposition that there is a distinct, autonomous, unchanging self that can 
permanently attach itself to or avoid some other things or agents of the same 
nature. As we saw in section 5, Buddhists believe this is a mistake we often 
make, and precisely the one that causes suffering because it conflicts with 
reality. The desire in anger that seeks avoidance of things we don’t like is a 
mark of dissatisfaction. In this sense anger is not just a cause of suffering, but 
is itself a symptom of suffering caused by the lack of awareness of the 
metaphysical truth. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Having set out these crucial aspects of the Buddhist arguments for 
eliminating anger, and the underlying metaphysical picture which underpins 
them, we can now turn to the opposing view — Moderationism — in more 
detail. In order to motivate a defence of (the currently unpopular!) 
Eliminativism, we must show what is wrong with the far more prevalent 
moderationist arguments. I turn towards this task in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter Three: 
MODERATIONIST ARGUMENTS FOR 
ANGER 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter examines moderationist accounts, both Buddhist and 
non-Buddhist, in favour of anger. All accounts — as far as moderationism 
goes — argue that some kinds of anger are good or right and thus cannot be 
eliminated. On their view, eliminating anger altogether eliminates 
something of irreplaceable value, though they can concede that not all anger 
is good, or that anger is not always appropriate. We will first examine the 
general approach of the Buddhist moderationists, which involves the 
‘transformation of anger’. What this means varies across accounts, as do the 
terms used to describe this process (it may be referred to as a 
‘transformation’, as ‘metabolisation’, as ‘transmutation’, and so on). 
Essentially, it is the moderationist attempt to recharacterise anger, which 
deviates from the generally accepted notion. I will highlight what I see as 
some methodological concerns about this approach, though I do not intend 
for these concerns to be regarded as defeating of moderationism. After 
looking at the general approach taken, we will focus more narrowly on one 
specific moderationist account — that of Emily McRae — which gives us 
the most detailed account of what is involved in transforming anger, and 
what the supposed benefits are of doing so. We will then examine other 
supposed benefits in the section which follows, raising issues with these 
claims. Again, my rebuttals are simply meant to show that they are not 
convincing enough for eliminativists, and not to totally dismiss 
moderationism. In section 4, we deal with an argument for ‘apt anger’ by 
Amia Srinivasan. I will identify what the concerns of this unique account are 
and give some preliminary responses from the Buddhist eliminativist 
perspective, before going on to develop my own response in Chapter 4. 
Finally, we turn to examine the odd relationships between anger and 
compassion as proposed by moderationists. This pairing is peculiar to 
arguments in favour of anger. I will show that there are many issues 
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surrounding this pairing that moderationists have to respond while 
eliminativists are not faced with the same problems. The central aim of the 
chapter is to cast sufficient doubt on the moderationist position to allow for a 
defence of eliminativism in the chapters which follow. 
 
 
1. The Transformation of Anger 
  
Many Buddhist moderationist accounts attempt to recharacterise anger, 
specifically by shaking off its negative aspects via a process of transformation 
and redeploying what is left of the emotion in a productive or ‘creative’ 
way.148 In this section we will examine the nature of this transformation (to 
the extent that is possible given the lack of detail on this process which is 
typical of many accounts) and suggest some concerns the moderationist may 
need to address. What we shall see is that moderationists lean on a 
distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘transformed’ anger, with the former 
sharing the characterisation given in Chapter 1, with its many negative 
associations and effects, and the latter offering a far more useful emotion for 
deployment in a variety of ways and contexts. As we saw in Chapter 2, some 
moderationists see this transformation as part of a therapising of anger i.e. 
what we should do with anger once it arises, whereas others see the project 
as trying to find a way of ‘getting anger right’ i.e. developing a way of 
responding angrily to the world which doesn’t carry its negative effects. We 
also saw that some eliminativists, such as Thich Nhat Hanh, are sympathetic 
to the therapising project, but ultimately defend a view that it would be 
better if anger did not arise at all (thus rejecting the notion that we should 
try to get anger right so as to make use of it). 
 
In Chapter 1, we saw how the Buddhist characteristation of anger is 
closely linked with a tendency to seek to harm others. In some cases, this 
could be manifested as violence. Moderationists, however, seek to 
disassociate anger and violence, defending the claim that anger is not 
necessarily violent. Barrows, for example, complains that “In our culture we 
                                               
148 Barrows, “The Light of Outrage,” 53. 
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frequently confuse anger with violence… We are conditioned by the very 
order of the society to expect little to intervene between our experience of 
anger (ours or anyone else’s) and the impulse to act on it hurtfully.”149 The 
thought here is that violence is necessarily bad, but anger is not. As we often 
mistakenly equate anger to violence, such association ruins anger’s potential 
to be good. Thus, in order to come to accept the moderationist view, we 
have to stop conflating anger and violence and, instead, condemn violent 
anger while permitting peaceful anger. As such, not all incidents of anger 
should be seen as bad just so long as we refrain from acting violently. 
 
 This is a fair point to make. Not all anger leads to actual aggression, 
or in fact to any action at all. However, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, 
according to the traditional Buddhists, anger is essentially a mental 
phenomenon, i.e. without an expression or someone else recognising it, it is 
no less anger.150 Thus, the moderationist recharacterisation of anger along 
these lines is not actually inconsistent with the Buddhist account. That anger 
is a primarily mental phenomenon in fact seems to play into the 
moderationist argument that we can simply suppress our mental anger and 
then express it creatively somehow. We can see, therefore, that there is 
agreement between moderationist and eliminativist views on this particular 
characterisation of anger. However, simply pointing out that anger can be 
dissociated from violence is not likely to persuade the eliminativist to 
embrace anger since, as we pointed out in Chapter 2, merely suppressing 
anger would not address the concern of the Buddhist eliminativists that the 
(phenomenological) experience of anger itself is inherently undesirable. As 
such, the eliminativist has additional reasons to reject anger, regardless of how 
closely it may or may not be connected to violence.151 As such, the 
                                               
149 Barrows, 53. 
150 That the violent action is impulsive in Barrows’ quote doesn’t make a significant 
difference. Anger that leads to impulsive violent action is primarily a mental phenomenon 
just as much as anger that leads to a carefully deliberated act of violence. One might be 
severely paralysed, thus unable to act on a violent impulse, yet still have that impulse. The 
central point here is that we can agree that violence and anger (of various sorts) can come 
apart. Barrows’ point is that they are too closely associated within our culture. 
151 The question regarding what constitutes violence is open for debate. Eliminitivists may 
wish to object that simply getting angry is itself violent, if the definition of violence involves 
something forceful and likely to cause harm. Then, we cannot even feel anger because such 
would commit violence which in itself is inherently wrong. However, I do not intend to 
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moderationist would need to show us that anger can be further transformed 
so as to remove the residual negative aspects of anger, or else persuade us 
that the benefits of anger outweigh those negative aspects. We shall come to 
this latter sort of argument later; for now, we will focus on the 
transformation of anger. 
 
 Another way in which the moderationist seeks to recharacterise 
anger is by suggesting that anger does not always involve a desire to harm 
others. Barrows, again, wants to argue that anger can sometimes lack the 
desire to harm or act out altogether. She proposes a so-called ‘holy anger’ as 
different from the normal kind of anger as a forward-looking emotion, 
rather than one which desires the suffering of others (the characterisation 
typical in Buddhist texts, as we saw in Chapter 1). She suggests of holy anger 
that “its aim would not be vengeance, punishment, humiliation, the 
suffering of the offender. It would take no delight in fantasies of the other’s 
defeat; it would not be satisfied by these, because its aim would not be to 
continue the cycle of suffering.”152 Instead, anger is lauded for its energising 
effects — a common claim across moderationist accounts.153 Thus, the aim 
of the transformation of anger is to harness its energy in service of non-
violent aims, aims which also do not seek to harm others. By eliminating 
anger, the thought goes, we sacrifice something which is of significance and 
value. As Barrows explains, in “attempting to abdicate our anger, we lose 
touch with a deep wellspring of strength and a positive force for many kinds 
of change.”154 
 
                                               
pursue this line of argument. For, again, we lack enough discussion about violence in the 
moderationist accounts. Moreover, violence has a tricky place in Buddhist ethics. There is 
some indication that violence, such as killing, may be acceptable in some exceptional 
circumstances, in Buddhist philosophy. A notable source for such dispute is, e.g., in the 
Mahāyāna text Upāyakauśalya Sūtra (cited in Chapter 2) See the contemporary discussion in, 
e.g., Gethin, “Killing Compassion,” and Keown, “Compassionate Killing,” (for the 
Theravada context specifically), and Jenkins, “Auspiciousness of Compassionate Violence”; 
Jenkins, “Compassion and Violence,” (for the wider Buddhist context generally). 
152 Barrows, “The Light of Outrage,” 54. 
153 Barrows, 52; Gross, Buddhism after Patriarchy, 171; hooks, “Buddhism, the Beats and 
Loving Blackness.” Non-Buddhist moderationists make a similar claim. See, for example, 
Lorde, “The Uses of Anger,” 280. 
154 Barrows, “The Light of Outrage,” 53. 
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 Such a position on anger has a lot of intuitive appeal. As we noted in 
Chapter 1 (2.1), we tend to closely associate justice with anger, as when we 
feel angry about some grave social injustice. This is one of the main 
motivations for feminist moderationists in particular when they advocate on 
anger’s behalf. However, there is a possible methodological concern that the 
moderationist may need to contend with: by transforming anger so 
drastically, do they in fact bring about its cessation in favour of some other 
emotion? This is a concern that moderationists themselves raise — McRae, 
for instance, addresses this kind of problem (we shall examine her account 
specifically in the next section). I suspect that there are actually two concerns 
at play here. First of all, by stripping anger of its negative properties, there is 
a possibility that anger simply ceases to be anger. This is a concern because 
it renders talk of ‘transmuted anger’, ‘holy anger’, ‘Tantric anger’, and so 
on, a series of misnomers — it is simply not accurate to talk of those 
concepts in terms of anger, and thus those positions, in fact, argue for the 
elimination of anger. The second concern is that the characterisations given 
to transformed anger are so generic that any argument in favour of those 
characterisations could simply be used in favour of some other emotions as 
well. I will try to explain these two concerns a little further. 
 
 Our first concern is a conceptual one. In effect, the moderationist 
appears to unpack the concept of anger, identifying its properties, in much 
the same way that we did in Chapter 1. However, in doing so, the 
transformative process — a process which is not explained in many 
moderationist accounts — seeks to establish a new concept of anger which 
discards the negative properties and retains only its positive ones. Barrows, 
for example, discards the desire to harm others which is characteristic of 
normal anger, and retains anger’s energising effects, resulting in ‘holy 
anger’. However, it is debatable as to whether this method for establishing 
the new concept really displays any philosophical rigour. The eliminativist 
might wish to suggest that there must be some necessary conditions for 
something counting as anger, or else anger may not be distinguishable from 
other emotions. And unfortunately Buddhist moderationists have not been 
engaged enough on that front. Anger is something both commonly 
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experienced and universal across human populations, and we typically have 
no trouble identifying it in ourselves and others. That would suggest that 
there might be some essential characteristics of anger, which perhaps also 
make it so easily recognisable. The danger of the transformative process the 
moderationist employs is that such necessary conditions may simply not be 
met by the new concepts this process yields. 
 
 The second, related, concern, is that even if what is left over from the 
transformative process is sufficient for us to regard that emotion as anger, 
the newly produced emotional response might simply share too many of its 
positive features with other, non-angry, emotions. For instance, if what is 
retained of anger is its energising effect and its intentionality, advocating 
transformed anger on this basis might be quite unpersuasive if we can simply 
point to an alternative emotion which has those same benefits, and possibly 
more. As we have noted above, there is much to be said for those positive 
aspects of anger — if it is energising and externally directed at some specific 
person, cause, object etc. in the world (i.e. is intentional), then it is clear that 
transformed anger could be a force for social change. However, the 
eliminativist might equally wish to point out that what the moderationist 
values in their transformed anger is actually present in other positive 
emotions like compassion and generosity. If transformed anger amounts to 
nothing more than ‘an energising and intentional emotional state’, then this 
description fits other emotions just as well, and thus we may simply adopt 
these other emotions rather than (transformed) anger. Generosity, for 
example, can be both energising and intentional — consider the ‘spring in 
your step’ that you get from giving a homeless person the ‘benefit of the 
doubt’ when you give them your last bit of money on the promise they won’t 
spend that money unwisely. Here, our attitude of generosity is both 
energising and intentional. Being committed to doing good, as we might 
have experienced, can very well give us such energy to create change for the 
better even at a broader social level. If transformed anger has no special 
claim to the positive aspects it claims, then there is no reason to prefer it 
over the alternatives. Moreover, there are reasons to reject it — if the 
transformative process goes wrong, then we might be left with normal anger 
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(in some degree), and thus there is a risk of trying to operate on the basis of 
transformed anger while only normal anger is present.  
 
 As I said above, these methodological concerns need not be 
defeating of moderationism — they are simply left as concerns to be 
addressed. Part of the problem with understanding the moderationist notion 
of transformation of anger is that many moderationist accounts are not 
philosophical texts that seek to outline the concepts they bring into play with 
any degree of precision. As such, the transformative process is often left 
unexplained, and the characterisation of transformed anger might simply 
emptier than it was actually intended. However, there are some more 
substantive moderationist accounts that we can examine to see if they can 
address those concerns, and offer arguments that should trouble the 
eliminativist. One such account is that of Emily McRae, who advocates for 
‘Tantric anger’. We turn to that account now. 
 
 
2. McRae’s Tantric Anger 
 
 Emily McRae attempts to make the case for moderationism by 
advocating what she calls ‘Tantric anger’. McRae identifies six features, 
based on two Tantric Buddhist texts by Dharmarakṣita — The Wheel Weapon 
that Strikes at the Enemy’s Vital Spot and The Poison-Destroying Peacock Mind 
Training,155 which she claims distinguish Tantric anger from ‘normal anger’, 
i.e. the everyday kind. The first characteristic is that tantric anger is 
transformed anger, as opposed to merely feigned anger. The thought here is that 
an eliminativist might argue that any beneficial consequences of anger might 
be just as easily obtained by pretending that we are angry, i.e. that it is not 
actually anger that should be defended. However, Tantric anger is not 
pretended — it is real anger that has undergone a ‘metabolising’ process 
(more on this below). This brings us to the second distinguishing 
characteristic — Tantric anger has been “transformed or metabolised into 
‘that which is like anger’”.156 By this, McRae seems to mean that Tantric 
                                               
155 Sopa, Sweet, and Zwilling, Peacock in the Poison Grove.. 
156 McRae, “Metabolizing Anger,” 473. 
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anger retains the “power, energy, desire to act, and external focus 
paradigmatic of normal (unmetabolised) anger”.157 The third characteristic 
distinguishing tantric and normal anger is that the former is “accomplished 
through meditative and contemplative practices that function as therapies 
for the emotions”.158 This is the process by which anger seems to be 
metabolised, and McRae cites Buddhist ‘mind-training’ as an example of 
such a process. A fourth distinguishing characteristic is that Tantric anger is 
non-compulsive, i.e. a person who is ‘tantrically’ angry is in control of that 
anger, and can drop it when it is no longer useful. This is meant to contrast 
with the compulsion to act out associated with normal anger. Tantric 
anger’s fifth distinguishing characteristic is that it is not oriented towards 
harming others, but instead towards helping them. Normal anger, by 
contrast, is often defined with reference to a desire to harm those who have 
wronged us. Lastly, tantric anger is “intimately connected with the Buddhist 
metaphysical view of ‘no-self’, the idea that there is no substantial, enduring, 
permanent, independent self”.159 
 
 We can see that the recharacterisation strategy mentioned earlier is 
deployed here too. Some of the claims, including that no ill-desire is 
involved, that it means to help, etc. have been discussed to a certain extent 
above, with some objections. However, given McRae’s far more detailed 
argument, I think we should reconsider this set of complex claims carefully 
to evaluate whether this special kind of anger can be a valid contender for 
moderationism. 
 
McRae attempts to methodically argue that a view that defends 
Tantric anger is both more attractive than the eliminativist position, and is a 
more nuanced view than many of the moderationist alternatives. 
Eliminativists, as she notes, have highlighted the irrationality and destructive 
tendencies of anger, but the Tantric thesis, she believes, “preserves the 
commitment to the cultivation of positive regard for all members of the 
                                               
157 McRae, 479. 
158 McRae, 473. 
159 McRae, 474. 
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moral community while still recognising a robust role for anger in moral 
life”.160 Certainly, McRae’s argument for a more refined account of anger 
offers a very clear strategy for the moderationist against the eliminativist — 
moral life is incredibly complex, and on the surface one of the great failings 
of the eliminativist position is that, by advocating that we eradicate specific 
emotional responses, it might be thought to restrict and simplify the possible 
range of moral actions. But we must examine McRae’s arguments more 
closely to see whether she achieves the aims she sets out for Tantric anger. 
 
One of McRae’s targets is Glen Pettigrove’s defence of ‘meekness’. 
On that view: 
 
“Meekness is the virtue whose purview is the governance of anger 
and related emotions. The meek person is slow to anger and is 
not prone to resent others, to desire their suffering, or to take 
pleasure in their distress.”161  
 
Pettigrove is not, strictly speaking, an eliminativist. His position is 
instead that, even if we think anger is sometimes morally appropriate, the 
better response to wrongdoing is still meekness. It is in discussing 
Pettigrove’s view that McRae introduces us to a central example in which 
she thinks anger, or Tantric anger in particular, would be a better response 
than meekness. The standards against which we measure this include which 
response helps reveal to us what we value, which helps us to better recognise 
wrongdoing, which helps us communicate what we value or expect, and 
which motivates us to defend the things we value or to challenge injustice 
(more on this in section 3 below). The example that McRae cites as a 
challenge to Pettigrove’s claim that meekness ought to be preferred to anger 
comes from Martha Nussbaum: 
 
“Elie Wiesel was a child in one of the Nazi death camps. On the 
day the Allied forces arrived, the first member of the liberating 
                                               
160 McRae, 467. 
161 Pettigrove, “Meekness and ‘Moral’ Anger,” 343. 
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army he saw was a very large black officer. Walking into the 
camp and seeing what was there to be seen, this man began to 
curse, shouting at the top of his voice. As the child Wiesel 
watched, he went on shouting and cursing for a very long time. 
And the child Wiesel thought, watching him, now humanity has 
come back. Now, with that anger, humanity has come back.”162 
 
 Certainly, this is a striking example. The horrors of the Holocaust 
are well-known to virtually everyone. McRae thus asks us to imagine a 
similar scenario in which the officer, instead of cursing, began to cry — 
under that situation, she asks, would that have ‘restored humanity?’ In 
McRae’s view, such a response would fail to properly recognise the Nazi 
guards’ wrongdoing, because the outward expression of sadness captures only 
loss, pain and a certain kind of suffering. It is not, she suggests, specific enough 
to capture the kind of suffering caused by injustice, and thus it would fail to 
capture an important aspect of Wiesel’s reality. It is anger, she asserts, that 
does what meekness cannot in this situation. 
 
This is an interesting claim, but one which I feel needs closer 
scrutiny. The underlying thought of this situation seems to be one that an 
expression of anger shows your humanity, i.e. shows that you understand 
and care, which is a common argument among moderationists. However, 
one reason that McRae’s point seems appealing, it seems to me at least, is 
that we find comfort in others sharing our emotional perspective. If Wiesel 
was angry at his treatment at the Nazi death camp soldiers, as we might well 
expect, then seeing the anger of the Allied officer would assure him that 
there was a sympathetic response to his tragedy. One way in which we can 
characterise sympathy is with reference to ‘common feeling’, i.e. shared 
emotion. An angry Wiesel might well see anger as restoring humanity, 
because that reflects and validates his own feelings about the situation. It is 
undoubtedly reassuring to know that others feel the same way as we do in 
moments of heightened emotion. But it seems to me that we could also re-
describe Wiesel’s situation above in such a way that meekness can replace 
                                               
162 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 403. 
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anger: where weeping openly would be the restorative act required. As we 
have noted elsewhere, anger is (typically) intentional, i.e. directed at 
someone or something specific. But the Holocaust, while affecting and 
involving specific people, goes beyond those individuals’ experiences in 
terms of its moral significance. This is why many Holocaust memorial 
ceremonies today specifically reference ongoing genocides, in 
acknowledgement that such horrors have not yet ended. Discovery of the 
Nazi death camps revealed something much deeper about humanity — that 
even in such extreme situations, a total absence of compassion is possible, and 
that humanity is at its worst when we allow that to happen. It seems that 
Hannah Arendt had something like this in mind when she spoke of ‘the 
banality of evil’: that compassion, or ‘caring’ if you like, can be pushed out 
when structures are set up in such a way as to dehumanise others, and the 
consequences of this are well-documented.  
 
In fact, Elie Wiesel himself has made this very point, saying “The 
opposite of love is not hate, it is indifference… To be in the window and 
watch people being sent to concentration camps or being attacked in the 
street and do nothing, that's being dead.”163 As such, an Allied officer openly 
weeping at ‘seeing what there was to be seen’ might well be thought of as 
precisely bringing back humanity, for it was compassion that needed to be 
brought back to the victims of the Nazi death camps, not anger. This seems 
particularly true in this situation since the injustice that needs to be 
recognised here is not localised to a single individual, but spread across an 
entire population. What Wiesel, or anyone, may have been looking for was 
simply a sign that the rescuers understand and care, which is what anger is 
supposed to signify in this case. However, understanding and caring are also 
the foundation for compassion, a positive emotion that can function just like 
anger, but without risking the negative ‘side-effects’ identified in Chapter 1. 
It was, in fact, anger and hatred that had led them to places like Auschwitz 
and Belsen to begin with, as the anger of the political classes fuelled the 
creation of a mechanised system of mass slaughter.164 None of this is to deny 
                                               
163 Wiesel, quoted in “Elie Wiesel - Wikiquote”; and “Elie Wiesel - Oxford Reference.” 
164 Thanks to Andrew Haggerstone for our discussion and pointing out to these examples. 
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that Wiesel was angry, but that is not the central question here — our 
concern is establishing what the better response to this tragedy would be.165  
 
If there is any merit to the point above, then it highlights a further 
worry about whether the restoration of humanity could be the result of the 
metabolising process McRae describes. That worry is that tantric anger 
might not have the restorative property that Wiesel observes of the Allied 
officer’s actions. I have suggested above that the reason Wiesel might have 
taken the officer’s actions to be restorative of humanity is because they 
reflected his own anger at the situation. But it is arguable that the kind of 
anger in play here is simply normal anger — anger that did aim at harming 
the wrongdoer, and that was an instinctive (i.e. compelled) reaction, rather 
than Tantric anger, which is the result of careful deliberation, and does not 
aim at harming the wrongdoer. If, it transpires, what is restorative in the 
situation is common feeling, then normal anger on the part of the soldier would 
be a closer reflection of Wiesel’s own anger, and thus truly more 
sympathetic. As George W. Harris explains: 
 
“What is it that makes such anger appropriate? If we take 
Wiesel’s story as a guide, it is the inhumanity of the 
perpetrators… [T]he unadulterated fact is that you cannot be a 
Nazi at heart and have much humanity left… Not to think of 
them as the enemy, not to think of them as fitting objects of 
anger, not to think of them as deserving of punishment and pain 
for pain inflicted, and not to think of them as less than human is 
to signal a loss of one’s own humanity.”166 
 
                                               
165 Interestingly, there are other interpretations of the Holocaust that suggest the victims 
were stripped even of their capacity to feel: “[W]hile Arendt may be referring to the 
particularly extreme state of death-in-life that has come to be called ‘Musselman,’ Améry 
explicitly states that this is not what he is primarily concerned with… The Musselman, if you 
will, is not one who no longer acts spontaneously, thus also becoming incapable of asserting 
his uniqueness, but one who no longer reacts (feels). This is an extremely important 
qualification for Améry, which Arendt –– since she only counts the experience of actors –– 
fails to observe.” (Shai, “Reductio Ad Moralem,” 838.) 
166 Harris, Dignity and Vulnerability, 113. 
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It therefore seems to be the case that what carries out the restoration 
of humanity in this situation is normal anger, and I suggest that this is 
because it chimes with the victim. Tantric anger might not rule out the kind 
of display the officer gave, but that does not mean that it has the explanatory 
power that normal anger does with reference to how humanity is restored by 
anger in this situation. Instead, Tantric anger precisely lacks this power 
because it fails to properly apprehend key features of Wiesel’s own anger — 
such as the desire to harm the oppressor. Humanity is restored by the 
reconnection of the victim’s feelings with the rest of the world, having been 
reduced to less than human by his oppressors. But Tantric anger has no 
special claim to this property, and neither does anger itself — whichever 
emotion is felt by the victim could see humanity restored should he 
recognise it in his rescuers (including meekness, compassion etc.) 
 
McRae attempts to anticipate other objections to her view, and to 
deal with them in turn. However, she is not always successful in this regard. 
One such example concerns McRae’s worry that metabolised anger might 
end up simply functioning as a middle ground between the destructive 
normal anger and the effective compassion in response to injustice, i.e. that 
metabolised anger is a better response than normal anger, but just not as 
good as skipping straight to compassion. This problem is reflected in the 
methodological concerns I raised above — can the moderationist really 
make a case for the specialness of transformed anger over and above some 
other emotional response?167 This worry emerges, in part, from the Buddhist 
aim of helping others, and attempting to not impede their happiness (which 
we saw in Chapter 2 is not simply the hedonistic kind of happiness). In 
discussing this worry, McRae poses the following question: “What is the 
point of this middle ground of metabolized anger if what we really should do 
                                               
167 McRae also wrestles with the second sort of methodological concern I raised above — 
that transformed anger might not be anger at all. Her response to that concern is simply to 
point to the similarities between transformed anger and normal anger. However, as I noted 
above, this sort of response is surely inadequate where those similarities are shared by vastly 
different emotions like compassion and generosity. 
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is care more for others, something that compassion and love are much better 
suited to accomplish?”168  
 
McRae seems to have an ‘easy’ answer readily available: the fact is 
that we do get angry, so “if we take the tendencies of human psychology 
seriously the relevant question isn’t ‘Should we get angry?’ but, instead, ‘I’m 
angry, so now what?’”169 For McRae, the answer is obviously that we 
transform that anger into tantric anger. However, this is a puzzling episode 
for McRae, since it seems to beg the question. The relevant question for 
moderationists might well be ‘I’m angry, so now what?’, but what is under 
examination in the central debate moderationists find themselves in within 
the context of Buddhism absolutely is ‘Should we get angry?’ In other words, 
the question that she asks, ‘I’m angry, so now what?’, is exactly the same 
kind of question that eliminativists ask, that is ‘What should we do with our 
anger?’ Denying that simply begs the question in favour of moderationism, 
since it only seeks to put anger to good use rather than asking whether we 
should attempt to stop it arising altogether. But her reason for doing that is 
not sufficiently strong. True, it follows from an empirical observation about 
human psychology, but (for me, at least) this misses the point entirely. But 
the question about what is and what ought to are different questions. We might 
respond that if you take Buddhist philosophy seriously, then you have to 
understand that examining the nature of human psychology is part of the 
inquiry into human conditions, which results in the central question of 
whether we should get angry to begin with, or instead prevent it from arising 
(assuming this Buddhist aim is achievable). It is only the case that we need to 
consider what to do with anger if we have first concluded that it ought not to 
be eliminated. 
 
This is not the only way in which McRae’s account breaks with 
central concerns in Buddhist philosophy. McRae’s treatment, or rather use, 
of the ‘no-self’ doctrine is also puzzling. McRae’s Tantric anger is supposed 
to be “intimately connected with the Buddhist metaphysical view of ‘no-self’, 
                                               
168 McRae, “Metabolizing Anger,” 477. 
169 McRae, 477. 
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the idea that there is no substantial, enduring, permanent, independent 
self”.170 However, the way this connection is explained leaves some 
questions unanswered. Firstly, McRae suggests that a central aspect of the 
relationship between anger and the no-self thesis is that the intensity of 
normal anger disrupts our normal patterns of thought and perception. As 
such, McRae suggests, we can utilise normal anger in helping us to 
understand the no-self thesis. This, she asserts, is itself a kind of 
metabolisation of anger since it is anger put to good use. She also suggests 
that “the understanding of no-self results in a kind of de-identification with 
one’s emotional experiences, which allows the tantric master to have the 
freedom to choose his or her emotional responses.”171 In addition, this 
understanding also “reveals that the usual distinctions between self and 
other are spurious,”172 and this — she suggests — is what leads to the 
elimination of the desire to harm others in the metabolising process. 
 
This discussion from McRae leads her to a rather different 
conclusion to the one that Buddhist eliminativists reach when considering 
no-self. We will return to this in more depth in Chapter 4, but it is important 
to make some points here also. In McRae’s view, normal anger helps us to 
accept the no-self thesis, and then once it is accepted, we can choose 
whether or not to become angry. Yet, part of the intellectual resources we 
now have at our disposal is a recognition that there are no ‘others’ at which 
to get angry, just as there is no self. That being the case, it would seem that 
the obvious thing to do would be to abandon anger altogether — since we 
recognise its futility. This is the position the eliminativists end up in. Yet, 
McRae thinks that, instead, we will retain anger and simply shake off the 
aspect of anger that seeks to harm others. 
 
The only explanation that seems to give us reason to cling to (what is 
left of) anger under these epistemic conditions seems to be the ways in which 
McRae thinks replacing the desire to harm with an intent to help can bring 
                                               
170 McRae, 474. 
171 McRae, 474. 
172 McRae, 474. 
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about good consequences. However, this brings us back to considerations of 
pragmatism, and we can ask once again whether anger is better than some 
alternative (e.g. compassion, patience, etc.) for these purposes. We will 
discuss these pragmatic concerns in section 3 below, but given the Buddhist 
characterisation of anger as one which involves suffering, even when there is 
no corresponding desire to harm others (see Chapter 1), then this seems like 
an unusual route for McRae to take. There are other problems with 
McRae’s account, but hopefully I have already done enough here to give us 
reason to think it may not have defeated the eliminativist entirely. So what 
does the moderationist have left to say in favour of anger? 
 
 
3. The Supposed Benefits of Anger 
 
 Pettigrove offers the following broad characterisation of the kinds of 
moderationist argument:173 
 
1. The Evaluative claim: that if we truly value X, then we will become 
angry when X is harmed (as long as we know about it); 
2. The Epistemic claim: that anger helps us to recognise the morally 
salient features of our situation; 
3. The Communicative claim: that anger lets others know what we 
value, expect, or demand, and; 
4. The Motivational claim: that anger can move us to defend what we 
value, and to challenge injustice. 
 
These four claims are intended to show the benefits of anger. 
Incidentally, they are similar to those made by Buddhist moderationists. We 
shall address these in the order presented above, starting with the Evaluative 
claim. 
 
One objection to the Evaluative claim seems fairly obvious: that it is 
simply not true in all circumstances. Consider a case where a dear friend 
                                               
173 Pettigrove, “Meekness and ‘Moral’ Anger.” 
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intentionally destroys your prized possession. It is conceivable that under 
these circumstances you might not get angry — if you (for some reason) are 
already worried that your anger will harm your friendship, then you may 
not respond angrily to that discovery. This does not suggest that you do not 
value the possession, it simply might be that you value your friendship more. 
Pettigrove suggests another case — that the Dalai Lama’s apparent lack of 
‘moral’ anger does not make us think that he does not value the Tibetan 
people or care about their expulsion, or that he does not think they have 
been harmed unjustly. In the latter case, anger does not arise at least in part 
because of years of mental training to that end. 
 
The connection between what we value and our anger simply is not 
as tight as the Evaluative claim suggests. It seems that, besides not always 
getting angry at harm done to things we care about (despite us believing the 
harm was unjust), we can also get angry at harm done to things we, on 
balance, care very little about. There are many cases of people becoming 
angry over relatively minor inconveniences — a housemate using the last of 
the toilet roll and placing the cardboard tube on top of the bin, rather than 
inside the bin; your husband leaving a wet towel on the bedroom floor; the 
outcome of a football match, and so on. Moreover, our anger isn’t always 
proportionate with regards to what we value — sometimes feel more angry 
about one of these minor inconveniences than we do about morally serious 
cases. That is not to say that this is how things should be, it is just to point out 
that the relationship between anger and value is rather imperfect. 
 
The Epistemic claim is intended to capture the idea that anger can 
somehow give us insight. In particular, it is supposed to give us another 
perspective on the world, allowing us to view events or facts differently to the 
way they would otherwise be commonly viewed. Alison Jaggar, for example, 
suggests that anger “may provide the first indications that something is 
wrong with the way alleged facts have been constructed, with accepted 
understandings of how things are.”174 Similarly, Buddhist moderationists 
                                               
174 Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge,” 167; See also Frye, “A Note on Anger,” 87; Lorde, 
“The Uses of Anger,” 280. 
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highlight anger’s effect on the subject. Hooks, for example, says that holding 
on to one’s anger can help clarify our reflection, particularly on ‘compassion 
and struggle’.175 Gross too argues that anger, when ‘transmuted’, changes 
from a cloudy mind to clear thought. She claims that anger articulates itself 
as ‘analytical clarity’ while lacking disturbing effects one would expect in the 
emotion.176 In suggesting this, then, proponents of this sort of argument are 
once again disagreeing with the characterisation of anger given in Chapter 1 
as an emotion which tends to obscure our understanding of the world. Of 
course, the moderationist doesn’t deny that such obfuscation is possible, nor 
do they claim that all anger (or that anger always) grants us such insight. 
Instead, it is moderated anger, or anger which has been properly 
transformed, which can yield these benefits. Let us hear Gross describe the 
experience: 
 
 “With practice, the anger that had been so much a part of my 
feminism had started to transmute. I no longer experienced so 
much of the time that painful state in which clarity and anger are 
totally mixed up. The clarity remained but the anger started to 
settle. My body no longer tensed with hot, explosive energy; 
instead I began to hold a relaxed body state that has nothing to 
do with giving in and everything to do with furthering 
communication.”177 
 
What seems to be described here is the slow dissipation of anger, and 
the gradual increase in control over the emotion. While the physiological 
reflexes (like the tensing body) that accompany anger are overcome, it does 
not necessarily mean that she becomes less angry; but nonetheless she gains 
mental clarity. This fits with what Pettigrove points out: that one method 
which moderationists think can help transform anger into its more 
epistemically useful kind is via the passage of time. The thought is that anger 
is most intense when it is an immediate response to a person or situation 
which has harmed or frustrated us. Over time, the thought goes, our anger 
                                               
175 hooks, “Contemplation and Transformation.” 
176 Gross, Buddhism after Patriarchy. 
177 Gross, “The Female Body,” 11. 
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dissipates somewhat. In order to mitigate the initial intensity of anger, 
moderationists “have often appealed either to the judgment of the victim at 
a later time — after the heat of passion has had an opportunity to pass — or 
to the vantage of a bystander, each of which is thought to offer a more 
reliable perspective.”178 This, according to Pettigrove, has provided the 
benchmark for the epistemically useful form of anger that moderationists 
advocate. 
 
However, we might still wonder if this kind of transformed anger has 
any special claim over alternative responses when it comes to epistemic 
value. For the moderationist to make their case and win out against 
eliminativism, it is not enough to simply highlight some upsides to anger, 
since the issue is not simply one of whether we should get angry or else do 
nothing, but instead one of whether we should get angry or do something else 
instead. The Buddhist view does not suggest that we should simply ignore 
wrongdoing, it instead suggests that we should respond to wrongdoing 
compassionately, or patiently, or generously, and so on. Our actions are not 
regarded as causally inefficacious — doing nothing would create a different 
causal chain than responding angrily, or responding compassionately, etc. 
Thus, the eliminativist can approach this debate by advocating a better 
response than anger. This is the approach that Pettigrove takes when he 
advocates ‘meekness’, though not from the Buddhist perspective. 
 
Pettigrove also highlights some empirical data that challenges the 
moderationist claim that (moderated) anger can be epistemically valuable. 
Keltner et al., for example, engaged study participants in reasoning tasks 
after they had induced anger in a variety of ways (through participants’ 
memories, through works of fiction, via news reports and videos, through 
pulling angry faces). The results were consistent across each of the methods 
of inducing anger, and each showed impairments to reasoning — even when 
the level of anger was moderate (as could be expected of such experimental 
situations) and also in cases in which we are not personally involved. Thus, 
                                               
178 Pettigrove, “Meekness and ‘Moral’ Anger,” 361. 
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neither the dissipation of anger nor removing our personal connection to the 
situation (i.e. being a bystander) yielded the improvements to reasoning 
claimed by the moderationists.179 Similarly, other studies suggest that anger 
can make us underestimate risk — of being caught up in a natural disaster, 
of heart disease, of divorce, and of various other scenarios covered by the 
study — compared to other emotional states.180 
 
Despite these impairments, when we are angry we tend to falsely 
think we actually become more insightful and objective. Lerner and Tiedens, 
for example, propose that the evidence of the kind of false optimism shown 
in the studies mentioned above (and it is false optimism, since angry people 
are actually more prone to at least some of the risks they were assessed on e.g. 
heart disease and divorce) suggests that angry people favour a kind of 
exceptionalism about the self. They suggest that angry people would see 
themselves, for instance, as not only being far less likely to be caught in a 
traffic jam, but also of being better placed to navigate their way out of it. 
Other studies suggested that angry people are more prone to irrelevant bias 
in their judgements: being more inclined to judge a person guilty of a crime 
if his name was Juan Garcia than if his name was John Garner.181 
 
It is worth noting here that these criticisms do not only apply to 
moderationists who seek to transform anger, but also to those who seek to 
moderate it in other ways. Aristotle, for instance, sees anger as good when it 
is anger with the right person, in the right degree, at the right time and 
place, for the right purpose. This is of epistemic benefit for it supposedly 
helps us apprehend the world correctly: our anger has hit upon the morally 
salient features of the situation (who committed the moral transgression, 
how bad the transgression was, etc.) However, this is clearly not what the 
evidence suggests. If the response is merely that anger would be useful under 
such circumstances, it remains an open question with those circumstances 
could obtain. There is another way to read the Aristotelian position, which 
                                               
179 Keltner, C. Ellsworth, and Edwards, “Beyond Simple Pessimism.” 
180 Lerner and Keltner, “Beyond Valence.” 
181 Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer, “Negative Affect and Social Judgment.” 
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is as defending the aptness of anger. We will explore another version of this 
view below in section 4. 
 
Pettigrove cites yet more studies to serve the same point about the 
epistemic shortcomings of anger, and we need not go into quite so much 
depth here. The general picture that the empirical evidence paints is one 
suggesting that anger does not appear to give the epistemic clarity that the 
moderationists try to claim on its behalf — though clearly an angry 
moderationist would optimistically disagree, if the evidence is accurate! So 
what of the other supposed benefits of anger? Let us now turn to the 
Communicative claim. 
 
Moderationists suggest that anger has particular worth in letting 
others know what we value, expect, or demand. Certainly, someone 
snapping at you when you try to take their last chocolate from the box 
seemingly communicates just how strongly they feel about that chocolate! 
That anger expression signals that you have trespassed against her and there 
is highly likely a chance that she is going to harm you in order to protect her 
valued chocolate, or prevent you from taking advantage of her again. 
However, exactly how effective is anger as a communicative force? 
 
Pettigrove suggests that one impairment that anger causes to 
communication is with regard to uptake. A moral message that is delivered 
angrily can make the recipient of that message defensive, and thus less open 
to listening. Pettigrove points out that “one of the first things couples 
therapists teach their clients is how to communicate their objections to… 
their partner without expressing anger, because it increases the likelihood 
that their message will be heard and understood.”182 Few are willingly open 
to embrace an angry message, especially when it is directed at them. We see 
this problem not only at the personal level, but also at the political level too 
— cable news shows are full of panels who utterly fail to engage in debate 
                                               
182 Pettigrove, “Meekness and ‘Moral’ Anger,” 367. 
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because of their heightened anger surrounding issues like Brexit and Donald 
Trump’s presidency.  
 
It is unsurprising, in a way, that anger might not actually help us 
communicate. Anger is not in itself referential, i.e. angrily saying ‘that’s my 
chocolate!’ does not give any more specificity about what is valued than 
calmly saying ‘I would prefer if you didn’t eat my last chocolate’. Emotions 
might help us convey the degree to which we care about something, but that still 
depends on an underlying ability to channel that anger into effective 
communication. However, when angry, we seem to have a tendency not to 
utter what we actually mean. How often have we angrily chastised someone 
for doing one thing when we are, in fact, angry about them doing something 
else altogether? It seems a common occurrence for our anger to make us say 
something which is actually unconnected to that emotional response, such as 
when we are angry that our partner came home late again, but we angrily 
chastise her by saying ‘You woke me up!’ In this example, I am not angry at 
being woken up, but (for the moderationist) my anger suggests otherwise, 
thus communicating the wrong message. But it is precisely because what we 
actually say and what we feel come apart that we have the choice of using a 
better tool than anger to communicate what we value, expect or demand. 
Language is, in itself, sufficient for carrying all of the important information 
in that regard, as Pettigrove points out: “being slow to anger will enable the 
meek agent to use some other tool — typically language — to communicate 
his or her moral objection more effectively.”183 As such, given anger’s 
tendency to attach itself to utterances that fail to communicate what is 
important to us (and thus turn us into unreliable witnesses on our own 
behalf) it might be better for us to avoid anger when we wish to 
communicate something morally important. 
 
If the arguments above have any merit, anger can create both bad 
listeners and bad speakers, and so the Communicative claim might also have 
some problems to overcome. But what of the supposed benefit to 
                                               
183 Pettigrove, 367. 
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motivation, i.e. that anger can move us to defend what we value, and to 
challenge injustice? Surely the enduring picture of an angry Malcolm X 
leading the charge for civil rights is proof of anger’s motivational benefits? 
Or what about the fury of the Suffragettes? 
 
Again, Pettigrove suggests otherwise, pointing at a variety of studies 
to suggest that the picture is far more complex than this. Across a variety of 
populations we see moral anger misdirected. This misdirection might be the 
result of an impossible situation, i.e. where the oppressor is simply too 
powerful, or otherwise unreachable. However, where this moral anger is 
misdirected it tends to find alternative targets close at hand. Al-Krenawi and 
associates’ analysis of rates of domestic violence among Palestinian Youth,184 
Powell’s study of the impact of societal systems on black male violence,185 
and Oliver and Hairston’s analysis of domestic violence perpetrated by 
former prison inmates,186 all suggest that “the highest rates of child abuse 
and domestic violence occur within populations that are the victims of 
systematic injustice.”187 None of this is to suggest that moral anger is the sole 
factor at play in these cases, but neither can it be denied that it is a 
contributing factor. And as Pettigrove also notes, the effects of anger within 
oppressed populations might move outside of the home but still not find 
their true target — there is plenty of evidence about the aggression and 
violence that members of those groups direct towards each other.  
 
Rather than being a motivational force for correcting systemic 
injustices then, moral anger can often be misdirected and end up harming 
the very groups who the moderationists suggest it should help. Situations like 
domestic violence and gang conflict are, unfortunately, the norm, whereas 
positive social change as a result of anger are (at best) exceptions. It is fairly 
obvious why this is the case — it is much easier for the anger of an 
individual to be misdirected than it is to unify the anger of many individuals 
                                               
184 Al-Krenawi, Graham, and Sehwail, “Tomorrow’s Players under Occupation.” 
185 Powell, “The Impact of Societal Systems on Black Male Violence.” 
186 Oliver and Hairston, “Intimate Partner Violence During the Transition from Prison to 
the Community.” 
187 Pettigrove, “Meekness and ‘Moral’ Anger,” 369. 
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and focus that on an appropriate target. Similarly, while a single individual’s 
anger might well (at least theoretically) provide sufficient motivational force 
for change, a single individual within an oppressed population is unlikely to 
have the other prerequisite conditions (social status, economic conditions, 
influential audience etc.) in place to be able to effectively channel that anger. 
 
So, many benefits are claimed for (moderated, transformed) anger, 
but upon closer inspection many of these supposed benefits fall away. 
However, there is another moderationist approach which is less concerned 
with what we can gain from anger, and instead focuses on its intrinsic value. 
It is to that view which we now turn. 
 
 
4. ‘Apt’ Anger 
  
  The arguments we have discussed so far predominantly appraise 
anger in terms of its benefits. However, Amia Srinivasan suggests that anger 
is assessed in such cases for its prudence, and that this can be contrasted 
with assessing the aptness of anger.188 Reasons of prudence, she says, are of 
instrumental value, concerned with anger’s effects. As we have seen both in 
Chapter 1 and in the discussion above, the prudential reasons for rejecting 
anger include impairment to rational capacity, alienation of would-be allies, 
aggravation of conflicts, and how it compromises the pursuit of just 
outcome. Advocating anger based on supposed positive effects such as 
analytical clarity, powerful communication, and motivation, also appeals to 
anger’s instrumental value. Srinivasan argues that by focusing on the 
instrumental value of anger we fail to appreciate its intrinsic value, i.e. to 
appreciate the injustice of the world, which leads to what she calls an ‘affective 
injustice’.189 
                                               
188 Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger.” 
189 Srinivasan’s proposition about the nature of ‘affective reason’ i.e. apt anger is a curious 
one. She thinks that getting aptly angry is a kind of ‘appreciation’ of the world as it is. It is a 
sort of capacity comparable to aesthetic appreciation, except that it does more; anger calls 
for others to share its negative appreciation of injustice. I find it difficult to understand what 
the nature of apt anger really is. However, such a capacity, to me, seems simply like a result 
of our perception or evaluation of the world, and therefore it shouldn’t be cast out in purely 
affective terms, as Srinivasan suggests. In fact, she admits an evaluative attitude of anger, 
while denying a cognitivist account of anger — an account that judgement (partially) 
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 Srinivasan’s position is a kind of moderationism, and as such her 
approach also involves some revision of anger in order to make it defensible. 
That is to say, she does not defend all kinds of anger, but instead anger 
which meets certain criteria, namely those for aptness. Her approach differs 
from other moderationists in that she does not feel that there is any need to 
defend anger from the charge that it is ‘counterproductive’, i.e. that it lacks 
any instrumental benefits (such as those outlined in the claims in section 3 
above). Instead, Srinivasan suggests that “the counterproductivity critic faces 
the burden of explaining why, in such conflicts, reasons of prudence trump 
reasons of aptness.”190 In other words, what matters when we assess the 
value of anger is not whether or not it helps us achieve some particular ends, 
but instead whether or not it is apt. To understand this defence of anger, we 
must first outline what Srinivasan means by ‘apt anger’. 
 
 Essentially, Srinivasan’s notion of apt anger centres on our reasons for 
anger. With that in mind, the first criterion that Srinivasan identifies for 
aptness is that “one’s anger that p is apt only if p constitutes a genuine moral 
violation.”191 What Srinivasan has in mind with this is that the transgression 
in question has violated the subject’s view of how things ought to be, not 
merely how they wished things to be. So, anger is not apt if it is anger at, say, 
simply not getting what you want. Instead, it should involve some genuine 
moral violation, such as a broken promise, a betrayal, etc. In addition, in 
order for someone to be aptly angry, it is not sufficient that such a moral 
violation has occurred — it requires that the person knows that this violation 
has occurred. I cannot have a reason to be angry at your betrayal if I do not 
know that I have been betrayed. Moreover, my anger must be motivated by 
that reason, and be proportional to it. My anger would fail to be apt if you had 
betrayed me, but I was angry at you because I falsely believed that you had 
                                               
constitutes anger (notes 22, 25). I think her deploying the term appreciation is, partly, to 
emphasise its involuntary nature and its value as a ‘natural’ capacity. However, as she 
recognises in her note 19, it is not totally involuntary, but simply not under our direct 
voluntary control. 
190 Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger,” 127. 
191 Srinivasan, 129. 
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stolen from me; similarly, my anger should not exceed a level appropriate 
for the nature of the moral violation.192, 193 
 
 Srinivasan’s strategy for the defence of anger, then, amounts to 
something like this: because apt anger is possible, by shifting the focus from 
the aptness of anger to the counter-productivity of anger, anger critics fail to 
be sensitive to the value of what has been harmed when anger is apt. If I am 
angry over a betrayal, your saying to me, ‘Well if you are angry at me I’m 
only going to be more likely to betray you in future!’ simply misses the point. In 
cases of apt anger, there is a moral violation, thus something of value has 
been harmed; and it does not matter if my anger is counter-productive, you 
should be focused instead on my reasons for anger. Failure to do so is a kind 
of affective injustice, for it fails to treat my emotional state with the respect it 
deserves. This argument is certainly quite unique among moderationist 
accounts. However, I’m not convinced it presents a great challenge for the 
Buddhist eliminativist. I will develop this line of thought more in the next 
chapter, but I can at least respond briefly here to this challenge. 
 
 The Buddhist eliminativist could, and perhaps would, concede that 
failure to engage with the reasons for someone’s anger is a kind of affective 
injustice, or at least is a moral failing. They would do so, however, on the 
grounds that it would constitute a lack of compassion. Being compassionate is 
                                               
192 Undoubtedly, more detail is required from Srinivasan on this point, but it does not 
matter too much to me here — there are more important points to focus on in Srinivasan’s 
account than the scant detail given in her account of ‘aptness’. In Srinivasan’s defence, she 
does not aim to give an exhaustive list of criteria nor a full defence of the ones she offers. 
Compared to Aristotle’s account of virtuous anger, i.e. that one must get angry at the right 
things, with the right persons and proportionate in terms of time and manner to the offence, 
she professes that apt anger’s demands are rather lower; one can have apt anger without 
always perfectly meeting the right target and proportion.  
193 In setting up her account, Srinivasan makes an interesting move that is difficult to make 
sense of. She seeks to reject the idea that anger is inherently bound up with the idea of 
seeking revenge, or seeking to harm others. In doing so, she argues that sometimes we 
simply demand that others ‘recognise’ our anger. However, by this, she suggests that what 
we want is for the person who has wronged us “to experience that suffering that comes 
precisely from taking part in my own” (129). Yet this seems to be precisely the definition of 
revenge. It’s an odd move for Srinivasan to make, because it seems unnecessary given her 
general strategy for assessing anger, i.e. whether or not the anger is apt. Perhaps it is 
motivated by a concern that wanting others to suffer is never a good thing, and so our reason 
for anger would somehow be undermined if (apt) anger cannot exist without a commitment 
to wanting someone else to suffer. 
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a matter of sympathising with, and showing concern for, the suffering of 
others. To become fully engaged with their situation, the compassionate 
person would be able to recognise that someone is suffering, i.e. in the state 
of being angry, and that they were made to suffer, i.e. they have been 
wrongfully harmed. Alternatively, in the latter sense of suffering, we can talk 
in a more Buddhist fashion by saying that compassion recognises that the 
angry person, as well as everyone else, are constantly in the state of ‘being 
done to’ — a state of suffering in a metaphysical sense which has been 
discussed in the previous chapter. As such, the Buddhists are likely to agree 
with Srinivasan that simply moving the conversation from exploring the 
reasons for someone’s anger to whether or not that anger is productive 
would seem morally insensitive. But what is important to note here is that 
Srinivasan’s focus is on how we respond to angry people. As such, this is not 
directly an argument in favour of anger itself — it is, seemingly, a charge 
against what she sees as an inadequate response to anger. It this sense, what 
Srinivasan’s account seems to demand is for someone to care or recognise 
that victims have understandable reasons for being angry, which is what 
Buddhists urge everyone to do through compassion. In other words, to avoid 
the affective injustice that Srinivasan identifies, what is required is that we 
respond to apt anger compassionately.194 This would involve seeking out the 
reasons for someone’s anger, and trying to sincerely understand them. In 
doing so, however, that does not commit the Buddhist eliminativist to a 
defence of anger, nor does it commit them to agreeing that the anger in any 
form is actually apt (i.e. meets all of the criteria Srinivasan sets out). It would 
be sufficient to prompt compassion if there has simply been a moral 
violation; perhaps the mere presence of anger of any kind should prompt 
compassion. As such, if the angry person were to ask ‘What should I do with 
my anger?’, the Buddhist eliminativist could very well still advise them, 
‘Eliminate it!’, all the while being (or attempting to be) understanding of why 
they were angry in the first place. 
 
                                               
194 Arguably, the correct response to in-apt anger should also be compassion: pointing out 
to an angry person that their reasons are not sufficient for anger might seem callous, even if 
you are correct in your assessment! 
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 This is possible for the Buddhist eliminativist because the reasons to 
eliminate anger, on their view, go beyond the issue of its counter-
productivity, placing them on similar footing to Srinivasan. Srinivasan’s 
strategy of moving away from talking about what one should do with anger 
to what anger is about is precisely the Buddhist approach. What sets them 
apart is what it is they take to be an objective description of the world. It is 
normatively true that apt anger is a response to an unjust harm, which we 
know is acknowledged by the Buddhist. However, they are not happy to 
settle the matter on this basis, and instead offer additional insight into the 
mental process that explains how anger arises. For Srinivasan, there is a 
presupposition underlying her view that it is fully autonomous agents who 
are wholly responsible for wrongdoing, which the Buddhists argue is not the 
correct description of the world (more on this in Chapter 4). In this sense, 
the Buddhist criterion for ‘aptness’ (or its equivalent in Buddhist terms) is not 
led by constructed norms, but by reality. For this reason, Srinivasan’s worry 
that we are caught up in between valuing things for their instrumental value 
rather than their intrinsic value is not a genuine dilemma, since the Buddhist 
concerns extend to the intrinsic too. Since the Buddhist is concerned with 
the nature of reality in their appraisal of anger, their concerns are with 
things of intrinsic value also i.e. truth. We shall examine more of this claim 
in the next chapter.  
 
As it stands, it seems to me that the Buddhist can avoid the charge of 
callousness that is linked to the counter-productivity thesis by exercising 
compassion, and still caution against anger altogether, without any genuine 
conflict arising between these two positions. I turn now to a final concern 
with the moderationist position, which is a concern about the relationships 
between moral concepts that they employ in trying to defend anger. 
Specifically, I focus on the relationship they describe between anger and 
compassion. 
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5. Anger and Compassion 
  
 A common claim in Buddhist moderationist arguments for anger is 
that anger can be ‘rooted’, or employed in the service of, compassion. I wish 
to raise some initial concerns with this notion here, though I do not claim 
these to be defeating of the arguments for this kind of position. Instead, I 
intend to simply raise some questions for the moderationist to answer. Since 
the eliminativist wishes to get rid of anger altogether, there are no 
conceptual issues to answer on how anger can be employed 
compassionately, or how it can be grounded in compassion; the eliminativist 
is free to help themselves to any successful moderationist strategies in order 
to deal with anger when it does arise, but the main focus of the eliminativist 
position will always be on preventing that rather than remedying it. 
However, the success of at least some moderationist views relies on their 
ability to make sense of the relationship between these two concepts. 
 
 At first glance, there may seem to be nothing odd about relating 
anger and compassion. Wendy Donner, for instance, suggests that:  
 
“In the context of feminist virtue theory, Buddhist feminists 
advance arguments that maintain that in some circumstances 
anger has the potential to do good, by promoting spiritual and 
emotional healing and awareness, as well as by challenging 
patriarchy. Thus anger can be virtuous if rooted in compassion 
and wisdom.”195  
 
 Barrows makes a similar suggestion about how we ground our anger, 
saying that, “Such [‘Holy’] anger would be replete with authority, grace, 
confidence. It would not be petty. It would embrace complexity and be 
channelled compassionately.”196 Both Donner and Barrows seem to suggest 
that by linking anger to compassion, anger can become a force for good. But 
what, precisely, is the nature of this link? 
                                               
195 Donner, “Feminist Ethics and Anger,” 76. 
196 Barrows, “The Light of Outrage,” 54. 
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 It seems to me that we could make sense of it in a number of ways. 
The simplest way is to suggest that anger and compassion could have a 
successive relationship — that anger is useful when it gives way to compassion, 
or is exchanged for compassion. However, this sort of relationship doesn’t 
seem to be sufficient for a defence of anger, for reasons I have pointed out 
above (i.e. where the defence rests upon something like the energising effects 
of anger then being deployed in the service of compassion, since — I have 
argued — compassion has its own energising effects). Another way to cash 
out the relationship is to say that anger and compassion can co-exist; 
however, this relationship could admit of a number of variants. We will 
examine some of these below. 
 
 Firstly, let us consider a dominance relation between emotions. 
Consider first the relationship between fear and love. It seems initially 
plausible to say that someone in an abusive relationship may both fear and 
love their partner. Imagine, then, a situation in which their partner is 
mortally wounded, and requires a blood transfusion that (for whatever 
reason) only they can provide for their partner. Such a situation offers a way 
out of the abusive relationship, and thus a way in which fear could prompt 
the avoidance behaviour for which the emotion exists. Conversely, they 
could choose — out of love — to save their partner’s life by giving blood. 
Whichever course of action they choose, we might be tempted to say that 
one emotion has dominated the other in making that choice (just as a desire 
for chocolate ice cream might dominate a desire for sticky toffee pudding in 
our choice of dessert). However, the situation might not be so simple. 
 
 One consideration here is that our emotions are attached to reasons. 
In the example above, the subject’s fear might be attached to the historic 
instances of abusive behaviour, and their love might be attached to the 
occasions in which their partner has made them feel secure, desirable, 
useful, and so on. The question, then, is whether we can adequately attend 
to both emotions and sets of reasons at the same time so that one can 
dominate the other, or whether one set pushes out the other. A dominance 
relationship depends upon both things being present, but if one pushes out
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the other then the situation just described is actually another instance of the 
emotions occurring successively. The question here is whether we have the 
cognitive resources to process both sets simultaneously. If not, then the 
dominance relation collapses into a successive one. 
 
 Applying this to our understanding of the moderationist account of 
anger and compassion then, we might wonder whether we can attend to the 
reasons for anger and the reasons for compassion in the way required for a 
dominance relation. Certainly it may seem like I have suggested above that 
this might be possible — when the Buddhist eliminativist attempts to see the 
‘aptness’ of someone’s anger, are they not attending to both the reasons for 
anger and the reasons for compassion? However, it is worth keeping in mind 
that in this situation the anger belongs to someone else; it is not an instance 
of both emotions co-occurring. As such, this does not describe a dominance 
relationship. For the moderationist, what is required for a dominance case is 
that reason acts as an arbiter between emotions that are both present, and 
helps us channel anger in the right way. It is likely that this arbiter is 
something moderationists have to deploy consciously, which could be a 
result of their commitment to act compassionately and is part of their 
practice. However, we may add that the mediating reasons that help us 
channel anger into compassion are a different set of reasons than those that 
evoke anger to begin with. As such, despite simultaneously co-occurring, 
anger and compassion can still be distinguished through their reasons. This 
certainly matches the aims set out by some of the moderationists discussed 
above, however, we have already seen that this kind of approach is replete 
with difficulties. When reason acts as an arbiter in this way, the result seems 
to be that anger is stripped of its defining traits and becomes unrecognisable, 
leading to the conceptual difficulties identified in section one above. 
Moreover, if what the moderationist is doing is advocating for the consistent 
dominance of compassion over anger, then they are, in effect, arguing for a 
kind of eliminativism in practice. 
 
 Another way to cash out the co-occurrence of anger and compassion 
might be to construe it as a kind of emergence relationship. The thought here 
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would cover cases such as those where we say things like ‘I am angry at you 
because I feel compassion for you’. In other words, it is because of my 
compassion for you that I feel anger at what you are doing e.g. in cases of 
self-destructive behaviour. In this way, my anger emerges from my compassion. 
But does this capture what the moderationist needs to say of anger in order 
to defend it? 
 
 One concern here would be that the revision of anger here is only to 
its cause, and not to its character. In other words, anger born out of 
compassion differs only from anger born out of jealousy in virtue of what 
gives rise to it. However, I think the moderationist would want to deny that. 
The idea must be that anger born of compassion lacks some features that 
anger born of other sources possesses. But this, again, brings us back to the 
criticisms outlined in section one above, i.e. that anger lacks its distinctive 
characteristics, and may fail to be anger. Moreover, when we say we are 
angry because we feel compassion for someone, this suggests that we must 
have felt compassionately toward them to begin with. If this is so, we already 
recognise their suffering. If this is the case, then such anger would presumably 
lack the epistemic benefits that at least some moderationists claim for this 
kind of anger, since we must already be aware of the morally salient features 
of this situation in order to first feel compassion. 
 
So what alternatives does the moderationist have? One might be to 
advocate for a blending of anger and compassion. This is consistent with the 
language used by many moderationists e.g. ‘transformation’, ‘transmutation’ 
etc., and it could arguably avoid the problems of the successive and 
dominance relationships above. A blended emotion (retaining characteristics 
of each) could be thought to incorporate the presence of both emotions, and 
it might also have a shared set of reasons. However, what marks this sort of 
relationship out as difficult to grasp is the apparent conceptual 
incompatibility of anger and compassion. If anger really does involve the 
desire to inflict suffering on others, can it really be successfully blended with 
compassion, whose defining feature is its concern for such suffering? 
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It may be possible for these traits to co-exist, depending on how we 
understand these characterisations of anger and compassion. For one, we 
might simply reject that desiring the suffering of others is a necessary 
condition for anger (which many moderationists do). However, I think I 
have shown in the arguments presented above that they do not make an 
entirely convincing case for this claim. Another way in which such co-
existence would be possible would be a way in which we are internally 
conflicted by such a kind of anger. If I desire your suffering, but I also 
sympathise with it at the same time, then my (blended) anger involves 
bringing suffering upon myself, i.e. by feeling guilt. But clearly this is not an 
intended consequence of the moderationist account. Although we may 
imagine moderationists will say they are happy to sacrifice their own 
suffering for the righteous cause, this raises another complication to the 
issue. For if moderationists think that their anger is justified, guilt would 
usually indicate otherwise. Transformed anger is, instead, primarily 
intended to alleviate both my suffering and that of those around me, given 
that its primary use is in fighting social injustice. 
 
 Again, I want to reiterate that these are simply issues for further 
consideration for the moderationist. I do not claim that these are points that 
they cannot respond to, but nor are these concerns that would trouble the 
eliminativist, since the eliminativist advocates something even simpler than a 
successive relationship between these emotions — the total elimination of 
one in favour of the other! 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
We have seen in this chapter how the moderationist attempts to 
revise the account of anger in ways that remove the negative aspects 
identified in Chapter 1. However, we also saw that this leads either to 
conceptual difficulties, or to a place where anger has no clear advantages 
over alternative responses. We see these worries play out in more detail 
when analysing McRae’s moderationist account in particular. What we see 
is that the moderationists are themselves concerned that their revision of 
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anger may remove the aspects that make it distinguishable as anger, but we 
do not see any adequate response to this issue, even in more detailed 
accounts like McRae’s. Shifting the terms of the discussion to the more 
general benefits of anger does not seem to help the moderationist either. It 
turns out that many of the supposed benefits of moderated anger do not 
stand up to empirical scrutiny. Moving the discussion further to whether or 
not anger is apt — where the measure of anger’s value is no longer focused 
on its instrumental value, but instead its intrinsic value — does not seem to 
advance the case for the moderationist either: what is appealing about that 
account can actually be retained by Buddhist eliminativism that advocates 
for compassion instead of anger (an idea we will pursue more in the next 
chapter). But this move toward compassion is also a move we see the 
moderationists try to make themselves, though it seems more needs to be 
done to address how anger and compassion relate. All in all, I hope I have 
done enough to at least carve out space in the conversation for a defence of 
eliminativism. 
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Chapter Four: 
In Defence of Eliminativism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter begins by reminding us of the dual challenges of 
moderationism: (1) that anger can have positive effects in the world, and that 
(2) even if it doesn’t, it is still an apt moral attitude, thus worth preserving. I 
take it that the first challenge, at this point, has been met to at least some 
degree — we saw in Chapter 3 that moderationists overstate the case for 
anger’s positive effects, and that rather than anger it is, in fact, virtues like 
compassion, generosity, etc. that actually yield the kinds of positive effects 
they claim on behalf of anger, and so these responses should be preferred. 
This is in keeping with the Buddhist eliminativist view that we should 
counter anger with these sorts of virtue. The argument I develop takes this 
sort of approach by developing the view that we can learn how to change 
the way we see the world by reflecting on the Buddhist teachings on 
metaphysics in particular ways. This new way of seeing the world is via a 
patient perspective, and involves broadening the set of relevant 
considerations in moral reasoning. 
 
The second concern above, that of aptness, as noted in Chapter 3, 
has only been partially addressed at this point, so Chapter 4 seeks to offer a 
further response to this concern from a Buddhist eliminativist perspective. 
As we shall see, this response depends upon an understanding of the 
Buddhist metaphysics, and the role this plays in the elimination of anger. I 
argue that the patient perspective has a dual function, in this regard: firstly, 
it can help us prevent anger from arising (rather than simply therapising it 
when it does arise), and that this creates the space to practice other virtues. 
As we come to develop these virtues, I suggest, we move towards a way of 
responding to the world which more closely aligns with the metaphysical 
picture the Buddhist wants us to accept. This makes the metaphysics less 
alien, and thus more credulous. It is in the eventual acceptance of the 
metaphysics that our moral outlook is radically transformed, dissolving 
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concerns about aptness as related moral concepts — agency, justice — are 
eroded and now fail to apply in the ways that aptness-moderationists 
assume. 
 
 
1. The Moderationist Challenges 
 
 Let us be reminded of the moderationist concerns. Moderationism 
can be typically identified in two ways: arguments with consequential 
concerns, and those with normative concerns. The former argues for anger’s 
positive effects in terms of motivation and communication, for example. 
Moderationists of this sort may seek to minimise negative aspects of anger by 
way of ‘transforming’ it. In other words, anger is good when it is moderated 
in such a way that it becomes a positive force. The second sort of 
moderationism involves an assessment of anger in terms of epistemic 
coherence, i.e. the aptness or appropriateness of anger. That is to say, anger 
is good or right when our reasons fit with our emotional response. These are 
the two kinds of argument the moderationists make in challenging anger-
eliminativists. 
 
 Now, let us also reiterate the eliminativist view. It argues that there is 
no single instance of anger that is good or right, and thus, in keeping with its 
denomination, it seeks to eliminate it altogether (though they can agree with 
the moderationist that should anger arise, we ought to seek to minimise its 
negative effects). However, Buddhist eliminativists, at least,197 do not want to 
simply reject anger, but to do so and replace it with something else. This is an 
important point we need to keep in mind for, without anger, Buddhists can 
demonstrate that we are not deprived of an irreplaceable moral attitude. 
Therefore, their responses to the moderationists will have to address both 
concerns of the moderationist — are the consequences of eliminating anger 
worse than transforming or moderating it, and does eliminating anger 
disregard an apt emotional response to the world? 
 
                                               
197 The Stoics, for example, are also eliminativists and so arguments can be varied. See 
Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions.” 
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The first concern has already been dealt with, to a certain extent, in 
earlier chapters. We have seen that anger is likely to cause negative 
consequences. The moderationists are themselves wary of it, which leads 
them to transforming or moderating anger. Nevertheless, most accounts in 
relation to transformation of anger have not provided enough information 
about the process, and it remains unclear whether anger actually survives 
the transformative process at all. Deliberately or not, this makes it difficult 
for us to assess whether such positive forms of anger are plausible and I have 
raised many questions for them to answer in Chapter 3. Moreover, the 
Buddhists can demonstrate that positive attitudes such as compassion and 
generosity are at least as, if not more, productive than anger, and capture 
many or all of the benefits they identified for transformed anger. We will 
address this issue again below.  
 
Nevertheless, before proceeding on the assumption that we’ve carved 
out space for a Buddhist eliminativist thesis here, the Buddhists have to 
overcome a serious charge that they wrongly dismiss the righteousness of 
anger. While we offered a preliminary response to Srinivasan in Chapter 3, 
that response focused on how we can respond sensitively to anger, but left 
the question of whether or not that anger is apt essentially untouched. 
Buddhists have a hard time defending themselves against both charges; 
considering some of the passages that we have seen, their arguments appear 
insensitive to the victim’s suffering when they are unjustly wronged. Let us 
consider some of the controversial verses from Śāntideva. 
 
 “I feel no anger towards bile and the like, even though they cause 
intense suffering. Why am I angry with the sentient? They too 
have reasons for their anger.”  
  
 “If, disregarding the principal cause, such as a stick or other 
weapon, I become angry with the person who impels it, he too is 
impelled by hatred. It is better that I hate that hatred.”198  
 
                                               
198 BCA 6.22, 41 
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What is notable in these verses is how Śāntideva demands us to treat 
persons in the same way that we treat bile and sticks. This argument — 
cease distinguishing the two types of causes, personal and impersonal 
(person and bile/stick) — surely makes moderationists unhappy; how can we 
take such an argument seriously if they don’t see the obvious difference that 
persons have free will while bile and sticks do not? Our normal practice of 
blame within anger becomes arbitrary, or inapt, when we cannot properly 
recognise harms made by persons as distinct from harms made by 
impersonal causes (e.g. natural disasters). Without the distinction, 
moderationists would say, we fail to tell apart wrongdoing and simply 
unfortunate events.199 This is why we have commemorative events for World 
War One and World War Two, but never have something similar for the 
victims of Spanish flu despite the size of its impact being felt around the 
globe.200 And it makes sense, we say, when we think that the causes of the 
World Wars are man-made — recognising it as such will remind us of a 
preventable tragedy, shame the perpetrators, and do justice to the victims — 
while flu cannot be held morally responsible for it because it does not have 
the will to harm. Śāntideva’s conflating the two causes is simply insensitive, if 
not morally failing. Buddhist eliminativism becomes even more unattractive, 
assuming it is practicable at all, when Śāntideva goes on to say something of 
a victim-blaming nature: “Those who injure me are really impelled by my 
actions. For this they will go to the realms of hell. Surely it is they who are 
harmed by me?”201 Imagine this advice from the perspective of a victim of 
domestic abuse — there is no reason to be angry towards your abuser; 
moreover, it is your abuser who is harmed by you. Clearly, such a position 
appears to radically fall short of meeting the challenge posed by 
moderationists concerned with aptness. In Chapter 3 I offered some 
preliminary responses to the challenge posed by defenders of the aptness of 
anger view, but stopped short of a full defence because we had not, as yet, 
fully outlined the connection between the Buddhist metaphysical outlook 
and their elimination of anger. I turn to that issue now. 
                                               
199 Carpenter, “Ethics Without Justice.” 
200 Meierhans and Wainwright, “Spanish Flu.” 
201 BCA 6.47 
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2. The Metaphysics of Eliminativism 
 
 Instead of just indulging ourselves in the bad impression these 
passages from Śāntideva give, we should take a step back and assess the 
argument carefully. The Buddhist invokes their view of metaphysics 
constantly in relation to the elimination of anger. Buddhaghosa rejects anger 
due to the view that there is no enduring self over time; “Since states last but 
a moment’s time; Those aggregates, by which was done; The odious act, 
have ceased, so now; What is it you are angry with?”202 Candrakīrti also 
refers to no-self, but thinking of it not in reductionist terms like 
Buddhaghosa; self is merely a reflection of something truer: “[Those] who 
see the absence of the self, agent, object, time, and manner of the wounds — 
all things are like the image in a glass. By understanding thus, all torments 
are endured.”203 Śāntideva supports his above argument by appealing to 
causality:  
 
“A person does not get angry at will, having decided ‘I shall get 
angry’, nor does anger well up after deciding ‘I shall well up’. 
Whatever transgressions and evil deeds of various kinds there are, 
all arise through the power of conditioning factors, while there is 
nothing that arises independently.”204  
 
In this way, these metaphysical views seem to be their compelling reasons 
for abandoning anger.  
 
                                               
202 Vism IX, 22; It could be objected that this passage refers to the doctrine of 
impermanence rather than no-self. However, this depends on which aspect of the three 
marks of existence i.e. impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha), and no-self (anattā) we're 
focusing on. More importantly, I see that the notion of anicca as already built into the idea of 
anatta as applying to human beings i.e. that there is no such thing as unchanging, 
permanent self. And so we see the verses that immediately follow the quotation express 
more precisely the idea of no-self, "Whom shall he hurt, who seeks to hurt another, in the 
other's absence? Your presence is the cause of hurt; Why are you angry, then, with him?" 
203 MA 3.3 
204 BCA 6.24, 25 
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 There are many explanations of the lack of self in the Buddhist 
tradition.205 How the concept of ‘no-self’, or ‘not-self’ as it is sometimes 
translated, is cashed out varies across traditions, and even between authors 
within traditions. The precise history of this concept and the debate whether 
it is true need not be discussed here — it is certainly the task of another 
thesis altogether! However, its role in relation to anger remains the same 
across texts — that anger should be eliminated as a result of this 
metaphysical notion. Another, related, metaphysical notion at play here is 
that of dependent arising. The idea is similar to our notion of causality, and 
claims that all phenomena arise in dependence upon other phenomena, 
such that if one exists, so does the other, and if one ceases to exist, so does 
the other. This encompasses both the psychological and the material realms. 
This notion relates to our discussion of anger in a number of ways (some of 
which we will explore below), but one significant role for this metaphysical 
notion is in relation to the ideas of enlightenment and suffering. 
Enlightenment can only be achieved by ending suffering (which admits of 
various kinds; see Ch. 2), and ending suffering depends, in part, on 
eliminating anger, and vice versa. We shall see below why anger, for 
Buddhists, is never apt and has to be eliminated, and how embracing this 
metaphysical notion of dependent arising can help us to eliminate anger, 
and thus (ultimately) eliminate suffering. 
 
 While there are many interpretations of no-self thesis, I shall mention 
only those made in connection with the elimination of anger. One view is 
that while Śāntideva’s argument that anger is irrational, it is irrational only 
in a practical sense, not in an epistemic sense.206 That is to say, the 
metaphysics simply offers a way to reduce anger, but cannot be taken as 
true. While the advice to those who aim to have a better life on reducing 
anger may be sage, it was arguably not the Buddhist intention to dismiss 
their own metaphysics as purely instrumental, for they would face the 
question of whether anything the Buddha says is true at all if it were to be 
                                               
205 For discussions of problems arising from different interpretations of no-self offered by 
Buddhist philosophers, from Abhidharmika to Pudgalavādin and Mādhyamika schools, see 
Ganeri, The Concealed Art of the Soul, especially chapters 6 and 7. 
206 Bommarito, “Bile and Bodhisattvas.” 
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taken as purely pedagogical.207 Moreover, such a reading is not sufficient for 
the Buddhist to claim to eliminate anger, as I will argue below.208 
 
Charles Goodman has another view. Recognising the dual purpose 
in the Buddhist texts, he sees their argument invoking the Buddhist 
metaphysics as a reflection of a hard deterministic view in Buddhist ethics. 
From a Buddhist view, wherein there are no persons but only simple, 
impermanent composites, interrelated by a complex web of causal chains, 
the answer regarding free will would be that:  
 
“If you don’t exist, nothing is up to you. If there is no 
autonomous self, there is no autonomy. If there is no genuine 
boundary between self and other, there can be no genuine 
distinction between actions that flow from the self and motions 
imposed on the self from outside.”209  
 
Moral responsibility being rejected as such, Goodman thinks that it 
does not affect morality itself, since good and bad actions can still be 
determined without someone being responsible for them. Moreover, this 
repudiates reactive emotions such as anger because the negation of moral 
responsibility renders anger irrational. If this reading is right, then the 
Buddhist has apt reason to abandon anger altogether, as we cannot be 
blamed for something for which we cannot be held morally responsible.  
 
 The point that distinguishes these two interpretations is the notion of 
autonomy. Goodman, like most hard determinists, sees that causal chains 
necessitate the lack of autonomy. The sense of autonomy at play here is that 
                                               
207 See Ganeri, The Concealed Art of the Soul for the discussion about two aims of the Buddhist 
texts, i.e. the aim to “turn around” the audience way of thinking and the aim to convey 
truth. 
208 I’m tempted to think that Bommarito's rejection of the epistemic reading of the Buddhist 
metaphysics was not totally dismissive as he recognises that, from the perspective of some 
contemporary philosophers in the West, the argument can’t be made sense of, yet 
“Buddhists might have other grounds for accepting that anger is never warranted in the 
philosophical sense.” And he wants to show that the value of the argument can be 
appreciated independently of the success of the argument for the Buddhist metaphysics 
itself; Bommarito, “Bile and Bodhisattvas,” 378. 
209 Goodman, “Resentment and Reality,” 362. 
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of full autonomy, where an agent's autonomy is not undermined by external 
factors. Bommarito, on the other hand, argues that the absence of 
unchanging self does not necessarily warrant a complete lack of autonomy. 
Certain mental and physical states in a collection embedded in causal chains 
including desires and intentions (not a soul or some static essence) can have 
autonomy. Bommarito points out that autonomy can come in degrees, and 
therefore resists Śāntideva's conclusion of the total lack of autonomy from 
dependent arising. What this means for Buddhist eliminativists is that it does 
not suffice to simply state that the metaphysics of no-self and dependent 
arising is true. In order to deny moral responsibility, they have to take the 
route that rejects an agent's autonomy — even if it is only partial — whether 
that route is hard determinism or otherwise. As such, it seems that a 
successful argument against moderationists requires that Buddhist 
eliminativists insist upon a total absence of autonomy due to the notion of 
no-self.  
 
 I should emphasise that this doesn't mean that Bommarito's reading of 
the metaphysics is not possible or that it doesn't exist in the Buddhist system. 
My point is to iterate that Buddhist eliminativists who want to reply to 
aptness-moderationists, regardless of doctrinal differences, rely heavily on 
the metaphysics or ultimate reality that rejects autonomous agency, 
whatever that form of the Buddhist system is, e.g. determinist and semi-
compatibilist.210 Some Buddhists who reject the truth claim of the 
metaphysics will have a hard time convincing aptness-moderationists for 
they lack the decisive reason to eliminate anger to begin with, and without 
it, they are only left with prudential reasons for eliminating anger, and thus 
don’t respond to the moderationist concerns about free will and moral 
responsibility proper.  
 
Those Buddhists like Bommarito who don't posit the truth claim 
could respond to aptness-moderationists by conceding that there are indeed 
                                               
210 See Mark Siderit's paleo-compatibilism position which distinguishes two compatible 
levels of reality between determinist ultimate reality and libertarian conventional reality, for 
example. 
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aptness conditions of anger, but these conditions will likely never obtain (as I 
argue in section 3.1 below). However, this response can only go so far as to 
making instances of apt anger unlikely to occur in practice — conceding 
that there are conditions that could be met that would render anger apt 
means that it is theoretically possible that such anger can occur. If that is the 
case, then the elimination of anger would lead to the loss of something 
valuable (as Srinivasan sees it), and thus the truth of the metaphysics is the 
more stable basis for the eliminativist argument. 
 
In the Buddhist argument for the elimination of anger, we can 
appreciate their metaphysical view provides them reason as well as a means 
to eliminate anger. These two approaches are complimentary to each other. 
One provides reason to eliminate anger, the other provides the tool to 
execute it. This thesis relies in part on the truth claim of the metaphysics and 
it is my view that they indeed make such a claim. It is required to respond to 
aptness-moderationists in particular, but not consequentialist moderationists. 
However, I must admit that the burden to prove the metaphysical truth may 
be heavier for Buddhists as it is against what we might regard as common 
sense (i.e. the position held by most non-philosophers). But since my aim is 
not to give a defence for the Buddhist metaphysics, I will only give the 
provisional answer above to address their concern. As such, we're left with 
two views of anger predicated upon different metaphysics. To move forward 
from where we are, instead of simply defending eliminativism by bringing 
up a totally different picture of metaphysics, I shall try to offer what is 
accepted as a common ground between Buddhist eliminativists and 
moderationists, that is a way to moderate anger.  
 
Therefore, my own approach will be to try to persuade anybody 
interested in moderating anger to adopt the method. I want to argue that, 
independent of whether we initially believe in the Buddhist metaphysics or 
not, the Buddhist methodology of what I shall call ‘broadening perspective’ 
has some merits in our conversation with moderationists. Although this 
approach may be more acceptable to moderationists who are concerned 
with prudence, I will try to show that the methodology should be part of the 
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apt-anger criteria, and that it would result in minimising anger to the point 
where we may find far fewer instances that still arise. The idea is that 
approaching the Buddhist argument from the practical point of view better 
equips us with tool that can be shared among eliminativists and 
moderationists. However, I think that these tools can actually take us 
beyond a moderationist view and into an eliminativist one, eventually 
leading to the acceptance of the Buddhist metaphysics. 
 
 
3. Eliminating Anger 
 
 From a Western perspective, abandoning a metaphysical concept 
like the self might seem like a leap too far. As such, our eliminativist 
argument is likely to face resistance if this is the starting point for eliminating 
anger. However, as we have just seen, the Buddhist metaphysics can be read 
in two ways. The first is purely pedagogical, i.e. the metaphysical claims 
aren’t literally true, but we should act as though they are if we want to learn 
how to eliminate anger. The second is that the metaphysical claims are, in 
fact, a description of reality. We do know that the Buddhists want their texts 
to be both “the text as vehicle for self-transformation, and the text as bearer of 
declarative content.”211 In other words, the texts are intended to persuade the 
audience to the course of Buddhist life, affecting their way of thinking, but 
this new way of thinking is also regarded as matching reality. The position I 
develop here will attempt to demonstrate how the pedagogical reading can 
lead, eventually, to an acceptance of the metaphysical truths. In order to do 
this, I will seek to integrate an understanding of patience from the Western 
literature into the Buddhist framework for the elimination of anger. Doing 
so, I argue, not only puts us on the path to accepting the Buddhist 
metaphysics, but also gives us a way to respond to concerns about the 
aptness of anger that are raised by the moderationist. 
 
In discussing whether or not the Buddhist texts require us to really 
believe in the metaphysics underpinning their discussions, or whether we 
                                               
211 Ganeri, 97. 
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can instead just treat them as advice on how to look at situations differently, 
Amber Carpenter suggests that there is a clear and strict limit on the latter 
sort of approach: 
 
“[T]here is only so far this… can go in mitigation, for the text, 
and the Buddhist eliminiativist view of anger, certainly intends to 
challenge and transform our ordinary notions… [If] Śāntideva is 
not really saying there is no difference between the assailant’s 
responsibility and that of the weapon he uses, then he is not 
giving us any reason or means to abandon afflictive emotions 
associated with perceiving oneself with having been wronged.”212 
 
I believe that Carpenter is correct here in thinking that abandoning 
afflictive emotions such as anger will, ultimately, require the acceptance of 
the metaphysics, and that in doing so we will find a resultant transformation 
of our moral notions. I will outline precisely what Carpenter has in mind in 
a subsequent section. However, Carpenter here provides a useful 
springboard for discussing the limitations of the pedagogical reading of the 
Buddhist texts by suggesting it gives us no reason or means to abandon 
afflictive emotions. I will argue, instead, that it can provide both reasons and 
means. 
 
Firstly, I think it is important to remember that the Buddhist 
teachings are intended for a universal audience. By this, I mean that the 
advice of the Buddha should hopefully be applicable to people of any 
background, including those whose culture embraces a radically different 
metaphysical outlook. If one already embraces a metaphysics without the 
self, for instance, then in a way the Buddha’s teachings are unlikely to reveal 
quite so much that is new or interesting. By contrast, approaching Buddhism 
from a traditional Western philosophical perspective, precisely what is 
interesting about Buddhism is its departure from this perspective — 
Carpenter makes this very point herself. However, what is not emphasised 
sufficiently strongly in Carpenter’s argument in this specific paper, is that 
                                               
212 Carpenter, “Ethics without Justice,” 318-9. 
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persuading someone to abandon one metaphysical view in favour of another 
will require some preparatory work. We might compare, metaphorically, 
abandoning belief in a continued self as a leap from a cliff edge; if this shift 
in metaphysical outlook is just such a leap, then the pedagogical reading of 
the Buddhist texts is the trail of breadcrumbs which gets us to the cliff edge 
to begin with. 
 
As we have noted above, this sort of reading is not out of step with 
Buddhist thought. In fact, it mirrors the Buddhist methodology quite closely. 
They believe the metaphysics to be literally true, but their texts are also 
meant to serve the dual purpose of helping us come to understand and 
accept this metaphysics.213 The extent to which Buddhists concern 
themselves with practical issues is evident in the texts. Visuddhimagga, for 
example, where Buddhaghosa discusses the metaphysics of no-self in relation 
to anger, is telling. The text is generally recognised as a detailed 
meditational manual: it begins by covering every minute detail about how 
one should prepare bedding, seating, etc. according to the temperament of 
the reader (which we saw in Chapter 1 are also detailed so that the 
meditators can identify their type). Buddhaghosa leads us step-by-step to 
what one should think to combat anger, from focusing on our own benefits 
(‘It’s gratifying to see those who get angry and harm me having sleepless 
nights without me punishing them at all’),214 to thinking about good things 
in the other person,215 and invoking the metaphysics of no-self. The 
Buddhists recognize that transforming one’s perception of reality is not an 
easy feat. In fact, traditional belief in rebirth or reincarnation helps explain 
the extent to which it is seen as difficult to achieve: it takes several aeons 
spanning innumerable lifetimes to become enlightened. But precisely for 
that reason, it is urgent for us to take a step, however tiny it is, to accomplish 
                                               
213 Cf. Goodman, “Resentment and Reality” and Bommarito, “Bile and Bodhisattvas.” 
Goodman, like most Buddhist readers, also recognises the dual purposes of the texts, but he 
thinks the metaphysical argument is a reflection of the Buddhist deterministic view. In 
contrast, Bommarito argues that Śāntideva’s argument can be taken as advice only, and not 
as philosophically argument. 
214 Vism IX, 15. 
215 Vism IX, 16ff. 
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it. It is in keeping with this spirit that I think a defence of the pedagogical 
reading of the Buddhist texts is important. 
 
But is Carpenter correct in suggesting that a purely pedagogical 
reading fails to give us reason or means to abandon anger? I wish to suggest 
that this is not the case. Firstly, the reasons to abandon anger are partly 
inherent in the characterisation of anger itself — we have seen the many 
negative aspects of anger in Chapter 1. The moderationist attempts to 
transform it, assessed in Chapter 3, ultimately did not persuade — it turned 
out that even transformed anger did not yield the epistemic benefits they 
claimed, for instance. Moreover, I think a pedagogical reading of the texts 
does give us a means to abandon anger: by changing the way we look at the 
world we can prevent anger from arising, creating the opportunity to replace 
anger with other, positive, emotional responses. I will now develop this 
suggestion further. 
 
3.1 Patience and perspective 
 
 A pedagogical reading of the texts can assist us in our attempts to 
eliminate anger. I suggested in Chapter 3 that it is perhaps a misconception 
among moderationists that the elimination of anger amounts to doing nothing. 
I have suggested that this is not so — the choice isn’t get angry or do nothing, it 
is get angry or do something else instead. And, for the Buddhist, that ‘something 
else’ is acting in accordance with a particular set of virtues; virtues which 
follow from adopting the metaphysical outlook described above. In 
particular, I wish to argue that the pedagogical reading of the text 
encourages us to utilise the notion of dependent arising, as well as an 
undermining of the concept of self, in order to come to see instances of harm 
or wrongdoing from a new perspective. This new perspective involves a 
broadening of what we take into consideration when we look at the world, 
i.e. it is a broadening of perspective. 
 
 Consider again the passages from Śāntideva above about bile and 
the stick. A reading that is available to us here, given what we have said 
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about the prevalence of meditative teachings in Buddhist texts, is that we are 
meant to consider occasions of wrongdoing from a perspective that at least 
includes the broader set of material or mechanical causes of wrongdoing. In 
other words, we shouldn’t focus merely on the agent’s wrongdoing, but we 
should instead broaden our considerations to include the circumstances that 
made that wrongdoing possible. The principle of dependent arising reminds 
us that we are not actors operating independently, but that we are also acted 
upon in ways we cannot control, and this is why we all suffer (see Chapter 
2). By considering these broader factors, we can come to reassess whether 
our anger is apt in a given situation, as we shall see below. 
 
Consider, for example, someone cutting me off in traffic. If I come to 
understand that this person has a pregnant wife giving birth in the back seat, 
I might no longer see anger as an apt response. Without this broader 
perspective, I may have otherwise felt that I had reason to be angry. 
Abstracting further still to the consideration of an underfunded NHS leading 
to a shortage of ambulances is likely to end any pretentions to the aptness of 
my anger altogether. We could push this to macroeconomic levels where we 
consider a system which fails to collect tax from the richest corporations 
while simultaneously encouraging greed. What will bring about the cessation 
of anger will differ from person-to-person i.e. some of us require more 
perspective than others. 
 
Note here that this method is not simply one of how we can remedy 
anger — it is also one concerned with preventing it from arising in the first 
place. It is true that considering factors like those mentioned above might 
help alleviate anger once it arises, but this is not the point for the 
eliminativist. If this was what this position amounted to, then it could only 
be a defence of moderationism. Instead, what we are attempting to do with 
this method is to approach the world in a certain way. To return to the 
example above, if I set out on my drive working on the assumption that 
other drivers are faced daily with concerns like pregnant spouses, then my 
anger will not arise when someone cuts in front of me. If it does, I should set 
out on my next journey keeping in mind that there are pregnant spouses and 
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a shortage of ambulances, and so on. In this way, my broader perspective 
prevents my anger arising — and prevention is better than cure. 
 
The method we are employing here is one which also treats the 
Buddhist view of no-self quite seriously — it diminishes the role played in 
moral reasoning by factors linked to agents and patients (the driver’s 
wrongdoing, the harm caused to me) in favour of a view which incorporates 
where that agent sits in relation to broader social, material, etc. contexts. In 
broadening our perspective in this way, we ‘zoom out’ from our focus on the 
agent’s actions, eventually to a point that we are far enough out that the role 
of the self (agent, patient) is so small in our moral picture that (eventually) it 
is practically non-existent. In the process, we find that both our anger, and 
the aptness of our anger, disappears. 
 
Far from being a matter of simply abandoning anger, though, the 
broad perspective we are describing here is, in itself, a kind of positive virtue: 
patience. Whereas Hume and Hutcheson see patience as valuable only in 
virtue of its impact on our conduct in life, Bommarito argues that there is an 
alternative way to conceive of patience which recasts it as impacting in a 
morally important way upon our relation to things of value in the world.216 
In setting up his (Buddhist-inspired) account of patience, Bommarito 
addresses Kupfer’s suggestion that impatience is ‘anger in the modality of 
time’.217 The thought here is that someone who is impatient is someone who 
is unable to wait, or that must have instant gratification. However, 
Bommarito points out that by paying special attention to patience’s 
corresponding vice, Kupfer may be missing something important about the 
virtue of patience. Not every case of being patient is a matter of waiting for 
things calmly, Bommarito points out; instead, it can be characterised with 
reference to enduring frustration or suffering (such as putting up with a 
colleague’s insensitive behaviour, or calmly waiting for improvement). 
 Bommarito argues that the calm acceptance of frustrations actually 
closely aligns with the Buddhist view of patience, specifically as it is 
                                               
216 Bommarito, “Patience and Perspective.” 
217 Kupfer, “When Waiting Is Weightless,” 279. 
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translated from the Sanskrit term ‘kṣānti’ (in Tibetan, ‘bzod pa’). In the 
Buddhist texts, we see kṣānti contrasted with anger (or hatred, of which anger 
is a substrate, as we saw in Chapter 1). Śāntideva, for instance, has the 
following to say: “There is no vice like hatred, and there is no austerity like 
patience.”218 Gampopa, similarly suggests that patience is “Not being 
disturbed, not retaliating, and not holding resentment in the mind.”219 
Patience, for the Buddhist then, is characterised as peacefully facing of 
whatever suffering comes our way, whether that is simply annoyance or 
greater suffering like physical/emotional pain. However, there is an 
important difference between this Buddhist characterisation of patience, and 
the Western characterisation given above. The Western view of patience 
tends to focus upon behaviour, or the absence of certain types of behaviour, 
e.g. not retaliating when someone persists in annoying us. However, the 
Buddhist view of patience (i.e. kṣānti) sees it primarily as a mental virtue, 
rather than a behavioural one. As Bommarito explains: 
 
“Someone who gets angry when insulted but bites their tongue 
and does not reply might have patience, but they don’t have 
kṣānti. Someone with kṣānti is not simply someone who gets angry 
and manages not to act on it, but someone who fails to get angry 
in the first place.”220  
 
 This type of view of patience reinforces the traditional notion that 
Buddhism should be primarily seen as advocating an eliminativist viewpoint 
on anger. Bommarito, however, despite making the observations above, 
does not attempt to defend an eliminativist view (his focus is instead on 
showing that patience is of intrinsic rather than merely instrumental value). 
However, his work here does point to ways in which we can develop a 
defence of eliminativism, along the lines I have suggested above. Perhaps 
more importantly, his analysis of patience illustrates a way that Western 
                                               
218 BCA 6.2 
219 Gampopa, The Jewel Ornament of Liberation. 
220 Bommarito, “Patience and Perspective,” 271. 
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philosophy can look to the Buddhist account of patience to enrich its own 
analysis of the concept by considering it a mental virtue. 
 
 For Bommarito, our analysis of patience should centre not on what 
patience has us do, but instead on how patience has us look at the world. 
This idea rests on the suggestion that for something to count as patience, it 
requires more than calm endurance of suffering — it also requires us to 
calmly endure suffering for the right reasons. Bommarito leans upon Ven. 
Rerukane Chandavimala Mahathera to support this argument, who notes 
that “calm endurance of oppressions fails to count as patience when due to 
folly, lack of courage, desire for wealth, or hypocrisy.”221 As Bommarito 
points out, we might endure suffering calmly simply because we are 
exhausted, or under the influence of drugs. However, this would not count 
as patience. It is therefore a necessary condition of patience to endure 
suffering, but this alone is not sufficient for patience. 
 
 Bommarito calls upon fourth century Buddhist thinker Asaṅga to 
further explain this notion: 
 
“Practice patience by cultivating the five attitudes: perception of 
feeling close to the one who harms you, perception that 
everything depends on interdependent conditions, awareness of 
impermanence, perception of suffering, and perception of fully 
embracing sentient beings in your heart.”222  
 
Asaṅga’s view thus leans upon the distinctive Buddhist metaphysics 
discussed above, in much the same way as I have suggested we can do in 
taking a pedagogical reading of these texts. What Bommarito takes to be 
important about his teaching is that it encourages a certain sort of 
perception and awareness:  
 
                                               
221 Bommarito, 273. 
222 Asaṅga, cited in Bommarito, 273. 
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“The patient person is patient because she perceives the world in 
a certain way… to be patient is to be in a particular affective 
state, one free of anger, because one has certain perceptions and 
awareness.”223  
 
 In particular, Bommarito argues, possessing the virtue of this kind of 
patience grants its possessor a sense of perspective, or a sense of scale. 
Bommarito suggests that patience can do this in two ways. Firstly, patience 
can help give us perspective on the relative worth of our particular desires and 
values and our desires and values in general. For instance, although I might 
strive to complete a PhD thesis because this is important to me, if my 
husband were to contract an irreversible terminal illness that might make 
me realise that it is more important to me to spend every available moment 
with him than it is to complete the thesis. Secondly, patience can help give 
us a sense of perspective in that it can help us to see our place in a wider 
context, i.e. as a member of a team, as part of a community, etc., giving us a 
sense of proportion.  
 
Bommarito's analysis of patience provides us with a philosophical 
grounding for the eliminativist view that I defend i.e. one which suggests 
that we should read the Buddhist metaphysics (at least initially) 
pedagogically. The kind of patience described by Bommarito is precisely the 
kind that should follow from a pedagogical reading of dependent arising — 
if we see everyone as both acting and acted upon, then we can consider the 
ways in which they are acted upon in assessing their actions. This leads to a 
broadening of perspective (Asaṅga points out the other important 
requirements in attaining this kind of patience e.g. feeling close to the one 
who has harmed us, as well as other aspects of the Buddhist metaphysical 
picture like impermanence and suffering). However, I think there is an 
additional function for this kind of patience when it comes to the elimination 
of anger: clearing the way for us to bring other virtues into play. 
 
                                               
223 Bommarito, 273. 
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3.2 Patience and the virtuous Life 
 
 As I argued above, the ‘patient perspective’ is a way of preventing 
anger from arising. And since the eliminativist argument is that we should 
not only avoid anger, but also replace it with something else, it seems to me 
that the patient perspective is a way we can create space for that 
replacement to move in. If we are angry, then it is much harder to be 
compassionate (as I suggested in Chapter 3), and so the patient perspective 
makes it easier to apply such virtues by helping us avoid anger to begin with. 
At this point, we can start to apply compassion, generosity, etc., to occasions 
of harm. In this way, the patient perspective opens up the possibility of a 
virtuous life, even under quite difficult circumstances. 
 
If, as a result of the patient perspective, we can come to practice the 
virtues more easily, then we can begin to condition ourselves into 
responding to others in a variety of other virtuous ways. Those ways, too, 
might offer their own benefits with regard to eliminating anger. Generosity, 
or dāna, for example, might also bring us closer to an acceptance of the no-
self thesis, and thus further help us to prevent anger arising. By giving away 
our material possessions via acts of generosity, for example, I erode my sense 
of self-importance, I stop laying claim to things as ‘belonging to me’, and 
thus minimise the amount of things with which I self-identify (this is no 
longer ‘my MacBook’, or ‘my house’ etc.) So, by initially reading the 
Buddhist texts as intended as pedagogical tools, we can not only find ways to 
minimise instances of anger, we can also bring ourselves closer to a point 
where we might be able to take the leap from the metaphorical cliff 
described above, i.e. to a point where we might be more open to accepting 
the Buddhist metaphysics as true.  
 
However, the attitude of generosity is in itself the aim of its own 
practice, which means that on the Buddhist view our moral and epistemic 
development go hand in hand. Their connection comes, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, because of the connection between happiness and 
enlightenment. Enlightenment, for the Buddhist, is the elimination of 
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suffering. Alleviating suffering, we can also become happier. In stopping 
anger from arising we reduce the felt experience of suffering, and so 
practicing virtues like generosity is, in itself, rewarding, since it stabilises that 
virtue as a response to the world and thus further alleviates suffering and 
leads to happiness. Thus, the dual rewards of generosity are greater 
tendencies towards generous behaviour, and the reduction of suffering. If we 
can come to apply virtues like generosity, compassion, etc. consistently — 
that is to say, at all times — as a result of applying the pedagogical reading, 
then this arguably amounts to an acceptance of the Buddhist metaphysics. 
 
There are other ways in which adopting a pedagogical reading of the 
texts might bring us closer to the cliff edge. By undermining the importance 
of agency in our moral reasoning, as a consequence of adopting the broad 
perspective on the world that I described above, this might also come to 
diminish the significance of other moral concepts that typically play a part in 
our assessment of an occasion of anger. For instance, once we move away 
from the concerns about the role that agents play in a situation (e.g. the 
driver’s wrongdoing, the harm done to me) then a consequence of this is that 
moral concepts like praise and blame also become less significant within our 
new perspective. As we adopt the broader view, we stop trying to look at who 
is responsible, and instead start to look at the wider causes of our current 
situation. A natural consequence of this, then, is that this will reduce 
instances of anger further still, since anger requires a perception that I (or 
those persons or things we care about) have been harmed by someone. What 
this amounts to, as Carpenter observes, is a dramatic shift in the way we 
conceive of moral situations, and how we experience them. I will return to 
this thought in section 4 below when we consider the further role that the 
Buddhist metaphysics can play in this shift.  
 
Being patient then, when properly done, does not amount to being 
inactive and complacent in a moral situation. While the principle of 
dependent arising helps us understand that we are conditioned, we are not 
rendered totally powerless. In fact, the Buddhist recognition of the need to 
act in order to develop virtues is reflected through the order of virtues we 
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should perfect. After chapter six, which discusses kṣānti, Bodhicaryāvatāra 
recommends us to practice vīrya, which is translated as perseverance, vigour, 
energy. At the opening, it strikes to the point:  
 
“Patient in this way one should cultivate vigour,… For without 
vigour there is no merit, just as there is no movement without 
wind. What is vigour? The endeavor to do what is skilful. What is 
its antithesis called? Sloth, clinging to what is vile, despondency, 
and self-contempt.”224 
 
Our moral development will be in vain if we don’t keep striving. 
Even worse, we may be left with a crippling sense of helplessness. However, 
if we follow Śāntideva’s, or generally Mahāyāna’s, scheme of perfecting 
virtues, we would be less likely to get such a shock therapy from working 
with the alien metaphysical view that we are engaging with. 
 
3.3 Aptness, again! 
 
Having now set out crucial aspects of my position, let us now address 
the lingering concern of aptness. Consider again the case of Elie Wiesel, 
outlined in Chapter 3. There is a danger here that, in advocating for the 
patient perspective, that it will appear to apt-anger-defenders like Srinivasan 
that we might therein be failing to take Wiesel’s reasons for anger sufficiently 
seriously.225 If the result of advocating the patient perspective is that I am 
contending that Wiesel should not have been angry, then surely this is so! 
However, I think there is a response available here to those who would 
defend an aptness-moderationist position. This response is, in fact, bound up 
with another potential criticism — that we might be being asked to reduce 
agents to mere automata when we are asked by Śāntideva to consider them 
as we would bile or a stick, thus dehumanising them. However, I want to 
suggest that taking a broader perspective on someone’s harmful actions 
                                               
224 BCA 6.1-2  
225 It was actually the soldier’s anger that was described in this case, but to make the point as 
strongly as possible for the moderationist I think the reasons for the hypothetical anger of a 
Holocaust survivor is a good example to work with. 
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towards us does not amount to treating them as though they are mere 
automata. Questioning why we treat ‘the sentient’ differently to bile on the 
pedagogical reading isn’t intended to make us dehumanize others, but 
instead to make us understand that the sentient are not exempt from the 
sorts of laws that govern everything else. They too follow the principle of 
dependent arising, and so their harmful actions occur (or arise in 
dependence) as a result of many things, including some beyond their control. 
Far from being dehumanizing, this is precisely a humanising process, and one 
which is familiar to us within our justice system. When a judge considers 
sentencing for a crime, they factor in the circumstances under which a crime 
was committed: was the theft of the loaf of bread a wanton act, or was it 
born of necessity? We could condemn the action and assign blame regardless, 
but our response to it is mitigated by a broader consideration of the 
circumstances. At a certain point of abstraction, we might find assigning 
blame to individuals the least relevant consideration — for instance, where 
there is systemic injustice, the patient perspective might help us to focus on 
the need for broader social change rather than punishing specific individuals 
who have brought about this injustice (I will discuss this further in Chapter 
5). 
 
We also value this sort of broad perspective approach in other 
domains. Consider, for instance, aesthetic appreciation. We can respond to 
artworks in isolation, but we tend to think that the better responses — real art 
appreciation — come as a result of understanding where the work sits in 
relation to a broader set of facts about its history, artistic traditions, and so 
on. It might only be possible to properly appreciate the work of Cézanne, for 
instance, if one knows something about representationalism, the invention of 
photography, etc. Our judgements about artwork might be considered more 
apt under such a perspective, since our reasons would (all things being equal) 
better support such judgements. As such, this sort of perspective applied in 
the moral realm could be thought to have similar consequences i.e. our 
emotional responses to moral situations will be more apt when they are 
informed by a broader perspective, and most apt when they are informed by 
the broadest perspective. Thus, proponents of moderationism who take the 
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approach of Srinivasan would presumably admire this methodology when it 
comes to ethics. As such, I think the approach I am suggesting does take 
concerns of aptness very seriously. 
 
 In this way, there is a point of convergence between apt-
moderationist and Buddhist eliminativists: they can both agree on the 
benefits of the method although for different purposes. The moderationists 
probably would and should want to improve the criteria for the aptness of 
anger, and taking a broader perspective serves this very purpose. For 
Buddhists, however, adopting such a perspective is meant to help you get rid 
of suffering. As such, the advantage of approaching this problem from the 
pedagogical reading is that we find some means that we could possibly 
share, instead of simply acknowledging that they have different ethical and 
metaphysical conceptions which may not lead to any solution at all. 
However, it must be admitted that such a solution plays into the Buddhist 
plan. Even though moderationists initially want to resist the Buddhist 
metaphysics, by adopting a broader perspective they already take one step 
further to the Buddhist mode of thinking — the very mode that begins to 
erode the moral concepts that we usually employ, and that make us push 
back against the metaphysical view (agent, patient, praise, blame, etc.) 
 
 It is at this point, then, that we need to say something more on the 
way that the Buddhist metaphysical view erodes our familiar way of doing 
moral reasoning. It does not fall within the scope of this thesis, nor does it 
yet fall within the scope of my expertise, to make a defence of the 
metaphysical picture here. However, we can explore the implications of 
accepting this position. What we shall see, below, is that the implications of 
the truth of the metaphysical system bear out the claims made above about 
the pedagogical reading of the texts. 
 
 
4. Why Eliminating Anger is Apt 
 
 We turn here to Carpenter’s discussion of Buddhist eliminativism, of 
Śāntideva in particular, which explores the implications for the Anglophone-
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standard moral scheme should the Buddhist metaphysical picture turn out to 
be true.226 The position she outlines helps us make further sense of the 
apparent insensitivity of some of his claims, which at times look like 
instances of victim-blaming, by focusing on the way that accepting the 
Buddhist metaphysics actually requires (or yields) a radical shift in moral 
perspective. 
 
Explaining Śāntideva’s methodology, Carpenter sees his instruction 
to look at the harmful actions of others in the same way we do the irritations 
caused by bile as an attempt to help us see the mistake in thinking that “I am 
being made to suffer by someone else, who, as responsible, should be held to 
account (is a fitting target of revenge).”227 We come to see this mistake once 
we accept that there is no distinction between the personal and impersonal 
causes of anger, since these are both subject to the principle of dependent 
arising: someone’s “wicked intention did not choose to be, any more than a 
flower chooses to grow,”228  and the causal explanation of the existence of 
such an intention has an interminably long list of causes, each with its own 
causal story to explain. Attempting to answer the question ‘Whose fault is 
this?’ is, therefore, an exercise in futility. However, this position appears, on 
the surface quite at odds with our normal conception of justice — that 
which seeks to punish wrongdoers. Rather than seeing this as accidentally 
leading to a problematic position where justice is undermined — since we 
are no longer assigning blame for wrongdoing — Carpenter suggests that 
this is an intentional consequence of the metaphysics. Undermining the 
significance of the self in our moral reasoning is precisely meant to erode our 
familiar ideas about justice and moral responsibility: 
 
“By insisting on the embeddedness of all causes, and by refusing 
to distinguish one kind as special, Śāntideva removes any warrant 
for that special moral emotion, blame… Seeing the stick-wielder 
as impelled by malice, say, does not absolve him of [moral] 
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responsibility… because I am not even asking the question of 
responsibility. The lack of control he has over the malice is not 
exonerating, but it is pitiable; to lack control, and be riven with 
afflictive emotions, is suffering.”229  
 
We are here, once again, reminded of the ultimate aim of the 
Buddhist eliminativist — the elimination of suffering. Śāntideva implores us 
to reflect “‘Such are his conditions,’ and be at ease,”230 when we consider 
the stick-wielder. But being ‘at ease’ here doesn’t simply mean that we are to 
accept the wrongdoing nonchalantly; it is, instead, pragmatic advice 
intended to help us avoid anger and thus avoid adding further suffering into 
the situation. The person who has fully integrated Buddhist thinking into 
their moral reasoning understands the we should, at all times, be seeking to 
eliminate suffering; by refraining from being drawn into answering the 
question of who is to blame, we can instead address the issue of what is to be 
done. 
 
Yet there is more going on in the Buddhist metaphysical picture 
here. An implication of the no-self thesis is an accompanying dissolution of 
the distinction between self and other. As Carpenter explains: 
 
“Buddhist no-self replaces a metaphysics of beings (distinct, well-
defined, autonomous individuals) with becoming (dependent 
arising)…. Individuation is an activity of mind, not a perception 
of reality. It is liable, therefore, to criteria of efficacy; 
individuation is correctly done not when it maps reality but when 
it facilitates achievement of our ends.”231 
 
This metaphysics replaces distinct agents and patients with a view 
where everything is both agent and patient, if we so choose to identify it as 
such. Since there is no distinction in reality between agent and patient, there 
                                               
229 Carpenter, 323–24. 
230 BCA 6.33; This is Wallace and Wallace's translation where ‘be at ease’ can be compared 
with Crosby and Skilton’s version which translates to  ‘remain happy’.  
231 Carpenter, “Ethics without Justice,” 325. 
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is no ultimate truth that could function as a standard of correctness against 
which to check the ascriptions we choose to apply. However, since the 
primary concern of the Buddhist is eliminating suffering, we can apply a 
standard of efficacy. Suffering of any kind is real and bad, and so ascribing 
agency serves a purpose only when such mental activity is conducive to 
ending suffering. By dissolving the notion of agency, this “undermines the 
ability to generate anger, for anger presupposes some agent at whom we can 
direct our hostility.”232 In other words, full acceptance of the metaphysical 
position makes anger impossible. Consider again, then, the implications 
suggested for the pedagogical reading of the texts above regarding the role 
that our concerns about the self, and blame, come to play in our moral 
reasoning. The suggestion was that as our perspective becomes broader, 
these concerns become smaller or, perhaps better, so enmeshed in an 
increasingly large web of interdependent causes, that anger does not arise. 
From Carpenter’s suggestion, it seems like the logical end of this i.e. the 
broadest perspective, is the one in which we come to accept a metaphysics in 
which anger is impossible — and the Buddhist metaphysical picture is just 
such a view.  
 
Carpenter is careful to point out that it isn’t simply that agency is 
dissolved in this metaphysical picture — there is, instead, no longer “a clear 
and stable distinction in reality between agent and patient.”233 As such, the 
view doesn’t collapse into determinism, where everyone is simply acted 
upon, for the metaphysical view which has replaced agency — dependent 
arising — sees everything as both acted upon and as acting upon others. It is 
for this reason that, as suggested above, everything can be seen as both 
agent and patient, should seeing things in this way be conducive to the 
elimination of suffering. This is also why, Carpenter suggests, reading 
Śāntideva as victim-blaming is too simplistic an analysis: the Buddhist view 
does not turn everyone into patients, but “rather reveals all aspects of person 
to be involved both as condition and as conditioned.”234 This metaphysics 
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raising a point here that I had perhaps hoped to side-step! They ask why it is that 
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therefore offers the Buddhist eliminativist a route to escape the aptness 
problem: since agency is fundamentally destabilised, so too is the possibility 
of reasons such as ‘X unjustly harmed me’ being objectively true. The 
eliminativist can assert that this is false i.e. it is not a description of reality, 
and that belief that it is true (and thus apt) follows from a misapprehension 
of the world. They would, however, still wish to avoid the charge of 
callousness; simply pointing this metaphysical picture out to someone who is 
angry would seem to be exactly that. However, they can avoid callousness 
via the means suggested in chapter 3 — by taking the angry person’s 
subjective experience of ‘apt’ anger seriously, and responding 
compassionately. The Buddhist’s compassion is motivated here on two 
fronts — both in seeking to alleviate the suffering the angry person 
experiences from their subjective point of view, but also in virtue of the 
epistemic failure that has induced the former suffering. 
 
In response to the moderationist arguments which seek to claim that 
anger perceives something about moral reality, the Buddhist view suggests 
the opposite. Understanding the world as the Buddhists argue, anger does 
not reveal nor confirm anything about reality. The only thing anger reveals 
is about ourselves; that we misconceive reality; that we think of the world in 
self-regarding terms which do not correspond to how the world really is. 
Instead, the Buddhist metaphysical view offers us a route to the elimination 
of suffering, and of anger, which the Buddhists are clearly aware is a difficult 
                                               
determinism too might not also reveal all aspects of a person to be involved both as 
condition and conditioned. Determinism may well be viewed in this light (though Carpenter 
does not see it this way). One recurring concern that plagued me in writing this thesis was 
whether the Buddhist metaphysics was required as a basis for the patient perspective if an 
alternative like determinism might well lead one to the same point. However, a central 
difference (it seems to me, at least) between the Buddhist metaphysical picture and 
determinism is that the former is inseparable from its ethical project, whereas determinism 
might be regarded as a purely metaphysical view (albeit one with moral implications). In 
other words, determinism is an attempt to describe the way in which the universe behaves 
i.e. in terms of cause and effect, but Buddhism is fundamentally an attempt to explain how 
human beings ought to behave. Dependent arising and determinism may arguably amount 
to the same thing, but dependent arising is just one of many metaphysical concepts at play 
in the Buddhist system, and they cannot be coherently adopted in isolation. In particular, 
the Buddhist view posits suffering as inherent in human existence, and thus the elimination 
of suffering becomes the primary aim of human moral action (see Chapter 2). Since 
determinism lacks a moral aim, one could argue that it is less useful as a metaphysical basis 
for an ethical theory. This argument requires further expansion no doubt, but the place for 
that is not in this thesis.  
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challenge. Whatever the merits of this metaphysical view, it is worth noting 
that a moderationist view which denies the no-self thesis, or dependent 
arising, is inevitably committed to some metaphysical view of its own, and 
thus the merits for that view would have to be assessed against any defence 
that can be given for the Buddhist metaphysics. Again, this is not the task 
here.235 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 At this juncture, we have developed a Buddhist eliminativist 
argument which integrates a view of patience taken from the Western 
literature, but that is based upon the Buddhist texts. I have argued that 
position outlined above can prevent anger from arising and resolve concerns 
about whether doing so removes an apt moral attitude. Buddhist texts don’t, 
however, concern themselves with the same sorts of issues that most trouble 
moderationists — as we noted in Chapters 2 and 3, many moderationist 
accounts come from feminist philosophers, who are concerned not only with 
their individual oppression, but with a widespread, systemic oppression of a 
group to which they belong. I therefore turn, in my final chapter, to such an 
issue so that we can examine how the view I defend would attempt to deal 
with that issue. 
  
                                               
235 Having said that, there is some evidence to suggest that we do project agency onto the 
world. The Heider-Simmel task, for instance, requires experiment participants to watch an 
animation in which geometric shapes move around a series of lines. Participants routinely 
describe the thing they observe in terms of agency, though clearly these shapes do not 
possess agency. For example, they will use descriptions such as ‘the big triangle is chasing 
the smaller one’. This might constitute tentative evidence that suggests that it is at least an 
open possibility that agency is projected onto the world rather than ‘read off’ it. See, Heider 
and Simmel, “An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior.” 
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Chapter Five: 
ELIMINATIVISM AND SOCIAL 
INJUSTICE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
One final strength of the moderationist position needs to be 
addressed here still. The moderationist defence of anger seems at its most 
persuasive when it is applied to the most morally serious cases — specifically 
those of widespread social injustice. It is largely in service of such causes that 
moderationist views emerge, for instance in the Feminist movement. When 
confronted with (often undeniable) evidence of systemic social injustice, our 
instincts may tend towards anger, so the question that arises for us to answer 
here is can the eliminativist position I have defended offer a satisfactory 
response to such cases? 
 
 
1. Anger? #MeToo 
 
As I write this thesis, there is an incredibly significant confirmation 
hearing underway in the United States — that of Brett Kavanaugh’s 
nomination for the US Supreme Court. His appointment would see the 
Republican party disproportionately balance the number of judges in favour 
of conservative legislation, possibly for decades to come. Ahead of the 
hearings, most of the discussion surrounded whether Kavanaugh’s 
appointment would herald the repeal of significant legislation governing the 
legality of abortion, and whether the nominee Kavanaugh believed a sitting 
president could be indicted of a crime. However, the focus of the hearings 
would suddenly change when a former high school acquaintance, Christine 
Blasey Ford, came forward with an accusation of sexual assault against 
Kavanaugh — an assault which allegedly took place some 30+ years ago, 
when Kavanaugh was 17 and Ford just 15. 
 
The accusation follows a recent trend in women coming forward to 
speak of sexual assaults and/or sexually inappropriate behaviour that they 
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have been subjected to at some point in their lives. A smaller number of men 
have also come forward. Many of these accusations have surfaced on social 
media, accompanied by the hashtag ‘#MeToo’ — intended to emphasise 
both how alarmingly common these sorts of assaults are, but also that it is 
only recently that victims have felt that they are able to speak up. Responses 
to the ‘#MeToo Movement’ have been polarised, which is typical of much 
public moral and political discourse today. The earliest high profile 
allegations against movie producer Harvey Weinstein were greeted by most 
as a welcome sign of change, and prompted frank and open conversation 
about the issues. However, as the movement has grown, people have 
become suspicious of the motives of the accusers and started to push back 
against the movement as a whole. This has particularly been the case when 
the accusations have strayed into the realm of politics, which has become 
particularly partisan in the US recently. President Trump’s own response to 
Kavanaugh’s accuser has been to question why the victim didn’t come 
forward with the allegations at the time of the assault, seemingly having 
missed the general gist of the conversation that the movement started 
(perhaps unsurprisingly, since the president himself stands accused of 
multiple sexual assaults). 
 
After so many decades of silently enduring sexual assault, it is 
understandable that the mainly female victims have finally had enough. And 
they are certainly angry. Journalist Emily Sargent explains how widespread 
this anger has become: 
 
“Something has shifted in the past couple of months. The seed 
was sown last year when a qualified, experienced woman lost out 
to a sexist, racist, alleged rapist in the American elections. A 
comic comparison in eligibility if it hadn’t also broken my heart. 
But it set a ball in motion. And it has been a year of savage blows 
to women since. Speaking to other women, many say they’re also 
charged with this new alien anger.”236 
 
                                               
236 Sargent, “2017 Was a Start, But Women Need to Stay Angry.” 
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 Sargent, in this passage, confirms the observation of the 
moderationist: widespread social injustices prompt anger as an energising 
response. And this anger is somewhat seductive (consider the discussion of 
anger and pleasure in Ch.1, section 3.2) — Sargent, rather than feeling the 
need to curb her anger, concludes instead that it needs to be harnessed: 
 
“Maybe, though, this fire in women’s bellies is burning extra 
savagely for a reason. Something we’ve learnt from our history 
about fury, change and the limited window of time in which we 
can harness its power. Right now we are poised. A collective 
heart, beating red and bloodied. We can’t repress what we have 
always known to be true any more. The monster has grown too 
big for the blanket that used to hide it.”237 
 
How can the eliminativist argument I have defended here make 
sense of both the emotional response of the members of the movement, but 
also follow up on their demands for social change? In other words, can we 
deal with the apparently apt anger of the victims, and bring about social 
change in the absence of the energising effects of anger (since our position is 
one which would seek to prevent anger from arising to begin with)? I turn to 
these questions now. 
 
 
2. Turning Theory into Practice 
 
 How would the position I advocate deal with the problem identified 
by the #MeToo Movement? The approach to anger I have advocated is 
eliminativist, which means it seeks to prevent anger from arising altogether. 
The patient perspective described in Chapter 4 is the method we can use to 
achieve this ends. However, one issue with social movements such as the 
#MeToo Movement is that anger has already arisen. As such, the method 
defended by the eliminativist needs to show that it has a place both as 
prevention and cure as regards to anger. 
                                               
237 Sargent. 
   180 
 By taking the instruction of Śāntideva as pedagogical, my hope is 
that the result is a broadening of perspective, where we first see the actions 
of wrongdoers contextualised against a web of personal and impersonal 
causes. As noted in the previous chapter, the Buddhist view is that these 
webs are interminable, and thus they admit of many potential levels of 
abstraction when it comes to the patient perspective. I have suggested that, 
at a certain level of abstraction, anger is eliminated. This method can be 
used as a means of therapising anger — it asks us to reconsider our anger in 
light of this perspective, but its primary aim is in getting us to approach the 
world with that perspective such that wrongdoing does not prompt an angry 
response to begin with. So what might this perspective encompass with 
regards to the concerns of the #MeToo Movement? 
 
 Speculation here on which factors could prevent us from becoming 
angry as either a victim of sexual assault, or as someone simply concerned at 
its prevalence in our culture, is obviously tricky ground to cover. Srinivasan 
is worried about the insensitivity we might show towards those who are 
angry by focusing on the outcome of their anger, rather than their reasons. 
However, the focus here is on both — it attempts to take the reasons for 
anger very seriously, and offers criteria for aptness that I have suggested 
moderationists might be willing to accept. In addition, it seeks to identify the 
best way in which to achieve the results we want. Nevertheless, we must 
tread carefully here too, as this is clearly an emotive issue. 
 
 Firstly, it should be noted that this process can go wrong. Although 
not explicitly following the method of the patient perspective, I believe we 
can see what it would look like for us to get things wrong by examining some 
actual reactions to the Brett Kavanaugh case. US news station CNN 
conducted an interview with a group of female Republican voters (whose 
party nominated Kavanaugh for the position on the supreme court), and 
asked their opinions on the accusations he faced.238 Their responses 
included pointing to facts about Kavanaugh’s past (that he was an altar boy, 
                                               
238 CNN, GOP Voter on Kavanaugh. 
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and a scout), that the accusation only included groping and not rape, that 
Kavanaugh was a seventeen-year-old boy and thus fuelled by hormones, 
and even the suggestion that every boy does this sort of thing at that age. The 
merits of these claims need not be addressed here, and it should be obvious 
that some of them are hyperbole at best. Instead, what I suspect we are 
seeing here is a case of something like the patient perspective gone wrong. 
 
 What these women are doing is attempting to take a broader 
perspective on the assault accusation — to include facts about human 
biology, about society, about the relative seriousness of certain actions, 
about the broader moral character of the accused, and so on. This perhaps 
reveals an instinct towards taking a broad perspective in moral reasoning. 
However, without the guidance of the Buddhist metaphysics and suffering, 
this process is rather unwieldy. The Buddhist view attempts to give purpose 
to broadening perspective as, with all things, it aims to reduce suffering. The 
broadening of perspective undertaken by the women in the interview 
appears to be aimed at something else: exonerating the accused, or 
reinforcing existing bias towards their political view (thus narrowing their 
view of the world, rather than broadening it).  
 
 Moreover, the patient perspective is only part of the process I have 
advocated in the previous chapter. The function of this perspective is to 
prevent anger from arising so that we may replace it with positive emotions 
like compassion, generosity and so on. It seems to me that the response of 
the women here highlights a danger the Buddhist is wary of, as discussed in 
Chapter 4: that the metaphysical picture can lead to complacency or 
inactivity. If we utilise the teachings of the metaphysical view only to 
eliminate anger, then we fail to develop the other virtues central to the 
Buddhist moral life; but they are clear in their instruction that we must 
develop these, even suggesting a particular order in which to do it! It seems 
like the response of the women in the interview has been to take a broad 
perspective only to prevent or dismiss outrage, instead of trying to 
objectively understand what the factors in the situation really are, and thus 
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there is a failure to move beyond that and into a compassionate, generous, 
etc. response to the world. 
 
So, what does the patient perspective look like when it is done right 
with regards to this case? We can actually take our lead here from Feminist 
moderationists, I think. In the wake of the #MeToo movement, the term 
‘toxic masculinity’ has become part of the discourse when attempting to 
explain the causes of frequent sexual assault and violence against women. 
The term refers to aspects of masculinity or male behaviour that are seen as 
harmful, including attempting to dominate others in all situations (the ‘alpha 
male’), the devaluation of women,239 and a restricted view on what 
constitutes permissible emotions — in particular, what is permissible may be 
restricted only to expressions of anger (which often manifest themselves as 
violence).240 Encouraging men to indulge in those aspects of masculine 
culture, it is suggested, explains a tendency towards inappropriate sexual 
behaviour towards women. Thus, feminists have to some degree made toxic 
masculinity the target of their own anger (the target isn’t simply men, despite 
this being claimed by many reacting to the movement), and the #MeToo 
Movement is characterised by attempts to highlight instances of such 
behaviour (often on social media). 
 
By identifying such phenomena as toxic masculinity, gender studies 
(particularly from a feminist perspective) helps to highlight many of the 
causes of harmful behaviour that should form part of our moral perspective. 
However, the patient perspective would seek to have us view the alleged 
behaviour of Brett Kavanaugh (and others) as both proponents and 
symptoms of just such a culture. Kavanaugh’s own response to Christine 
Blasey Ford’s testimony was dominated by anger; his performance in the 
senate was angry, belligerent, and confrontational — all indications of the 
effects of toxic masculinity. But Śāntideva’s teachings remind us that this is 
‘pitiable’ behaviour, since it indicates a lack of self-control. It shows that 
Kavanaugh is conditioned by many factors, including toxic masculinity, and 
                                               
239 Kupers, “Role of Misogyny and Homophobia in Prison Sexual Abuse.” 
240 Liu, “How Trump’s ’Toxic Masculinity’ Is Bad for Other Men.” 
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thus he also suffers. Acknowledging this suffering does not somehow ‘push 
out’ acknowledging the suffering of the victim, nor the wrongdoing in 
Kavanaugh’s alleged actions; it does not amount to ‘victim-blaming’. 
Instead, by attempting to prevent anger from arising by taking the patient 
perspective, we hope to leave the space for compassion to take anger’s place 
in our response to the wrongdoing. 
 
That men as well as women can suffer at the hands of toxic 
masculinity shouldn’t really be surprising, in a way, given the 
characterisation of anger in Chapter 1. In Kavanaugh’s case, Blasey Ford’s 
calm and measured testimony seems to have spoken louder than 
Kavanaugh’s anger, given that the net result of the two was the opening of 
an FBI investigation into the allegation; perhaps Kavanaugh’s angry 
response contributed to this outcome. But there is evidence from elsewhere 
that toxic masculinity can be harmful. According to Terry Kupers, the 
American prison system operates within a culture of toxic masculinity, 
affecting both the inmates and the guards. In his view, suppressing emotions 
other than anger, i.e. emotions that are perceived as showing weakness, 
directly contributes to suicide among male prisoners.241 This being the case, 
even though we do not here dispute the wrongdoings of these men, they 
nonetheless may still call for our compassion. 
 
2.1 Eliminativism and punishment 
 
Having compassion for both Blasey Ford and Kavanaugh, then, 
what are we to do? Our response to Blasey Ford appears to call for some 
action to improve her situation, but we might think that compassion for 
Kavanaugh stands in the way of an adequate response. However, we must 
remember that the patient perspective is not an attempt to exonerate, excuse, 
or even forgive the perpetrator (that, we have seen, would potentially be the 
wrong way to do it), but to instead understand the complex conditions that 
give rise to the occasion. We hope to recognise the wrongdoing without 
                                               
241 Kupers, “Men and Masculinities.” 
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getting angry. In fact, this recognition is built into the attitude of patience, 
for understanding the mechanics of how things come to be — seeing factors 
of causes and effects and their relationship to make a judgement that it is 
wrong — is just such a recognition. More importantly, the process of 
abstracting to broader contexts will help us to see what actions we should 
bring about through our compassionate response.  
 
The eliminativist view that I have defended does not suggest that we 
cannot engage in the practice of praise and blame. Buddhists are constantly 
engaged in this practice, in fact. They look into the quality of their actions, 
examining whether they are good or bad, praiseworthy or blameworthy, 
wholesome or unwholesome.242 However, we also need to be aware that the 
attitude of blame is independent from the quality of blameworthiness, in both 
the Buddhist view and the Western one; both acknowledge that we can get it 
wrong when we ascribe praise and blame. However, the Buddhist 
metaphysical view, as we saw in Chapter 4, sees the practice of praise and 
blame as a matter of pragmatism: it isn’t attempting to get ascriptions of 
praise and blame right, it rather praises or blames when doing so contributes to 
the reduction of suffering. 
 
It is in this way that the eliminativist account can come to find a role, 
also, for punishment. Those who harm others should be punished with a 
view to affect change in them so that we might reduce suffering. What 
constitutes adequate punishment is perhaps not possible for me to say. In 
Kavanaugh’s case, perhaps being publicly held to account in the way that he 
already has will be sufficient to affect change in his future behaviour; 
perhaps it will take a formal prosecution (should the FBI investigation find 
sufficient warrant for a criminal charge). However, it should be noted that 
the scope of the effects of punishment here isn’t limited only to Kavanaugh’s 
case — the hope with high profile cases is that they will come to serve as 
deterrents to others. And at least one hope of the #MeToo Movement is 
that these high profile cases will force all men into thinking deeply about 
                                               
242 See Harvey, “An Analysis of Factors Related to the Kusala/Akusala”, for the criteria 
found in the Pāli texts, for example. 
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their interactions with women. By seeing everyone as both conditioned and 
conditioning, the Buddhist understands that punishment does not only affect 
the punished. 
 
Of course, it is also the view of some people that the method of 
public condemnation utilised by the #MeToo Movement — with many 
accusations being made via social media platforms like Twitter, rather than 
through the traditional legal process — is one of the movement’s greatest 
concerns. Kavanaugh’s outrage, on full display at his hearing, is predicated 
on his innocence and the subsequent damage to his reputation. In such 
instances, the Buddhist eliminativist’s primary concern is unchanged — we 
still seek to reduce suffering. This is why the eliminativist would counsel 
Kavanaugh, guilty or not, to approach his situation in a way which seeks to 
eliminate his anger, rather than using it to fuel his response. In applying the 
patient perspective, one would hope that Kavanaugh could come to see the 
importance of his own case in relation to the many others that the #MeToo 
Movement concerns itself with. Even if he is innocent, his response here 
affects himself and others; as someone vying for a position on the highest 
court in the US, we might hope that he could see the potential damage he 
could do to real victims of sexual assault in terms of their willingness to 
speak out. This, perhaps more than the mere allegation, is what ought to 
disqualify him from the position he is seeking. 
 
 
3. The Benefits of Eliminating Anger 
 
We saw in Chapter 3 that Srinivasan was concerned that, in focusing 
on the counter-productivity of anger, eliminativists were overlooking the 
intrinsic value of anger. The considerations above, I hope, do something to 
address the kinds of concerns raised by Srinivasan about how we can deal 
with morally serious situations in which the anger of those concerned 
appears to be apt. But I think we can also say something here about the 
productivity of the Buddhist eliminativist approach compared to those who 
defend anger as useful for instigating or bringing about social change. There 
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is no reason for eliminativists to focus only on aptness or productivity — 
since Srinivasan raises a legitimate and serious difficulty, and (at least some) 
moral theories should hopefully be action-guiding, the eliminativist would 
do a better job to focus on both aptness and productivity. The second kind of 
concern here will be that eliminating anger might prevent a movement like 
#MeToo from arising, and thus the good that such a movement does (and it 
remains to be seen what the effects of this particular movement will be) will 
be sacrificed by the eliminativists alongside anger. I do not believe that this 
is the case, for reasons I will now outline. 
 
Not only do eliminativists use the patient perspective to better 
understand a given situation, they can also use it to therapise anger. Thus, 
one benefit to the approach I have advocated is that victims of sexual assault 
can, hopefully, reduce their own suffering in letting go of their anger. The 
opposing view, that of the moderationist, wishes victims to harness their 
anger rather than giving it up. But should victims really be told to cling to 
their resentment in service of some greater cause? In a way, that also seems 
like a form of callousness. That is particularly so if anger can be eliminated 
and replaced with something else which will further alleviate their suffering, 
and also bring about the social change desired. 
 
Moreover, we have seen in Chapter 3 that the supposed benefits of 
anger — communicative, epistemic, etc. — were overstated. Instead of 
giving epistemic clarity, for example, even transformed anger skews our 
ability to make accurate judgements. This is of great significance as an 
individual, but it is of greater significance still for members of a movement, 
who seek to make changes that will affect society as a whole. Without the 
influence of anger, we do not tend to act rashly and overestimate ourselves, 
as we saw in Chapter 3 is an issue associated with anger. The patient 
perspective is a method that, like the Buddha’s inquiry in the Four Noble 
truths,243 is pragmatically geared towards solving an identified problem. The 
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pedagogical reading is a guide for us to reduce the immediate pain of anger 
and hence practically effective to allowing us to focus on what is to be done. 
Since individuals rarely have the capacity to bring about widespread social 
change on their own, this responsibility often falls upon popular movements 
and their collective focus. Thus, the elimination of anger (and its therapising 
by utilising the patient perspective, just so long as we are unenlightened), can 
help individuals have the clarity of mind to see not only what must be changed, 
but also to identify how it can be changed. A movement populated by 
individuals like this would surely be more effective in bringing about social 
change than a movement populated by individuals unsuccessfully 
attempting to harness their anger. 
 
As noted above, the #MeToo movement has not, as yet, ceased, and 
thus it is difficult to utilise that particular case to illustrate the point above. 
So, to illustrate this point, we can look at a different movement and attempt 
to identify the challenges faced by patient and angry approaches therein. A 
useful comparison here, I think, are the ongoing challenges faced by the 
African-American community. A striking example of the negative effects of 
anger in response to social injustice can be seen in the 1992 Los Angeles 
riots. Following the trial of four police officers for the beating of an African-
American man named Rodney King following a high-speed chase, 
spontaneous riots erupted in Los Angeles prompted by the not-guilty-
verdicts in favour of the officers. The riots largely targeted Asian-American 
owned businesses, purely in virtue of their geographical location i.e. they 
happened to be in the areas in which the riots took place. These riots were 
fuelled by simmering anger over police brutality towards the African-
American community, but this anger was misdirected towards another 
minority group who were unconnected to the issue (as is so often the case; 
see Chapter 3). 
 
This event had some unpredictable consequences — consequences 
which reverberated beyond the original geographical regions in which the 
riots took place. One consequence of the riots was a spike in sales of 
handguns, as people across the country sought to protect themselves should 
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a similar event occur where they lived.244 However, it is also notable that 
homicides committed using handguns similarly spiked during the same 
period.245 At the best of times, the full consequences of our actions are 
difficult to foresee. But if we look at even transformed anger’s tendency to 
cloud our judgement, and then compare that to the approach of the patient 
perspective, we can see that the latter at least attempts to approach the 
world with a perspective that considers factors beyond the immediate 
situation with which we are confronted. As such, the patient perspective 
should be able to better identify the course of action we should take. A useful 
contrast to the LA Riots here is with the approach of Martin Luther King, 
who wrestled frequently with anger within his activism. King wrote in his 
autobiography of these struggles and his eventual realisation that he needed 
to eliminate his anger to achieve the ends he sought. Following failure to 
negotiate the end of segregation on buses, King reflected on what he saw as 
the cause of his failure: 
 
“That Monday I went home with a heavy heart. I was weighted 
down by a terrible sense of guilt, remembering that on two or 
three occasions I had allowed myself to become angry and 
indignant. I had spoken hastily and resentfully. Yet I knew that 
this was no way to solve a problem. ‘You must not harbor anger,’ 
I admonished myself. ‘You must be willing to suffer the anger of 
the opponent, and yet not return anger. You must not become 
bitter. No matter how emotional your opponents are, you must 
be calm.’”246 
 
Although clearly not advocating the patient perspective, or any sort 
of Buddhist perspective here, it is notable that Martin Luther King’s relative 
success at achieving his aims was predicated upon an attempt to eliminate 
anger. If we return briefly to the #MeToo movement and our observation in 
an earlier chapter that anger can beget anger (i.e. that others ‘mirror’ our 
angry responses), it is notable that the response to anger within the #MeToo 
                                               
244 Harris, “Gun Sales Soar After L.A. Riots.” 
245 Cooper and Smith, “Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008.” 
246 King, The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
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Movement has done just that. The article by Emily Sargent quoted in 
section 1 above was shared, presumably by her, from her Twitter account in 
December 2017. The article is a defence of anger, and although quite 
nuanced by the end of the piece, it begins with an unrepentant anecodote of 
her angrily pushing a man in a bar after losing patience with his drunkenly 
swaying into her, and asking her to ‘Give me a smile’. To date, her Tweet 
has had just 14 replies. All but 2 of those replies are aggressive and 
threatening, calling her disgusting, a coward, a ‘Feminazi’, and a number of 
more colourful terms that I will not repeat here. This sort of backlash 
against the women of the #MeToo Movement is alarmingly common on 
Twitter — more common and extreme, I hope, than the backlash they 
receive in real life — but the worst of it seems to be reserved for the women 
who dare to express their anger. What is frustrating about this sort of 
dialogue is that it appears to polarise the very groups the movement is 
hoping to reconcile on better terms. Rather than creating effective dialogue 
aimed at change, it drives people on both sides towards demonising their 
opponent. If compassion, or generosity, etc. turns out to be a more effective 
tool than anger then, given the seriousness of the issue, I hope that the 
movement can come to embrace those kinds of approach as an automatic 
response to these sorts of provocation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The elimination of anger via the patient perspective, I believe, could 
be a catalyst for change by replacing the collective mind-set of a movement 
with virtues that make people more outward-looking. As we become aware 
of the prevalence of suffering, we can eliminate our anger and develop a 
generous spirit and a sense of compassion i.e. a wish for someone to be freed 
from suffering. This applies to both victims of oppression and to anyone else 
who engages with the pedagogical reading of the Buddhist texts; in doing so, 
the patient perspective creates individuals predisposed towards activism. 
Coupled with the epistemic clarity that the elimination of anger brings, they 
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can take action effectively in creating social changes in the best way they 
can. 
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Appendix  
Sukha, pīti (prīti), and dukkha (duḥkha) 
 
 There is a variety of proximate terms of happiness in early Buddhist 
classification, notably sukha and pīti (or prīti in Sanskrit). In loose usage they 
are almost identical and sometimes found together. Because their distinction 
is absent in modern English, they are difficult to render. While sukha is 
sometimes translated to pleasure, bliss, and happiness, pīti, which can also be 
sub-categorised further into five kinds, may be translated as joy, delight, 
rapture, zest, as well as happiness. However, these translations do not 
capture the subtlety in the original languages. In his comprehensive analysis, 
Buddhaghoṣa explains the difference between sukha and pīti in Vism.: “Pīti is 
the contentedness at getting a desirable object, and sukha is the actual 
experiencing of it when got,” adding that the experience is analogous to the 
following situation:  
 
“If a man exhausted in a desert saw or heard about a pond on the 
edge of a wood, he would have pīti; if he went into the wood’s 
shade and used the water, he would have sukha.”247  
 
It is further characterised that pīti includes an element of mental 
construction while sukha is a felt experience itself.248 As Heim observes, the 
former denotes a person’s will, i.e. enthusiasm or anticipation, that adds into 
the experience, and the latter is a more passive activity of savouring the 
pleasure that results from contacts with external objects.249  
 
 Considering mental factors involved in the activities, sukha is defined 
simply in terms of feeling while pīti also require an additional factor of 
mental formation (saṅkhāra/saṃskāra). By excluding the dimension of desire 
towards an object, it is the more basic and wider sense of happiness, and 
includes larger instances of overall pleasurable feelings. In other words, it 
                                               
247 Vism IV, 100. A similar line of analysis can be found in another Buddhaghoṣa’s work, 
Atthasālinī 117-18. 
248 Atthasālinī 115-18; Vism IV 94-98. 
249 Heim, “Buddhism,” 23. 
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means that sukha requires fewer mental faculties to be completed, which may 
include the phenomena of pīti. This is made clear by Buddhaghoṣa: “Where 
there is pīti there is sukha; but where there is sukha there is not necessarily 
pīti.”250  
 
 This subtlety has some implications in the context of what should be 
a Buddhist goal. Since the experience of sukha, which is often treated as a 
desirable goal, is not necessarily defined by a fulfilment of enthusiasms or 
desires; happiness is not resulted from just doing whatever one wants. This is 
important because had pīti been the Buddhist ordinary life pursuit, it could 
have potentially undermined the Buddhist foundation about self-control 
against bad desires. For we have to fulfil our desires to pursue pīti in spite of 
bad consequences. Although sukha is by definition inclusive of pīti, but 
because self-gratification is not the only cause of sukha, there are ways to 
attain it without contradicting with their own premises.  
 
 Sukha has a far more important place in Buddhism than pīti. Perhaps, 
an etymological analysis can offer more contexts. Antonymous to sukha is 
dukkha (duḥkha in Sanskrit), the term for suffering or pain and undisputedly 
the most important concept in the Buddhist philosophy. The prefixes su- 
and du- in both terms denote the quality good and bad, respectively, to what 
they precede. In this case their original meanings are ‘having a good/bad 
axle hole,’ thus rendered as chariots running smoothly or badly. Merely the 
prefixes are telling of the place of these concepts in the Buddhist thought. 
Their low opinion of dukkha is made known clearly and loudly and therefore 
we may infer that from the etymology sukha is the opposite. It is, for some 
parts, but not entirely true. 
 
 As a kind of feeling, sukha appears to be the direct opposite of dukkha. 
An example can be found in the Buddhist analysis of vedanā or 
feeling/sensation, which is one of the mental aggregates. It is manifested in 
three ways: sukha, dukkha, and upekkhā (pleasure, pain, and not pleasure nor 
                                               
250 Vism IV 100. 
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pain, respectively). So in this categorisation, sukha has the opposite quality to 
dukkha. And yet, they are not antithetical when it comes to their values. Sukha 
is indeed more desirable than dukkha; however, unlike dukkha which is the 
most undesirable state in the Buddhist universe, sukha is, strictly speaking, 
not the most desirable state. The opposite of dukkha and the most desirable 
state is in fact an absence of it, viz. nirvana. Such a state requires a person to 
break off from the capacity to feel either negatively or positively, or even 
neutral. In this sense, no matter what the hierarchy of these feelings is, they 
would not be as good as putting an end to it.  
 
 This discrepancy is what we should be aware of. Sukha and dukkha 
may be opposite in some sense, but they cannot be taken as completely 
antonymous. Whereas sukha is essentially a mental phenomenon of feeling, 
dukkha has many layers of meanings which extends more than just mental 
suffering. It includes some metaphysical sense that is not captured in sukha 
(see the full depth of dukkha in Chapter 2 section 6). For this reason, they 
cannot be compared as opposite in every sense of the terms. 
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Abbreviations 
 
The texts used in this work are drawn from across Buddhist 
traditions, although only those mentioned several times are abbreviated, as 
following. Some of them are available in many versions, which sometimes 
are used for comparison, especially when the original traditional texts are 
found in different languages including Sanskrit, Pāli, and Tibetan. However, 
the references listed here are the versions used in citations, unless stated 
otherwise. I have tried to use the more accessible and yet reliable texts when 
possible. Referencing numbers follow the tradition set by the translation 
versions chosen here, typically in the format of book, chapter, verse, 
whichever applies to them.  
 
AN Aṅguttara Nikāya. Translated as The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha. 
BCA Śāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra. Two versions are the main sources of 
consultation. One based on Sanskrit, the other on Sanskrit and 
Tibetan. The Sanskrit-based version which is translated by Crosby 
and Skilton as The Bodhicaryāvatāra is my primary reference. However, 
in some occasions, when the other version by Wallace and Wallace is 
used as it conveys less confusion, it will be noted otherwise. 
Dhp Dhammapada. Translated with annotations by Gil Fronsdal as The 
Dhammapada. 
DN Dhīgha Nikāya. Translated as The Long Discourses of the Buddha. 
MA Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra. Translated as Introduction to the Middle 
Way: Chandrakirti’s Madhayamakavatara. 
MN Majjhima Nikāya. Translated as The Middle Length Discourses of the 
Buddha. 
Mil Milindapañhā. Translated as Milinda’s Questions. 
ŚS Śāntideva, Śikṣā Samuccaya 
SN Saṃyutta Nikāya. Translated as The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. 
Vism Buddhaghoṣa, Visuddhimagga. Translated as The Path of Purification. 
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